Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)⁰

Washington, June 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Attached Paper on Indonesian Foreign Policy Reappraisal

The attached memorandum was prepared by Frank Underhill at my request at the time he left the Indonesian Desk. Due to illness, however, he was not able to complete it until recently. I think you will find it of considerable interest in view of his long experience in Indonesia and on the desk.

Attachment¹

INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY REAPPRAISAL

Despite chronic internal political crises, continuing Cabinet changes, and eight Foreign Ministers in as many years, Indonesian foreign policy has been remarkably constant. Since independence, the Indonesian people and their governments have accepted as the foundation of their foreign policy a principle and a cause—non-involvement in either major power bloc and pursuit of Indonesia’s claim to West New Guinea. Further there can be no doubt that Indonesia will in the future continue to press its irredentist claim and continue to pay lip service to an “active and independent” foreign policy. There is increasing evidence, however, that Indonesian leaders are beginning to question the adequacy of a policy dominated completely by the essentially negative concept of non-involvement and the obsessive quarrel with the Dutch over West Irian, and to weigh the relevance of this policy to the problems which their country must face in the Far East in the coming decades. The insistent question which has prompted this reappraisal seems clearly to be, “What and who is to stand between us and a militant and expansionist China?”

Without attempting to make a comprehensive list, the more obvious indications in recent months of this reappraisal have been:

1. Indonesia’s relatively mild official position on the Taiwan crisis.

2. Statements of the Indonesian Foreign Minister to our Ambassador expressing concern over Communist China as an eventual threat to Indonesia. While to some degree self-serving, these statements echo others made by former Foreign Ministers, especially Sunario to Ambassador Cumming.

3. Subandrio’s trip to Australia.

4. Actions against the Chinese. While Indonesian Government repressive measures have been directed against Chinese associated with the KMT, our Embassy has pointed out that these actions have been part of a general movement against all Chinese. The Indonesian military, and to a lesser degree the civil leaders, have long shown concern over the potential fifth column danger of Indonesia’s relatively small, but strategically placed, Chinese minority.

The reasons for this gradual focusing of attention on Communist China as an Indonesian security problem are equally evident. A steady stream of Indonesians have returned from China impressed by the militant dynamism of the CPR. A series of events over the past three or four years: Dien Bien Phu, the Singapore riots, the Sino-Burmese border dispute, have had presumably a gradual cumulative effect. (This appraisal was written prior to the Tibet incident which undoubtedly has intensified considerably Indonesian doubts about the peaceful intentions of Communist China.) Perhaps most important of all is the probable influence of Indonesian military thinking. General Simatupang as far back as 1954 pointed out in his book “Pioneer in War, Pioneer in Peace” that Burma’s security problem today will be Indonesia’s tomorrow. Nasution in 1955 wrote that in terms of national self-defense Indonesia’s cherished active and independent foreign policy was an unrealistic and potentially dangerous shibboleth, and implied clearly that China was the only significant external threat to Indonesia’s national security. Indonesian military leaders have expressed privately these sentiments to American officials in even more explicit terms from 1951 to the present, and while again a desire to please American ears may have played some part, the statements were made with evident sincerity.

The Indonesian military is today exercising considerable influence in the political and economic sectors, and it seems logical to anticipate that Indonesia’s foreign policy will also show, sooner or later, the influence of strongly held military views in this field.

Projecting this trend into the future, what is the probable direction of Indonesian foreign policy during the coming months and years?

We should anticipate, first, Indonesian efforts to strengthen its position with the major Pacific powers. The coming years should witness especially the development of much closer ties between Indonesia and Japan. Both countries have much to gain from such an association, economically as well as politically. World War II animosities and residual fears of repeated Japanese expansion to the south may delay this trend, but Japan and Indonesia are natural trading partners, and as the two major countries on China’s eastern and southern periphery, they have a strong political interest in creating a counterforce to a strong China.

Similar factors should also bring about closer Australian-Indonesian relations. Despite the irritant of the New Guinea question, Australia has made a major effort through the Colombo Plan to assist in the establishment of a stable democratic Indonesia. These close Southeast Asian neighbors are faced by the same underlying military and strategic problem, and with the maturation of Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook, even the New Guinea problem may come finally into proper prespective. Australia’s security depends more, in the last analysis, on good relations with a democratic Indonesia than on Western control of West New Guinea. Indonesia, for its part, cannot afford an unfriendly southern neighbor.

