Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands⁰

Washington, May 29, 1960, 2:26 p.m.

1732. Your 1523¹ and 1524.² Request you see Luns soonest possible and tell him following which also being conveyed Dutch Embassy here May 29:

1. Current US intelligence does not indicate likelihood imminent Indonesian attack West New Guinea. Special May 24 estimate this subject³ prepared by US intelligence community concludes among other things “We believe that Indonesia will not attempt an armed attack against West New Guinea during the next six months at least.” The estimate does not exclude possibility minor armed clash incident to Doorman cruise, but now that inoffensive route for cruise has been established and publicized this possibility seems substantially reduced. Begin FYI. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report mentioned your 1524 received after preparation foregoing estimate but reviewed by intelligence areas Dept [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and deemed not to alter the estimate. End FYI.

2. In support our own intelligence estimate we have received recently and passed orally to Dutch through their Ambassador in Washington written Indonesian Govt assurances that Indonesian policy of not resorting to force in West New Guinea dispute remains valid and that Indonesia will not use military equipment obtained from US to attempt resolve dispute by force. We have no reason disbelieve these assurances especially in view of public reiteration basic Indonesian policy this matter May 13, in Havana by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio.

3. In light Indonesian assurances cited foregoing paragraph and recent helpful Dutch moves (publication inoffensive route of Doorman voyage, Dutch Information Service release which seems designed lessen tension and alleviate Indonesian anxiety) we believe there good reason hope for lessening of tension in situation rather than exacerbation of dispute by Indonesian military action. Draw as appropriate on Djakarta’s 3396 to Department,⁴ 145 The Hague, especially references to lessening public excitement this issue and fact Dutch announcements contributing this development.

4. You are also authorized to pass on to Luns on highly confidential basis approach made by high Indonesian army source to Embassy Djakarta reported in Djakarta’s 3373 to Department,⁵ 141 The Hague, 627 to CINCPAC; Djakarta’s 3374 to Department,⁶ 142 The Hague, 628 to CINCPAC; Djakarta’s 3397 to Department,⁷ 146 The Hague, being repeated CINCPAC. We consider this further evidence Indonesian desire moderate current suspicions. If a direct channel between Dutch and Indonesian army leaders could be established it might provide Dutch additional and direct assurances of Indonesian army intentions. Inform Luns that we will tell above-mentioned Indonesian army source that we have spoken to Dutch on this matter and that further initiative must come from Indonesians. We do not intend act as go-between in this matter, but would be willing pass message from Dutch back to Indonesian army source if Dutch so desire. We shall also tell Indonesian army source that for such contact to be fruitful, Indonesian army should be in position rationalize to Dutch reported moves such as alert in Eastern islands and leave cancellations.

5. For Djakarta: In view your tel 3396 and the maneuvers suggested above which involve your return to Sukendro, tend to agree with you that request for any further assurances at this juncture may be counter productive. You are authorized tell Sukendro of our approach to Luns para 4 above, emphasizing to him as we are to Dutch that beyond initial contact we wish to remove ourselves as go-between.

6. Notwithstanding our estimate of situation and doubtful reliability report of possible Indonesian attack, we understand Dutch concerns in matter and therefore we are further investigating report of Indonesian intentions which Luns has given us. We would hope that any moves of political or military nature which Dutch may feel obligated take in preparation for eventuality of possible Indonesian attack, would be discreet and not likely provoke further Indonesian reaction which would enhance possibility of incident through incautious move by one side or other. We strongly agree with Luns’ hope that Dutch will not find it necessary bring matter into Security Council.

Begin FYI. Department informed by Australian Embassy Washington that Australian Government approached by Dutch along lines Luns’ approach to you. Australian official reaction is that Dutch unduly alarmed since Australian intelligence like ours does not substantiate Dutch report of imminent Indonesian military action. Australians reason that Indonesian actions such as 24-hour alert consistent with publicly announced intention reinforce east Indonesia areas and need not reflect any aggressive intentions. Australians note further that similar Dutch alarm in early 1959 proved unfounded and that current Dutch alarm apparently arises from unspecified intelligence report. Australians believe Dutch approach may be effort exploit current SEATO conference⁸ by forcing discussion of West New Guinea dispute therein. In light foregoing analysis Australian Government believes “greatest pressure” on Indonesians requested by Dutch would be justified only on “much stronger evidence:” Therefore Australian Government has merely authorized its Ambassador Djakarta at his discretion to question GOI regarding military preparations in East Indonesia with view subtlety putting Indonesia on notice that their activities under scrutiny. Australians planning reply to Luns giving him their intelligent estimate but assuring him that Australian Government studying matter closely and urgently.

We informed that British also approached by Dutch along same lines and that British reaction similar to Australian. British have reportedly already passed their views to Dutch at London and The Hague. End FYI.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–2760. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Moore and Cameron and approved by White; Also sent to Djakarta and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. See footnote 4, Document 262.
2. Document 262.
3. Document 259.
4. Telegram 3396, May 29, informed the Department that the Embassy had no indication that any Indonesian attack on West Irian was either imminent or contemplated at any time in the future. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–2960)
5. Document 260.
6. See footnote 1, Document 260.
7. See footnote 2, Document 260.
8. The sixth meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers was scheduled for May 31–June 2 in Washington.