Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, September 8, 1958, 10 a.m.

882. CINCPAC also for POLAD. I fully support recommendations which General Vittrup is making to CINCPAC for types and quantity of additional material for Indo armed forces under military aid agreement. (ALUSNA Djakarta to CINCPAC 060445Z).¹

It is of the utmost importance that we maintain the momentum of the program if we are to sustain and expand Nasution’s confidence in US and improving atmosphere between Indo Government and US.

Nasution and other Indo leaders having been in their view responsive to US moves, any indication on our part that we are going to dole out military assistance in such a way as to obtain concrete pay-off for each new parcel would nip in the bud the developing Indo belief that they can in fact count on US for continued and meaningful support. Only when that confidence has come to full flower will top Indo leaders feel safe in burning their bridges behind them by outright repudiation of PKI support.

As matter of fact Nasution already has burned some of his bridges and would be extremely vulnerable should it turn out that his confidence in US had been misplaced. PKI strength would be greatly increased, probably to the point where Sukarno would be forced to go all the way with them in order to maintain his position.

I feel sure Sukarno, Djuanda, Nasution feel that their response to aid agreement so far has been all that could be expected in light of their uncertainty as to how far we were willing to go.

Likely we will have to rely to some extent on intangibles for evidence that arms aid is paying off, such as President’s public identification with program through publicizing Globemaster flight, Foreign Minister’s American Association speech² and private assurances from President and government of desire to establish closer relations and resist domination by Communists.

Nevertheless, there has been definite progress of a more measurable sort, such as limitations on propaganda activities and demonstrations by PKI, assumption of control by army over veterans organization, the apparent though as yet unannounced decision to postpone elections as means of averting Communist takeover, and goverment’s position on foreign investment.

Lifting of the ban on Time Magazine, indefinite delay of Pope trial, prohibition of strikes and lockouts of oil company workers, assumption by army of control of national front, all are positive developments in our favor. We can expect more such actions if the momentum of our arms aid program is not lost.

Of course I am constantly aware of the political problems with our Dutch and Australian allies which are inherent in our present policy in Indonesia. It is necessary to keep equally in the forefront that we do not nor does anyone, have capability of preventing Indonesia from building up her military forces to whatever size Indonesians feel appropriate. The only question is whether this is to be done with our aid, and with those restraints that we may be able to impose in our role as grantor, or with the aid of the Soviet bloc which encourages Indonesia to defy both the Netherlands and Australia on the West Irian question.

This applies with equal force to question of offensive and defensive weapons. Of course it is not possible to draw a meaningful line between offensive and defensive equipment in military field and in my opinion we should not attempt to do so. (The Hague 417 to Department September 4.)³ However, should we deny adequate equipment to Indonesian Army, Navy or Air Force, which has internal security and self defense responsibilities to 85,000,000 scattered through a chain of more than 3,000 islands, we will have accomplished nothing for our allies, we will have irreparably damaged our own interests, and we will have opened door wide for a permanent Soviet foothold in this part of the world.

I hope the Department will press forward as swiftly as possible in implementing General Vittrup’s well-considered program.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/9–958. Secret; Priority. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and CINCPAC.
1. Not found.
2. Reference is to Subandrio’s speech before the American Association luncheon in Djakarta, during which he spoke of a “fresh wind” that was infusing Indonesian-American relations. The Embassy summarized the speech in telegram 853 from Djakarta, September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/9–458) See Supplement.
3. In telegram 417, September 5, Young reported on a conversation with Luns in which the Netherlands Foreign Minister complained strongly about a proposed U.S. statement to the NAC on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia. Luns stated that it was a watering down of previous statements, would start a chain reaction of commercial arms sales to Indonesia by other NAC members, and did not make a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 765D.56/9–458) The Netherlands Chargé, Baron van Voorst, also protested the proposed statement to U.S. officials in Washington. (Memorandum of conversation, September 5; ibid., 765D.56/9–558) See Supplement.