89. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
4154. Department pass to CNO, ACSI, DWI and AFCIN. Rear Admiral Frost sends. Following my call and talk with General Nasution 9 May, which followed same lines as his earlier talk with Ambassador Jones (Embtel 4116),1 Nasution sent Lt. Colonel Sukendro to me to discuss some items Nasution did not have time to cover during my visit.
First Nasution wanted to tell me he planned to bring about changes in Cabinet to replace leftist-oriented members. Second, Nasution was deeply concerned about economic situation result recent bombings of shipping by rebels. Third, that rebel bombings had completely upset his timing for taking action against Communists because he could not, and would not, make any such move until rebel problem was solved. Effects of bombings had greatly disturbed him and had forced him to consider economic factor which he could not now control because of dependence of Indonesia upon outside shipping and other trade relationships. At same time, he wished me to know Communists were becoming more active in exploiting economic situation. He did not give details, his only comment being that I would understand how Communists would go about using this new tool which had been put in their hands.
During this 2-hour discussion, Sukendro again questioned sincerity of US motives. I did not emphasize Communism or anti-Communism but developed what we in US consider to be aspiration of new republic. These items included an independent Indonesia, in no way controlled by international Communism or any other influence, the vital requirement for maintaining the principles of the constitution of the Republic; economic control of country by Indonesians and finally necessity for tying together many divisive forces through their maritime communications; their navy and their political representation from all regional areas.
Sukendro stated General wished to ask me to convey message frankly to CNO and many other government level officials with whom he knows I have contact. “What can US do, what support can I expect from US?” he asked. It was apparent that General Nasution has serious doubts about US because of alleged support of rebels. Colonel Sukendro said General Nasution cannot understand why US would support such persons as Warouw who in 1948 during Communist uprising at Madiun [Page 158] was on “red side”. My only response was again to ask him to explain to me and to representatives here specific facts relating to those individuals on rebel side who were pursuing their own self-interests as opposed to those of country, or who sought to be “war lords” in various areas. This took some time as Sukendro was talking to me for first time without an interpreter. I told him I would again review background of all rebel leaders which has been fully reported by Embassy.
In summary, General desired to advise me that we were rapidly coming to “climax” in US-Indonesian relations and in current situation here and that he could not, and would not, hazard his chances of success without knowing how he was to control PKI activities and solve developing economic crisis. Everything hinged on whether or not US would support him. To accomplish his objectives, bring about political changes in Cabinet and move against PKI, he must know unequivocally and soon what US Government intends to do.
Comments: While there are many factors in this complex situation, I believe Nasution is only person who has strength to change trend of Soviet influence. As indication his cooperativeness, he made immediate arrangements (through Sukarno and FonOff) for Subijakto to receive me this morning after latter had declined all invitations both for himself and for navy and having stated he was too busy to see me.
Atmosphere my call on Subijakto was barely cordial and about only item he discussed was to play old record of Indonesia’s requirement for control of West Irian before anything else can be done. He thought Admiral Stump’s invitation to the Baguio Conference for 18 May was interesting but it came at time when he was too busy. There is no doubt that loss of their Corvette cuts him very deeply and he would seek to attribute this loss to alleged participation of US in rebel cause.
I must acknowledge that my visit here would have been a complete failure without assistance of General Nasution who has, I believe, gone further in disclosing his real position than at any time in past. I can see no other internal element in Indonesia through which we may promote best interests of Indonesia than Indonesian Army. Ambassador Jones comments follow and I am deeply grateful to him and to his staff for their determined and ever helpful assistance while in Djakarta.
Ambassador’s comments: I am deeply appreciative of Admiral Frost visit which has been more helpful. It was not only a real personal pleasure to have him here. Admiral Frost himself has made real contribution in terms of personal relations and developing confidence of General Nasution and other important military figures that US genuinely exploring ways and means of helping Indonesian situation. His visit also has tended to allay suspicion US Navy directly involved in aid to rebels. He has accomplished much in short visit.
[Page 159]As clear from above message, Admiral Frost has independently reached conclusion already reached by me that General Nasution and army represent majority in unlocking door to solution Indonesian problem. Interesting observation made by Admiral Frost on way to airport was strong impression of complete lack indication any Indonesians desire to get rid of President Sukarno. Control of him within democratic framework, not elimination, has been attitude throughout conversations. Admiral Frost departed with feeling Sukarno was still symbol of independence and should be regarded by US as fact of life in this situation.
Also on way to airport, Admiral Frost pithily remarked he was convinced “Nasution is reason we are still in ball game.” Admiral’s final observation was that as Yankee visitor in Djakarta, he felt a little like a Russian must feel visiting Washington.
In our discussions prior departure, we both shared great sense of urgency in moving off dead center and giving Nasution some positive tangible evidence of our willingness to back him.
During visit, Indonesian Army also indicated preparedness send mission to Washington or anywhere else to discuss implementation of my approach to Djuanda and Nasution and set forth frankly position of army in current difficult situation. Acceptance of this suggestion might be way of moving ahead promptly on arms for army without immediate commitment or necessity for shipment until resolution conflict. However, should this suggestion be adopted, we must recognize we have crossed Rubicon because such mission could not return empty-handed. To avoid PKI exploitation, fact of mission should be held confidential, Nasution stressed.
In conversation with Admiral via Lt. Colonel Sukendro, Nasution also emphasized vital importance keeping his plans secret. Admiral was not only first foreigner but first one out of family with whom we had shared his program. Even cabinet had not been taken completely into his confidence.
If any of this got back to Indonesians via US channels, this could be fatal to mutual objectives.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1058. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.↩
- Document 86.↩