Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

267. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)⁰

Washington, June 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Possible move to inscribe Netherlands New Guinea item at 15th GA; meeting in your office, 3:00 Thursday, June 29, 1960

Discussion:

1. It is possible that Indonesia will request the inscription of the Netherlands New Guinea item in the agenda of the 15th General Assembly. Although there are no definite indications that the Indonesians have made a decision to this effect, growing internal political pressures, the increased voting strength of the anti-colonials in the GA, and the reinforcement of Dutch military units in Netherlands New Guinea could stimulate them to do so.

On April 21 Netherlands Ambassador Van Roijen informed me that The Hague would like the United States to consider instructing our Embassies in a few key Afro-Asian capitals to discourage discreetly the inscription of the New Guinea item.¹ On May 4, Netherlands Minister Schiff specified to a Department officer that the Dutch hope was that we would instruct some of our Embassies to respond in a negative vein if asked their views about the advisability of inscription and another UN debate on Netherlands New Guinea.²

From the United States viewpoint, inscription of the West New Guinea item would be undesirable for several reasons. Debate of this issue at the General Assembly would further exacerbate an already tense situation and further increase the disruptive influence of this issue. Moreover, if a resolution desired by the Indonesians should be adopted, the GOI might consider that even an implicit GA endorsement of its claim to West New Guinea afforded justification for vigorous action to oust the Dutch. Another likely unfavorable consequence is that the Dutch might abandon their efforts to prepare the Papuans for self-determination, and/or grant them independence precipitously and prematurely.

It appears to be in our interest, therefore, to do what we can in a reasonable and quiet way to discourage an Indonesian decision to seek inscription. We believe that this objective can best be served at least for the time being by instructing our Embassy in Djakarta very discreetly to discourage the Indonesians from raising the New Guinea question in the General Assembly again.

We are uncertain whether US approaches in key Afro-Asian capitals would materially affect the responses of these governments to any Indonesian initiative, and we prefer to defer such approaches at this time. Moreover, such approaches would entail added risks of misunderstanding by the Indonesians.

2. The meeting in your office was necessitated by the fact that agreement on the attached instruction could not be obtained at the bureau level. FE opposes the sending of such instructions, and is preparing its dissenting comments. This impasse is symptomatic of a fundamental cleavage of opinion within the Department with respect to the New Guinea issue. Inasmuch as this issue is again active and may be debated at the 15th General Assembly, it is imperative that a thorough re-evaluation of our policy towards the West New Guinea question be undertaken on an urgent basis. This might be done by S/P.

I believe it likely that a study will show that some of the basic premises on which our neutral policy on the West New Guinea issue was based have changed and that a complete review of our policy is therefore required. It is clear, for example, that in the expanded General Assembly, our previous position of neutrality can no longer insure that a resolution on New Guinea will not be passed. For example, a simple resolution recommending negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch would probably muster the necessary 2/3 majority. This, of course, would be taken as a defeat for the Dutch. Admittedly, a major handicap in determining the implications of GA action on West New Guinea is the complete lack of a long-range US policy decision on the ultimate disposition of that territory. This, in turn, means we cannot at present devise or execute tactics that will give us maximum maneuverability and influence.

Recommendations:³

1. That you approve the attached telegram to Djakarta, instructing the Embassy to discourage discreetly the idea of inscription of the West New Guinea item in the agenda of the 15th General Assembly.⁴

2. That you authorize me to inform the Netherlands Chargé of the action taken, on the understanding that this is for the confidential information of his Government only.⁵

3. That you instruct that a re-evaluation of our policy on the West New Guinea issue be undertaken on an urgent basis.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6–2960. Confidential. Drafted by William B. Buffum and Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. of UNP and cleared by EUR, NEA, and AF.
1. An April 21 memorandum of conversation is ibid., 320/4–2160. See Supplement.
2. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–460.
3. A note at this point on the source text reads: “See FE memo of dissent.” In a June 30 memorandum to Merchant, Steeves outlined FE’s position on Wilcox’s memorandum of June 29. (Ibid., SPA Files: Lot 64 D 469, Memoranda) See Supplement.
4. Sent as circular telegram 32 to Djakarta, July 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/7–760) See Supplement.
5. Wilcox did this on July 8. (Memorandum of conversation, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 756C.00/7–860) See Supplement.
6. A meeting on the West New Guinea problem was held on July 1 during which it was agreed that a re-evaluation of present policy on West New Guinea was urgently needed. Merchant summarized this meeting and asked S/P to undertake such a study in a July 2 memorandum to Gerard Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56C/7–260)