Office of the Historian

261. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, May 26, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Dutch-Indonesian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Dutch Ambassador
  • Mr. E.L.C. Schiff, Minister, Dutch Embassy
  • G—Mr. Hare
  • WE—Mr. Chadbourn

After speaking about another subject, which is being reported separately,1 Mr. Hare referred to his conversation with the Ambassador on May 17 regarding the cruise of the Karel Doorman and other Dutch measures [Page 503] for the defense of West New Guinea (Deptel 1674 to The Hague).2 In accordance with the Ambassador’s request he had asked Acting Secretary Dillon to emphasize to Mr. Subandrio that the U.S. knows that the Dutch have absolutely no desire to create an incident or force a showdown over West New Guinea. Mr. Hare wanted the Ambassador to know that Mr. Dillon had stated that the Dutch had made it quite clear they had no aggressive intentions and that their actions were purely defensive (Deptel 2022 to Djakarta).3

After expressing his appreciation for this action, Ambassador Van Roijen said that his Embassy had just received the Dutch Government’s reaction to American plans to help build a naval facility at Ambon. While the Dutch could not say they were pleased with this development, it appeared to be an irrevocable step and there seemed to be little the Dutch could do about it other than accept it. The Ambassador went on to say that his Government hoped we would agree to pass on to the Dutch, on a confidential basis, any information we picked up at Ambon about Russian activities there as well as any information bearing on the security of West New Guinea. Mr. Hare agreed to this proposal and instructed Mr. Chadbourn to see that this was carried out.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.5698/5–2660. Secret. Drafted by Chadbourn.↩
  2. Van Roijen stated that he had received instructions from his government to tell the Department of State that it was concerned that Eisenhower might visit Indonesia as part of his projected Far East visit. If Eisenhower visited Indonesia, it would be interpreted “as a slap in the Dutch face.” The Netherlands would feel constrained to reexamine its policy towards the United States and the result might even be a reorientation of that policy. (Memorandum of conversation, May 26; ibid., 0711.11–EI/5–2660) See Supplement.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 255.↩
  4. Not printed.↩