Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, August 20, 1958, 7:24 p.m.

373. Ambassador from Robertson. Your 661.¹ From your experience in Department I am sure you will recall that policy we are now following in Indonesia is subject to divided counsel and you can well imagine that serious doubts exist as to its wisdom. Many sectors of U.S. public opinion do not make distinction between support for Nasution, Army and other non-Communists and support for Sukarno. These sectors of opinion also sympathize readily with dissidents who are patently anti-Communist and therefore less readily understands how it is that our present policy is anti-Communist. There is confusion as to why we seem not to support anti-Communist dissidents but rather President, who castigates us and who permitted Indonesia to slide into present precarious situation (remember New York Times editorial, August 6).

It is not only public, however, which is skeptical. I have been on notice for some days to meet with Senators Knowland² and Bridges to explain and justify why we are backing this horse.³ Moreover, you know about debates not only within Executive branch but within Department which have occupied us right down to present. There has been no unaniminity of conviction on our present policy at any time.

Given this situation, Sukarno undermines our policy every time he confirms and fortifies views of those who hold he is playing both sides and making suckers of us. If it is true that what we and our press say about Sukarno and Indonesia can cause reactions there and threaten basis for our cooperation, reverse is also true. If Sukarno wants to destroy our current policy one of the best means surely is for him to make more speeches along August 17 line. Basis of policy is fragile although we hope with time its wisdom as only possible course which would strengthen anti-commie centers of power, principally army, will become evident. I of course agree Sukarno is no more aligned with our enemies after than he was before speech; point is he unfortunately appears no less aligned than before.

Similarly it is dangerous for continuance of our current policy for Vittrup to raise hopes of broader and more extensive cooperation with and aid to Indonesian armed forces than we now have authority for or any prospects of getting, particularly if Sukarno continues to beat his unhelpful drums. It is natural for him to be zealous but he must be kept within limits of authority granted.

We are sending you other messages on this and also question of assurances received about use our token packet of arms. I would like to conclude this one by saying I do not think there is any difference between you and me in our understanding of what our policy is predicated on and I appreciate your continued skillful handling of a very difficult situation. I also welcomed your strong caution against changing our policy merely because of another Sukarno broadside but to be defended successfully it must give signs of paying off in reasonable time.⁴

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/8–2058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Parsons and approved by Robertson. Also sent to CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD.
1. Document 147.
2. William F. Knowland (R.–California), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
3. On August 20, Senator Styles Bridges (R.–New Hampshire), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a statement in the Senate criticizing the U.S. Government’s decision to sell arms to Indonesia as “shocking.” The Department transmitted a summary of his remarks to the Embassy in telegram 380 to Djakarta, August 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/8–2158) See Supplement.

4. In telegram 687 from Djakarta, August 22, Jones informed Robertson in part as follows: “Deeply appreciate your comment reference telegram. I understand situation fully. At same time your reassurance most helpful.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/8–2258)

   Jones met with Djuanda on August 22 and expressed to him the U.S. Government’s disappointment with Sukarno’s speech of August 17. (Telegram 688 from Djakarta, August 22; ibid., 756D.11/8–2258) See Supplement. On August 23 the Ambassador met with Subandrio “and conveyed Department’s reaction to Sukarno’s August 17 speech emphasizing especially our deep concern with respect to his attacks on the West, and making same point as in previous conversation with Djuanda (Embtel 688).” (Telegram 708 from Djakarta, August 23; Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/8–2358) See Supplement.