Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, November 20, 1958, 3 p.m.

1697. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Sukarno at 10 o’clock this morning, he having postponed appointment tentatively scheduled for eighteenth because he was not feeling well. President had three-hour examination by doctors yesterday and he has been ordered to take complete rest. He therefore will leave for 10 days in Bali end of this week returning December 4.

President opened conversation by asking me whether I had recovered from rigors of trip to East Indonesia. I laughed and said I had after two or three good nights sleep. I complimented him on his amazing energy and stamina and said he certainly had not acted like a man who needed medical attention. He admitted stimulation of trip helped not hurt him. He had planned trip to Kalimantan on twenty-seventh of this month to dedicate new airport but he had reluctantly cancelled this on insistence of his doctors. He asked my impressions of trip. I replied that aside from obvious beauty of Moluccas and attractiveness of gay, music-loving people I had received two distinct impressions:

(1) That people of Moluccas were genuine Indonesians and that they thought of themselves as Indos first and Moluccans second. This was significant since when I had been in Indonesia before I had heard much of separatist movement in Moluccas and anti-Javanese sentiment there. I said I presumed considerable anti-Javanese sentiment still exists (at this point President nodded agreement) but that it was evident from people with whom I had talked entirely aside from staged demonstrations that Moluccan people had become in spirit a part of a united Indonesia.

(2) That President himself served as a symbol of this unity and that regardless of anti-Javanese feelings in eastern Indonesia these sentiments did not apply to President for whom obvious genuine affection had been manifested on all sides. I said that some observers in the party inclined at first to be skeptical were convinced by genuiness of his reception. President was right in what he had said on trip, I commented, and quoted his own words back to him “It is easy to arrange a meeting but one cannot prearrange a smile.”

President while apparently gratified at my comments seemed to be waiting for me to say something else which I intentionally avoided saying, that is comment on West New Guinea aspect of trip. President, however, did not raise point but instead turned to subject of another trip he had planned as soon as various official visits such as that of President Tito, et cetera were out of way. This would be trip to northern Sulawesi, he said, and indicated he would include me in invitation.

President then referred to his conversation with Mister Baird last night (Embtel 1695),¹ reviewed what he had told him and then inquired whether I had seen press reports re no credit for Lockheed Electras, Surabaya Power and Kalimantan Dredges. If so what did I think about them.

I replied that I had seen press reports, that I had queried Washington as to their significance which I said I failed to understand in view of good news which I had come to impart. I then informed President in accordance with authorization Deptel 925² that the US was prepared to consider a program of increased economic assistance to Indonesia on project basis, using the various US lending agencies—DLF, EXIM Bank and PL 480. US Government, I said, was presently in process of reviewing all pending GOI applications and GOI would be informed as [soon as] we are prepared to proceed. President expressed gratification at this news and re-emphasized his concern re Lockheed Electras. It would be very embarrassing if after all this time this request were turned down. Need for these planes was very great but much more important at this point was question of pride. I responded that I had had no official word which would lead me to believe that this request had been rejected and I counseled patience, pointing out that newspaper reports are often misleading.

I then informed President US Government had also approved program of additional military assistance, including items for army, navy and air force. In order not to raise his hopes too high felt it desirable to mention some of specifications contained in Deptel 191,³ emphasizing however that this constituted advance notice and did not represent final decision. I pointed out as Sukarno aware presidential determination was required for this assistance and in this connection I stressed importance of no publicity at this time, pointing out obvious embarrassment to President Eisenhower in event news broke before he had had opportunity to act. I also noted current meeting of NATO parliamentary group in Paris and observed that I was sure he would agree that it would not be in the interest of either of our governments for this to become an issue [at] that meeting.

President readily assented. He went on to say that he hoped the US Government would not be like the British—that we would not feel it necessary to seek Dutch approval in advance for anything we did for Indonesia. I assured him that as he by now must be aware US policy toward Indonesia stood on its own feet. President then expressed gratification at this news. He also obviously appreciated my coming to him first (although for Department’s information this was result of chance not of planning since I had asked for appointments with PriMin and Sukarno simultaneously). Sukarno then said “please keep this aid coming—gradually but quickly.” He then repeated this phrase “gradually but quickly.” “It is important for it to come quickly.”⁴

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/11–2058. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague, Paris, Canberra, and CINCPAC.
1. Document 165.
2. Telegram 925, November 17, reads: “You are authorized inform Sukarno and Djuanda along lines final para your 1664 emphasizing our desire that there be no publicity. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/11–1758) In telegram 1664 from Djakarta, November 17, Jones requested that the Department authorize him to tell Sukarno and Djuanda of the general nature of the planned assistance programs. (Ibid.)
3. Reference is most likely to telegram 911 to Djakarta, November 14, which authorized the Embassy on a service-to-service basis to inform Nasution as well as the Indonesian Navy and Air Chiefs of the proposed augmentation in the U.S. military assistance program, including mention of potential specific items. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/11–1458) See Supplement.
4. In telegram 1704 from Djakarta, November 20, Jones reported that he passed on to Djuanda the same information that he had given Sukarno regarding the additional U.S. military and economic assistance programs. The Prime Minister was “very appreciative” and “said he was gratified at this indication of improving US-Indo relations.” (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/11–2058) See Supplement.