For the present and foreseeable future, however, the only answer to Indonesia’s question “What stands between us and China” is of course the United States. Indonesia has many reasons for maintaining good relations with the United States, but none more important than this one. An Indonesian diplomat once observed privately that he had read that it was initially the British fleet in the 19th Century that had made the Monroe Doctrine possible, and that it was the American fleet today that permitted Indonesia to have an “independent” foreign policy. We should therefore see increasing evidence of Indonesian desires to strengthen its relations with the United States.

The question arises of the influence of this trend on Indonesia’s attitude towards SEATO. Paradoxically, the existence of SEATO may well have impeded the development of such a trend since SEATO has in Indonesian eyes a predominantly Western character, and, because of the membership of France and Great Britain, certain colonialist overtones. It appears logical to expect, therefore, continued Indonesian criticism of SEATO while Indonesia at the same time is working towards the same objective of a deterrent to Communist China.

It is clearly in the U.S. interest to follow closely any further signs of this foreign policy reappraisal, and to encourage discreetly such a trend. It is important, however, that we do not attempt to force Indonesia against its will into the broader aspects of the Asian anti-Communist movement. Any rapprochement between Indonesia and the Republic of China is highly unlikely, and close relations between Indonesia and the Republic of Korea are equally improbable. As noted above, Indonesia will continue to remain aloof from SEATO. We should also not expect Indonesia to take a forthright stand against international communism. The appeal of the active and independent foreign policy will remain strong, and Indonesia’s policy reorientation, in its first phase at least, will be directed more against China as such rather than against communism.

If the foregoing analysis is valid, and this trend should develop, it would mark a welcomed maturing of Indonesia’s international outlook and contribute materially to the attainment of free world objectives in the Far East.

U.S.-Indonesian Relations

Indonesian Attitudes towards the U.S.

Through the years since independence there has been generally convincing evidence that Indonesian policy towards the U.S. has been founded on a substantial basis of admiration, trust, respect, and considerable popular good will. The Indonesians know that the U.S. has no design on their territory and no desire to dominate Indonesia politically. They admire not only our material progress, but also our cultural life and educational system, and even some of our most vocal critics among them aspire to an American education for their children. They may differ strongly on certain aspects of our foreign policy, but they generally give us credit for honest motives.

Despite this significant area of understanding and sympathy, however, there are certain elements in the Indonesian image of the United States which hamper the growth of closer relations, and make it difficult for them to look wholeheartedly towards us for leadership. Indonesians find little if anything worth preserving in their pre-independence past. It represents to them domination, exploitation, and individual humiliation, and they continue even after independence in strong emotional rebellion against it. Further, the economic condition of the masses of the Indonesian people today does nothing to recommend the old economic order. The Indonesian, next to national independence, cherishes most the idea of industrial progress and economic development, and he is prepared to sacrifice much to achieve these goals. The United States, however, has come to be regarded as the principal defender of the status quo, insufficiently aware of and not entirely in sympathy with Indonesia’s desire to break away from the past as sharply and as quickly as possible. They see us as a nation clinging to a moribund economic order and unwilling to take a clear and unequivocal stand on colonialism, and while grateful for our past, present, and future economic aid, they tend to see it motivated more by a desire to defend and preserve the old political and economic order than to help usher in the new. Repudiation of the past and a bright dream for the future account for much of the appeal of communism in Indonesia, but even those Indonesians who reject the Communists’ claim that they are the wave of the future have not been able to find in our actions and statements any alternative which to them provides sufficiently bold and dynamic ideas and programs with which to attack the economic and social problems facing them. (This theme emerges frequently in Foreign Minister Subandrio’s American Association speech early this year.)

There are certain aspects of U.S. life which adversely affect U.S.-Indonesian relations and which are not susceptible to rapid or easy change. Our race problem is perhaps the most notable in this category. The above noted image of the United States as a static, anti-progressive force, however, has been allowed to develop despite the facts in the case, and can be remedied not by more money for Indonesia, but by an effort to place our present aid to Indonesia and other underdeveloped countries in a different framework and context. It is difficult to define precisely the nature of this new context, but it should have the same elements of idealism, humanitarianism, boldness, and dynamism which existed in the original Marshall Plan, in Point Four, and—in the domestic sphere—in the New Deal. The irony of the situation is that we are and have been for some time embarked on such a program in Indonesia, but have not been able to present it in the philosophical and ideological framework which would bring the maximum return.

