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  4. Document 167

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State 0

Djakarta, December 4, 1958, 9 a.m.

1819. Department pass DEPTAR for ACSI. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Department telegram 873.1 We believe moment has arrived when we must discuss with Indonesian armed forces more fully and frankly than has heretofore been possible our long range intentions re military assistance. If we do not do so, we may find ourselves providing [Page 311] considerable assistance piecemeal without accomplishing our political objectives. This would be as unsatisfactory to Indonesians as to ourselves.

I believe we should tell chiefs of armed services that so long as there is no reversal in present favorable political trend in Indonesia US intends furnish such quantities and types of arms for all three services as it is able, consistent with other assistance commitments, requirements of our own military services, and limitation that only self-defense and internal security requirements are to be met.

So far as Indonesian Army now knows we have translated offer of additional military assistance into commitment provide 12 Bailey bridges. While army is glad to have Bailey bridges, it will have difficulty absorbing that quantity all at once. However, it could immediately use large number additional rifles. Army’s immediate needs change from time to time, and long gap between first request and actual delivery may produce other such incongruities if we approach problem on item by item basis.

Recently General Nasution and his deputies have informed MILTAG army headquarters now giving low priority to proposed equipment in augmentation program. They emphasize immediate need for small arms, transportation and communications.

Natural resolution for such difficulty would be for Indonesian Army to plan its requirements year or so ahead so US could make determinations well in advance as to items it is willing or able to provide. This not now possible since army has no assurances US will be providing it with any form of assistance year, or even month, from now. In any event it could make no plans without knowing what US had available and might be willing to supply. So far US aid has been what the US has decided is best for Indonesia have. Indonesian armed services do not believe they can make adequate long range plans on that basis, especially since they have no clear idea of what US thinks they should have in future. It is inevitable that unless they can see a little farther into future re our intentions, the services, particularly air force, will be tempted to deal increasingly with Soviet bloc as a more satisfactory alternative.

We realize our present program is to proceed only as rapidly as we receive signs that Indonesians are responding as we desire. While I believe this has been valid approach, it can become self-defeating because it prevents adequate planning and produces a situation in which improvement of relations can only proceed by fits and starts.

There is much evidence that General Nasution taking on greatly increased share responsibility for management Indonesian affairs, and it not beyond realm of possibility this trend will continue to point where his influence will be decisive on all questions. Therefore it is vital to our [Page 312] interest that we reinforce, especially at this time, his confidence in US willingness to see him through.

We need a definite plan as to approximate value and categories of weapons US prepared supply Indonesia annually for period of years, subject to favorable political developments. This plan should realistically take into account needs of services and fact that items we cannot supply may be obtained elsewhere.

While it may take some time to develop such a plan, there are certain steps we can take now to make it clear that we are prepared to go farther in future.

Specifically I recommend:

1.
That we inform armed services they should regard items cited paragraph 1 reference telegram as token of our willingness to assist and not our idea of meeting their most pressing requirements.
2.
That we inform Indonesians we prepared discuss long-range program, subject to availability of funds, which will strike balance between their requirements and our capabilities, military and political.
3.
That we substitute small arms, particularly M–1 Garands to equip and standardize complete infantry units, for Bailey bridges as item for immediate delivery to army.
4.
That we provide additional supplies and services requested by Marshal Suryadarma (MILTAG to CINCPAC 022330Z)2 in connection with helicopters.

Above comments relate primarily to paragraph 1 reference telegram and in particular to emphasis in discussing with Indonesians content subparagraph (C) reference telegram regarding future military aid.

In addition it would help greatly if I could inform Indonesians of removal restriction on issuance export licenses for aircraft pursuant paragraph 2 reference telegram.3

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/12–458. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague and CINCPAC.↩
  2. Document 163.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. Telegram 1095 to Djakarta, December 12, a joint State-Defense message, responded to Jones’ request for a long-range military aid program. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5622/12–1258) See Supplement.↩