147. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0

661. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Ambassador. Deptel 357.1 I share Department’s disappointment that military aid agreement failed to effect material change in Soekarno’s well-known public attitudes.

Of even more moment, however, is that according to Department’s 357 US policy now seems predicated on lines which I had not heretofore understood. I refer specifically to statement that “if highest authority in Indonesia instead should effectively align himself with enemies of US and free world, basis of our support is destroyed”.

I am sure Department will agree that President is no more aligned with enemies of free world and US than he was before the speech. Yet we reached a decision to give aid to Indonesian Armed Forces in belief that they would thereby be enabled to take effective action against internal Communist subversion which may otherwise capture control of Indonesia by Parliamentary or other means.

To conclude now that, because of one piece of July 4 oratory received by the Indonesian people as one more playing of a broken record, [we] must change our policy of assisting anti-Communist and potentially anti-Soekarno elements, would be in [my] view extreme folly.

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Of course I will see Djuanda and President and report disappointment which my government feels that he should have attacked everything we stand for. As explained Embtel 660,2 it would be difficult to raise point regarding “assurances” since I do not understand GOI has given assurances beyond those in exchange of notes. Meanwhile I feel that our thinking here and that of the Department should be brought closer together than appears to be case from reference telegram.

As I see it, our military aid has been predicated on the proposition of first things first. The immediate threat is not Soekarno’s leftish bent, third force ambitions or flirtations with both sides at once, but the PKI which may even now be strong enough to capture Indonesia with or without the President. There is today only one effective force in opposition—the Indonesian Army. We have understood it to be our purpose first of all to strengthen that force and to rally all anti-Communist elements around it. If this succeeds, the external relationships of Indonesia will most certainly move in the direction of our international objectives. If this fails we will have lost Indonesia. In view of these stakes, we can hardly be diverted by Soekarno demagoguery, although I realize that his utterances justifiably create resentment in the US and the free world.

In considering the case of Soekarno it is necessary to remember that we are dealing with a man who is convinced that the US gave active help to the rebellion against his government. He also believes this support was directed against himself. Further, he undoubtedly suspects that the military aid program is intended as support for Nasution against himself, an argument constantly dinned into his ears by the PKI.

At no point have I understood that the objective of our aid was to win over Soekarno, although I had been led to hope that his remarks on Independence Day would be softened, and apparently were softened, by the aid agreement. Although we have not written off entirely the idea that Soekarno might be changed by arraying sufficient internal anti-Communist power against him, if this occurs it will be a welcome by-product by [of] our immediate objective—to prevent a Communist take-over of Indonesia.

I would appreciate Department’s comments.

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/8–2058. Secret; Niact. Repeated to The Hague and CINCPAC.
  2. Document 146.
  3. Telegram 660, August 20, reported Jones’ conversation with Djuanda on August 17 about the U.S. position on the use of American military equipment and services in an effort to gain control of West New Guinea. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/8–2058) See Supplement.