U.S. Policy towards Indonesia

Since 1952 U.S. policy towards Indonesia has been strongly influenced by our increasing concern over the growth in strength of the Indonesian Communist Party. Prior to 1955 non-Communist Indonesians, apprised of this concern, were prone to pooh-pooh the danger and brush our warnings aside as American anti-Communist emotionalism. However national elections in that year and Javanese provincial elections in 1957 proved to them all too clearly that our fears were well grounded. Despite this clear evidence of a progressively greater Communist threat, there appeared to be, however, no person or organization prepared to take forthright counter action, and we began to cast about with an increasing sense of urgency for some individual or movement that would assume this task. When those we had identified as anti-Communist—Hatta, the Sultan of Djokjakarta, Police Commissioner Sukanto—also refused to act, our feeling of desperation increased, and when the Young colonels in December of 1956 repudiated the central government’s authority we transferred to them our sympathy and hopes as the saviors of Indonesia.

In the cold light of hindsight there were several basic errors in our appraisal of the situation. We underestimated the strength of anti-Communist forces on Java that remained loyal to the central government, especially the army, and we overestimated both the military and political capabilities of the colonels to succeed in their challenge of central authority. If in February 1958, at the time of the PRRI ultimatum to the central government, an estimate had been required of the situation in Indonesia in February 1959 based on the premise of a quick and complete military defeat of the rebels, we could have predicted little less than an Indonesia hostile to the West and under more or less complete Communist domination. Instead we have a situation which while grave in many aspects is far better than anything we would have any right to expect if the best intelligence estimates of 1957 had been entirely valid. Finally, we overestimated the strength of anti-communism as a primary motivating and unifying factor among the various groups in armed opposition to the central government. The DI on Java and Celebes and the Atjehnese in North Sumatra were and are unquestionably anti-Communist. However, regional interests, personal rivalries, and religious differences proved to have greater strength than anti-Communist sentiment, and neither military support nor other diversionary activities were forthcoming during the PRRI’s weeks of dire need. It is noteworthy that the Sulawesi wing of the PRRI did not begin its air attacks until after the fall of Padang, and that representatives of the Sulawesi leaders were in Washington early in 1958 expressing distrust of the Sumatran leaders and seeking to establish direct ties with the United States before the Sumatrans were able to do so.

From these developments certain general conclusions can be drawn:

1. Anti-communism is not in Indonesia, even among those strongly and sincerely professing such views, a primary and overriding motivating force. Rarely if ever are contemplated actions measured in the first instance in terms of the service or disservice they will do to the Communist cause, internally or externally. Nationalism, expressed either as loyalty to the nation or a region, religious ties, political party affiliations, and personal and family hostilities and friendships all clearly play a more important role.

2. We have been perhaps too inclined to view Indonesian public personalities as either heroes or villains, and to endow automatically those of known anti-Communist views with intelligence, maturity, political sagacity, and the other personal and political virtues. When these figures have disappointed us for one reason or another we tend to consign them to oblivion and look about for new champions. Our policy towards Indonesia has thus acquired on occasions a widely fluctuating character, appearing to swing from one extreme to another.

3. U.S. efforts to persuade Indonesia to check communism will be more successful if we give less emphasis on the direct frontal attack and attempt to turn the force of the stronger motivating forces cited above against the PKI. Nationalism is perhaps the strongest of these forces, and Communist strength in Indonesia will suffer most when Indonesians come to believe that communism is anti-Indonesia. There is evidence that this sentiment may already be developing and it is clearly in our interest to encourage its growth. We have been perhaps too much inclined to regard nationalism as a force working against Free World interests, and to ignore its potential as a weapon against Soviet-bloc interests.

0. Source: Department of State, SPA Files: Lot 62 D 409, General. Confidential. Also sent to Parsons and Marshall Green. All recipients initialed the memorandum indicating they had read the attached paper. Green wrote: “Well worth reading. Right to the point.” Parsons wrote: “This is a fine paper—let’s keep it handy. 7/12/59”
1. Drafted by Underhill on June 11.