158. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)0
Dear Mr. Dillon: The decision taken on 1 August 1958 to implement the token military aid programs for Indonesia was based, among other things, upon an estimate that: (1) The Indonesian Army is the only non-Communist force in Indonesia with the capability of obstructing the progress of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) toward domination of the country, and (2) given some encouragement in the form of [Page 293] U.S. aid, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff Nasution will carry out his plans for the control of Communism. Therefore, the bulk of the equipment programmed is intended for the Indonesian Army, but will be paralleled by some assistance to the other Services.
The first shipments under this token program commenced arriving in Djakarta on 15 August. There is evidence through official channels that the reaction in Indonesian political and military circles was very favorable. An initial momentum has thus been gained, and it is important that this momentum be maintained.
It is recognized that there are risks and uncertainties ahead in pursuing our current policy. Indeed, by its magnitude the comparison to the massive economic and military aid Indonesia has already received from Bloc countries, the token military aid program could hardly be expected to produce more than that which has already been accomplished—plus an opportunity for personal association between U.S. and Indonesian military personnel. However, it is the view of the Department of Defense that the token military aid program, by creating a momentum in Indonesia favorable to the United States, is accomplishing the purpose for which it was designed. What is important now is to maintain this momentum with further actions designed to convince General Nasution and the anti-Communist Indonesian politicians that the United States can be depended upon for continued support in return for further moves on their part to curb the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
The Department of Defense recognizes the sensitivity of the Netherlands to military assistance to Indonesia, and the staunch support of the United States by the Dutch both in NATO and the United Nations. Yet continued delay in our Indonesia program because of Dutch objections may readily result in the deterioration of our position in Indonesia and the ascendancy of the Communist Bloc.
Under other circumstances the Department of Defense would recommend the establishment of a MAAG organization in Indonesia. However, in view of the difficulties discussed above concerning the impact of this program on our relations with the Netherlands, as well as the desire of the Indonesian Government to keep the program on an informal basis, the continuation of military assistance to Indonesia should be at the present time by means other than a formal program. Such arrangements should not preclude the eventual establishment of a MAAG.
It is suggested that appropriate arrangements be made for conducting a continuing program of military assistance for Indonesia informally, although on an unclassified basis. Delivery of U.S. equipment [Page 294] could then continue to be supervised by qualified U.S. military personnel, but their operations should be conducted with minimum publicity.
In light of the above considerations, the Department of Defense recommends:
- a)
- Prompt completion of the initial token military aid program in its entirety.
- b)
- Approval of the augmented program forwarded to the State Department by the Department of Defense in memoranda dated 23 and 31 July 1958,1 to include necessary funding and authority to implement the programs as soon as possible.
- c)
- Early determination of a permanent Military Assistance Program on a continuing basis for Indonesia with minimum detriment to our relations with the Netherlands.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/10–1558. Secret. A draft of this letter was prepared by Rear Admiral W.S. Post, Jr., USN, Regional Director, Far East Region, ISA, and forwarded to Irwin for his approval on September 24. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Records: FRC 62 A 1698, 091.3 Indonesia) The letter was based on a September 22 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 092 Asia (6–25–48)) See Supplement.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 139.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