269. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
47. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptels 2258,1 2265.2 Embassy has deferred action on informing AURI pending further instructions.
Embassy notes purpose of deferment is to give CINCPAC time to submit comments and recommendations. Presumably these recommendations foreshadowed in CINCPAC message to CHMILTAG 292008Z.3
CINCPAC reasoning again raises issue which Embassy had believed long since settled, i.e., whether Marshal Suryadarma’s pro-Communist [Page 520] proclivities, if any, or his complete unreliability as an anti-Communist force should be a major factor in determining the level or kinds of assistance to Indonesian Air Force. Although Embassy recognizes other political considerations involved in question of long-range bombers, for example, our views of Suryadarma should not mislead us as to the more basic reasons why aid to AURI can advance our interests here.
The question is not whether or not Indonesian Air Force will have trainers. We do not have power to withhold trainers but only to help prescribe where they must be obtained.
Therefore our decision is whether AURI is to obtain trainers from us with possible increase in pro-Western orientation or from bloc with increased hostility to West as result our efforts to confine aid purely to those items which we think best.
Even more important consideration, however, is need to counter Communist charges that US working with Nasution against President, other elements of GOI who desire neutral course. At this time when President Sukarno is in mood of deep distrust toward us it even more important than ever we avoid appearance of internal political meddling by favoring one or two services to exclusion of another. If Suryadarma gains stature because of this policy, Embassy regards such development as unfortunate by-product but not of sufficient importance to justify change in policy. Certainly Marshal Suryadarma’s prestige will rise just as high if he obtains his trainers from Soviet bloc as if he obtained them from us. It is true that Sukarno considers AURI military counter-weight to Nasution, but again, bloc trainers in Suryadarma’s hands likely to accentuate this capacity to a greater degree than if trainers, technical back-stopping come from US.
On other hand, so long as we can answer Sukarno by pointing out we are not discriminating between the various forces at his disposal, we reduce danger of Communist-backed Sukarno move against Nasution.
While it might be contended we should give Air Force something less useful to it than training aircraft, we cannot long hope to maintain any sort of relationship with AURI if we insist on right to determine what is good for it. In any case, almost any substitute items would add just as much to Suryadarma strength and prestige as would trainers.
Embassy extremely reluctant seek General Nasution’s views on this sensitive subject at this time. Although we are close to Nasution in many ways neither he nor we have ever put cards on table to extent of permitting him to have voice in determining kind of material furnished Air Force. This would presuppose understanding between us which had best remain unspoken for now. Further, even though Nasution as Minister of Defense theoretically controls Suryadarma, all concerned are perfectly [Page 521] aware this not in fact true relationship. Should Suryadarma or President Sukarno learn we had discussed question with Nasution, harm to US interests would be incalculable.
Therefore Embassy considers US should make own unaided judgment as to whether trainer planes of type and quantity desired would significantly add to capability of Air Force to resist Nasution and how much weight this consideration should be given.
Embassy for its part has great difficulty in understanding how training planes could possibly effect power balance should Nasution decide to move against Sukarno and AURI.
It would seem that arguments advanced against trainers would inveigh against any assistance at all.
MILTAG, ARMA concur this estimate. Although AIRA temporarily absent from Djakarta, Chargé believes foregoing reflects his views also.
Embassy will comment other aspects Deptel 2258 after final confirmation of instructions.
In that connection meanwhile, however, one effective means of helping meet CINCPAC objective would be fund trainers over and above amounts already programmed by MILTAG for Army and Navy.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 798.5622/7–660. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Also sent to CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 2258, June 28, a joint State–Defense message, authorized Jones to inform the Indonesian Air Force that, subject to the availability of funds in Fiscal Year 1961, the United States was prepared to consider its request to procure 50 T–34 aircraft, (Ibid., 798.5622/6–2860) See Supplement.↩
- Telegram 2265, June 29, reads as follows: “If you have not already done so, you should refrain from approaching AURI re T–34 trainers until further instructed. Delay designed afford CINCPAC further opportunity study matter and submit his comments and recommendations.” (Department of State, Central Files, 798.5622/6–2960)↩
- Not found.↩
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In telegram 57 to Djakarta, July 11, the Department of State indicated that it concurred completely with the Embassy’s reasoning as set forth in telegram 47 as well as its recommendation that U.S. officials should not consult with Nasution on the T–34 project. (Department of State, Central Files, 798.5622/7–660) See Supplement.
The Embassy re assessed the orientation of the Indonesian Air Force as no longer Communist-oriented in despatch 161, August 26, entitled “Current Political Trends in the Indonesian Air Force and Possible Relationship Thereto of U.S. Aid.” (Department of State, Central Files, 798.00/8–2660)
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