Office of the Historian

266. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, June 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Possibility of the President’s Visiting Indonesia1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands
  • Mr. J.L.R. Huydecoper, First Secretary, Dutch Embassy
  • M—Mr. Merchant
  • M—Mr. Long
  • WE—Mr. Chadbourn

After discussing various other matters,2 Mr. Merchant referred to the Ambassador’s démarche on May 26 concerning the possibility of the President’s visiting Indonesia. In the first place, Mr. Merchant said, the decision not to go to Indonesia, had been made prior to the Ambassador’s talk with Mr. Hare on May 26. Because of time limitations the President would not make any visits south of the Philippines.

[Page 515]

Mr. Merchant then referred to Mr. Hare’s statement to the Ambassador to the effect that the liberty of action of the President could not be bound, even hypothetically. Mr. Merchant said that had the Dutch come to us as a friend and asked us to consider their point of view, it would have been readily understandable. But we do not find it possible to accept a hypothetical condition being placed on the movements of the President to other countries with which we maintain friendly relations. Moreover, we found the Ambassador’s démarche, made under instructions, to be excessive in tone and not in keeping with the maintenance of good relations between our two countries. The use of phrases such as a reevaluation or reorientation of Dutch policy vis-à-vis the U.S. was most disturbing to us. The President’s reaction had been comparable and the effect of the Ambassador’s démarche had not been a happy one.

The Ambassador appeared to receive these remarks with equanimity and said that he had wanted to speak in all frankness in order that we be left with no doubt as to the violence of Dutch reaction should the President have decided to go to Indonesia. He was afraid that Dutch sentiments in this matter might be overlooked in the United States. He thought it was accurate to compare Dutch reaction to a Presidential visit to Sukarno in Indonesia to U.S. reaction should Prince Bernhard visit Cuba, thereby giving the impression that the Netherlands endorses Castro’s anti-U.S. actions. The Ambassador said that he had wanted to impress on us the seriousness of this matter to the Dutch. He said that his government had wanted us to know that the Dutch can not be taken for granted. In closing, he said that he would pass on to his government the Secretary’s and the President’s reactions as outlined to him by Mr. Merchant.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–260. Secret. Drafted by Chadbourn. Approved in M on June 9.↩
  2. In a memorandum to Secretary Herter, May 30, Assistant Secretary Kohler recommended that the Secretary call in the Netherlands Ambassador to review recent developments in U.S.-Dutch relations and to inform the Dutch that the tone of their recent démarche concerning the possibility of an Eisenhower visit to Indonesia was “inappropriate.” (Ibid., WE Files: Lot 63 D, 106, Indonesia) See Supplement. Herter was unable to see Van Roijen, because of SEATO obligations that week. He asked Merchant to talk with him along the lines of the Kohler memorandum of May 30. (Memorandum from John A. Calhoun of S/S to Merchant, May 30; Department of State, WE Files: Lot 63 D 106, Indonesia) See Supplement.↩
  3. Memorandum of conversation, June 2, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/6–260) See Supplement.↩

  4. At 7:10 p.m. that evening, Goodpaster called Herter. The Secretary said that the President had spoken to him about Dutch representation in connection with Indonesia, and that Mr. Merchant had seen the Dutch Ambassador and had “read the riot act to him.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) The following day, the President met with Herter and Merchant and discussed Merchant’s meeting with Van Roijen:

    “Mr. Herter then told the President that Mr. Merchant had ‘taken down’ the Dutch Ambassador quite severely. The Ambassador had taken it well although he had not liked it. The reported action of the Dutch government in threatening to reexamine their relations with the U.S. and NATO in the event the President visited Indonesia was done by the government (i.e., the Foreign Office) and not by the Dutch Cabinet. The President warmly approved Mr. Merchant’s action and said the Dutch government should know that the decision not to visit Indonesia was made some days before the Ambassador had given this word.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 3; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)

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