Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, June 18, 1959, 5 p.m.

3776. DEPTAR for ACSI. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Deptel 1961.¹ Impasse produced in Constituent Assembly over GOI proposal return 1945 constitution differs only in sharpness of focus from fundamental impasse which has ripped Indonesian political life since independence. It boils down to fact that Moslem parties cannot govern Indonesia alone. No other parties or combination thereof can govern without support or at least acquiescence of Moslem parties.

Sukarno has regularly utilized this fact to help retain power in own hands, thus Indonesia traditionally has been able maintain effective government only through intervention Sukarno. Accordingly his absence now has brought Indonesian political leadership to almost complete road block, and there is no prospect stabilizing political situation until he returns.² Most serious consequence is lack of effective government to deal with deteriorating economic situation.

Whether or not this stalemate deliberately produced by army conniving with NU (and there is some evidence to suggest this) fact is that when confronted with opportunity to take strong measures in President’s absence, Nasution has failed to move either through reluctance disrupt democratic process or fear of internal army divisions, probably latter. It is all the more certain that any moves that Nasution may ultimately make will be in the name of Sukarno, not against him. Conversely Sukarno unlikely able establish political stability functioning government without, at this stage, full support of the army.

While in past Indonesia has been able to afford political upheavals which have temporarily paralyzed central government, as is the case now, there is serious question whether current [upheaval?] may not result in permanent far-reaching damage to nation unless strong corrective action taken immediately upon Sukarno’s return. This danger becoming acute now because of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation which may easily become extremely serious unless appropriate remedies applied soon. Yet there is no reason to believe that Sukarno will be any more impressed by this danger now than heretofore; and it would be unrealistic to assume that whatever measures he decides to take in the political field will be taken swiftly and decisively.

Although present economic crisis has not yet affected vast majority Indonesians who subsistence farmers on largely non-monetary economy, it is beginning ominous pinch in cities among laborers, white collar workers, armed forces, from which PKI hopes draw support its ultimate revolutionary goals. (Embtel 3775)³

Because of worsening economic picture fact Nasution apparently unable or unwilling act without Sukarno may mean it will be too late for him to take any kind of strong action with the President by the time Sukarno ready to proceed. This true not only because economic difficulties enhance prospects, but because of renewed importance party will have as supporter of President’s program where until Consembly crisis PKI was gradually being boxed in by being forced to choose between two unpalatable alternatives; support of 1945 constitution which could curtail its powers or open break with Sukarno which in end it feared more. It now may have opportunity to wiggle off hook, perhaps recover some of position previously lost.

Sukarno certainly will need political strength of PKI for whatever program he determines upon. Colonel Sukendro has informed Embassy he believes he has assurance of enough votes from Moslem parties to vote dissolution of Consembly, after which President would decree 1945 constitution in effect. Even if Sukendro’s expectation justified program remains based on support also of PKI, which has taken lead in demanding such course of action.

It has not been PKI but Moslem parties which have frustrated President’s plans, and his foremost objective upon return will undoubtedly be overcome Moslem opposition in some way, for which must have aid of PKI as well as PNI. Former will have a price, domestically and internationally, a price which Sukarno probably will not consider unduly high.

In these circumstances it would be wishful thinking to anticipate drastic action against Communists by army or GOI in near future unless PKI provides army with sufficient excuse by jumping traces in some way. Sukendro’s comments this regard (ARMA to DEPTAR CX–74)⁴ encouraging but no certainty he speaking for Nasution. Sukendro privately has long favored provoking clash with PKI.

Assuming that Sukarno still fears PKI threat his own position (I have no reason to doubt that he does) easiest apparent way out would be effect compromise between PNI, Moslem parties, which would bring about legal return 1945 constitution. Common antipathy toward communism then would enable Moslem parties, PNI, army, President work together against PKI. Unfortunately this easier said than done. Fact is religious controversy in part only convenient battleground for other less open but no less fundamental issues, such as support of, or opposition to Sukarno, regionalism versus centralism, Java versus outer islands, et cetera. Consequently, problem of lining up anti-Communist parties against PKI difficult one, and this doubtless primary reason PKI tactic supporting Sukarno and governmental issues.

In determining most effective courses action US must recognize Sukarno essential element political picture for foreseeable future; thus his acquiescence, preferably active support, needed for achievement any objective. If objective is reduction Communist power in Indonesia through GOI repressive action, means must first be found reduce Sukarno dependence on Communists internally, externally. Alternative might be to back strong rival leadership so as to neutralize importance Sukarno, but recent events strongly suggest this is out of question for present. It seems to me the army has shown its present inability to fulfill such a role, and there apparently is no available understudy of suitable talents.

Seemingly then we have only limited freedom of action in dealing with situation. We must be prepared to continue a policy of patient strengthening of anti-Communist elements in ways that may be open to us with a view to surrounding Sukarno with right sort of pressures; we must continue to attempt to convince President and associated leaders Indonesia can count on US friendship and support and that we are not attempting to dictate internal or external policies.

This is what we have been doing for nearly a year with some success. Fact that we may have to expect temporary setback resulting from present situation, with relative position of PKI enhanced, should not tempt us to embark on new, unorthodox methods for mere sake of change. Our cue now is to remain alert for developments capable of exploitation while recognizing that in so complex a situation, trends may not uninterruptedly flow in our favor.

In the long run we have good ground for optimism because of the political leadership, including Sukarno himself. The underlying antagonism of not only the Moslem but nationalist parties toward communism and all its works, the determination of army leadership to prevent a Communist take-over and our own capability to encourage and strengthen these elements are dependable assets.

Summing up, I am convinced that, considering all factors, our present policy of gradually increasing economic, military assistance, coupled with continuing efforts to build Indonesian confidence in West, exploit Indonesian fear of Communist expansionism/is all we should undertake for the time being. At same time we should not be deterred from doing that much by temporary deterioration of political, economic situation which likely occur next few months.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/6–1859. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and also sent to the Department of the Army and CINCPAC.
1. Telegram 1961, April 24, noted that the Department was following closely internal political developments in Indonesia as reported by the Embassy and the Army Attaché. “As and if situation begins to crystallize so that Embassy in position make more conclusive evaluation,” the telegram reads in part, “Dept would require on priority basis any recommendations Embassy might make as to optimum US courses of action in this situation. Important that such recommendations be submitted in time to permit complete and careful review by all concerned here prior to formulating any decision on possible US action.” (Ibid., 756D.00/4–2259)
2. Sukarno was scheduled to return to Indonesia from his worldwide tour on June 28.
3. Telegram 3775, June 18, reported on the deterioration of the Indonesian economy and emphasized the extent to which this trend was accentuated by the political crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/6–1859)
4. Not found.