255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands0

1640. Begin FYI. Secretary approved May 11 following courses of action in an attempt to moderate both Indonesian and Dutch actions in [Page 492] connection with forthcoming cruise of Karel Doorman to West New Guinea.1

1.
Advise Indonesian government that we are prepared discuss implications of Doorman cruise with Dutch and seek public restatement of Indonesia’s policy of no resort to force for resolution WNG dispute. Also we will express hope Indonesian government could take steps moderate official and public reaction this matter with view especially prevent recurrence acts such as vandalism at Dutch Embassy Djakarta.
2.
Call in Dutch Ambassador discuss military reinforcements WNG and Doorman cruise. We will inform Dutch of conversations with Indonesians outlined above emphasizing anxiety U.S. avoid possibility of incident. We would suggest that Dutch might place the matter in better perspective by issuing public statement (a) affirming Dutch government’s adherence to principle of peaceful settlement international disputes and maintenance Dutch obligations under the UN Charter, b) underlining the defensive nature and purpose of matériel being sent to WNG, and (c) emphasizing flag-showing nature Doorman cruise including proposed route vessel will follow.2
3.
Inform Dutch Ambassador that we would propose tell Indonesians of our discussions with Dutch after issuance Dutch public statement.
4.
Discuss substance our approach in advance with UK and Australian embassies here.3

Execution this policy planned as follows:

Embassy Djakarta being instructed approach GOI as outlined above. Parsons who will be with Sukarno party Puerto Rico weekend May 14–15 will seek opportunity make parallel approach Subandrio. Hare will see Ambassador Van Roijen p.m. May 17. Consultations UK and Australian embassies here as indicated, above.

At same time we discuss with Dutch Ambassador question of Doorman cruise and reinforcement West New Guinea defenses we will tell him of aid U.S. has decided to give Indonesian Navy with rehabilitation modest base facilities at Ambon. This matter unrelated to Dutch actions West New Guinea but timing of separate U.S. Govt, decisions on the two [Page 493] matters has been such that we believe best discuss both at one time with Dutch. For info all addressees. U.S. decision to help with Ambon base facilities taken in response to strong, specific request from Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff and with view facilitating U.S. surveillance Russian activity at Ambon oceanographic institute. This point will be made with Dutch in explaining our decision re Ambon. Only early U.S. action at Ambon will be engineering survey financed under FY–60 military assistance program for Indonesia. Our intention, which will be conveyed to GOI after we tell Dutch, is to follow through with construction of modest facilities in succeeding fiscal years subject of course to availability of funds and overall MAP programming requirements.

Dept will inform Australians and British as well as Dutch of our intentions re Ambon. End FYI.4

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/5–1460. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Robert M. Beaudry of WE, cleared with ISA and U/MSC, and approved by Ivan White. Also sent to Djakarta, CINCPAC, London, Paris for the Secretary, and Canberra.
  2. On May 11 Herter initialed his approval of this course of action and that in Document 254 on a memorandum from Kohler and Parsons recommending this action. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, Indonesia 1960)
  3. In telegram 1466 from The Hague, May 16, Ambassador Young outlined the reasons why he opposed this course of action. (Department of State, Central Files, 798.11/5–1660) See Supplement.
  4. In separate conversations on May 16 Mein informed representatives of the British and Australian Embassies of the U.S. response to the Karel Doorman trip. (Memoranda of conversations by Mein; Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/5–1660)
  5. In telegram 1674 to The Hague, May 19, the Department of State informed Young that after seriously considering his views, it decided to approach the Dutch as outlined above. The Department described in detail a meeting among Hare, Parsons, and Van Roijen on May 17 in which Hare made the démarche. (Ibid., 656.9813/5–1960) See Supplement.