Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, May 25, 1960, 8 p.m.

3373. Department pass ACSI, CINCPAC for POLAD. Colonel Sukendro, political deputy to General Nasution, told Chargé May 25 he had “full mandate” from Nasution to attempt arrange through US Government “informal understanding” with Dutch concerning Karel Doorman cruise, reinforcement West Guinea.

Assertion of authority from General Nasution came in response to Charge’s direct question.

Proposal was made after Chargé had put hypothetical questions to Sukendro as to whether public statement by Dutch giving assurance of peaceful intent, minimizing quantity and quality of proposed reinforcements, and showing route from Indonesian territorial waters, would be helpful in dealing with internal political problem.

Sukendro, speaking with care through interpreter whom he had brought to meeting called at his initiative, replied that such statement would indeed help but at this juncture it would be better for Dutch to pass such assurances privately to Indonesian Army (he specified that it should not be transmitted to GOI through other channels). Army then could make use of information internally at proper time, would let Dutch know when public statement would be helpful and would let US know when assurances could be passed officially, to GOI by US. Much depended, Sukendro said, on way in which any public statement was made as well as on timing. If these considerations not fully understood, Dutch statement would be more harmful than helpful by giving Communists new leverage for reviving issue.

Sukendro said Communist plan had been to drum up issue until Sukarno returned, then hand it to him as ready-made means of uniting country, preventing “political confrontation” set for that time. “Now,” Sukendro said, “that has been cut off.” Asked how it had been cut off, Sukendro replied that during recent demonstrations 72 Communist leaders had been arrested. Remainder so discouraged they had at least temporarily abandoned efforts to stir up public. Whether they could break out with new campaign upon return of President, he could not say. He reasoned, however, that public statement by Dutch now would deprive Army of effective anti-Communist weapon which they would have if Dutch assurances given only to them and in private.

Chargé pointed out that he required to deal with GOI on official level on behalf of US Government; Sukendro was asking that US deal with Nasution directly as an intermediary with Dutch Government. Was there no one in Dutch Mission with whom Sukendro could talk about such arrangement? Sukendro replied that he would do so if it developed that it would be worth his while. He expressed doubt that much could be accomplished in such manner, said he would prefer US participation.

It was at this point Chargé asked for assurance that General Nasution had authorized such approach. Sukendro unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative, elaborating that authorization had been given in frame-work of anti-Communist political effort.¹

Chargé said US Government had great confidence in the integrity and ability of General Nasution. If he asked us to assist him, US undoubtedly would do its best to help. Chargé asked Sukendro to inform General Nasution that his request would be promptly transmitted to USGovernment for consideration; Chargé would let Sukendro know if reply received.

It appeared obvious to Chargé that Sukendro wants as much information as possible before President Sukarno returns. Letter from President previous day indicated he would try to be back by his birthday, June 6, but he was tired and wanted to rest few days in Tokyo, Sukendro said.²

Henderson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/5–2560. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to The Hague and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 3374, May 26, Henderson commented further on his meeting with Sukendro. (Ibid., 790.5856/5–2660) See Supplement.
2. In telegram 3397, May 29, the Embassy suggested that the contents of telegram 3373 gave the United States a “strong card to play in reassuring Luns re Indonesian intentions. Obviously if Nasution seeking ‘informal understanding’ with Dutch he would not likely at same time be planning attack on New Guinea.” The Embassy recommended that the Department pass this information to the Netherlands in strict confidence. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/5–2960)