Office of the Historian

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0

Djakarta, May 16, 1958, 7 p.m.

4254. Department pass AFCIN–1A1, ACSI, CNO. Department pass CINCPAC. CINCPAC also for POLAD. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Jones. In addition to seeking solution to basic problems considered in Embtel 4234,1 I believe we can make substantial progress if we do certain things now within present framework.

I believe we can progressively accelerate number and effectiveness of GOI anti-Commie moves by adopting a policy of encouraging each anti-Commie move they make. Example: Forceful anti-Commie step was taken by army at our request to cancel large “anti-interventionist rally” scheduled today. Rally was cancelled yesterday despite fact that almost all political parties had agreed to participate and after notices were sent to employers ordering them to allow employees to leave their jobs to attend. Cancellation was not easy for army and demonstrated their power versus politicians.

I think we should follow up by letting GOI know that we not only appreciate army action but desire to show our approval in concrete form. (A) We should provide political support by statement by Secretary recommended my telegram 4234; (B) military support could include Department Defense invitation Indo military mission proceed US soonest accordance Embtel 4154;2 (C) economic support could be Sumatra highway construction project, diesel electric project outlined in ICATO 10923 of May 2, and the Jap yen loan (TOICA 1198).4 These three are mainly outer island projects which have no military significance and can be delayed later in case we cared to drag our feet. Meantime, approval along above lines would give me a valuable psychological weapon.

By above “carrot” technique we can focus attention, particularly of army, on what we are most interested in—anti-Commie action. If they are rewarded after they make an effective move, it will not smack of “quid pro quo” or “test rings” which are psychologically distasteful to Indos, but will illustrate to them what is the key that unlocks American policy. [Page 182] I fully understand our policy to date of denying any kind of support to GOI in order to build up pressure for change of government. At same time I think it is now necessary for us to unbend a little as suggested in this telegram. I do not recommend opening dam wide because this would relieve pressure we still need, but opening crack on above basis will definitely help at this particular moment.

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. Document 99.↩
  3. Document 89.↩
  4. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Files: FRC 59 A 2458)↩
  5. Not printed. (Ibid.)↩