Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Washington, November 21, 1958—6 p.m.

594. Reference: [1½ lines of source text not declassified]; Embtel 551; Deptel 381, sent Saigon 720.²

A. Fact Nhu’s thinking now somewhat more realistic removes immediate danger attempted coup by GVN. However, Nhu only assured Ambassador Durbrow that GVN is not considering forceful coup. From what Nhu has said it must be assumed GVN will continue maneuvers in Cambodia aimed at weakening Sihanouk’s position as head RKG. On past record of GVN maneuvers here and given Nhu’s misunderstanding situation, these actions will probably be clumsy and thus dangerous. Even if not clumsy, such maneuvers on part GVN, which closely identified in RKG mind with US, would not be consonant with friendly assurances which Sihanouk received in US. Nhu has made it clear that GVN would like to get Sihanouk out of power and that only reason it is not at present considering forceful coup is that it does not seem feasible. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

In last four days press polemics between GVN and RKG have been resumed. Since Cambodian material is in answer charges in VN press, it appears campaign was resumed at VN initiative. There is strong chance this will get worse and end present détente.

I believe pursuant OCB paper on Cambodia US interests require it be made very clear to GVN that it is our policy to encourage closer association and cooperation between free nations SEA (see also inter alia OCB file no 41 of May 25, 1955 sent under CA–9235 of June 25, 1955)³ and that we take serious view attempt interfere in internal affairs RKG.

Following line might be used:

We would like inform GVN of our position on GVN–RKG relations as explained by Secretary Robertson to Sihanouk (Deptel 267)⁴ viz., we urge both countries seek settlement through peaceful negotiations and we support principles renunciation force and peaceful settlement disputes set forth UN Charter. In doing this we are making our position clear both countries.

Furthermore, we understand that since Secretary Robertson spoke to Sihanouk along above lines, GVN has considered various means whereby Sihanouk might be replaced. In this connection we believe any such moves by GVN would promptly come to attention RKG and result in dangerous deterioration GVN–RKG relations. The US would be opposed to any attempt by GVN to interfere in internal affairs RKG, just as US would oppose outside interference in internal affairs GVN.

GVN should also be reminded that it has an implied commitment to the US to seek a financial settlement with Cambodia brought about by its reservation of 200 million piasters last year for a payment on its obligation to Cambodia; a sum which would otherwise have been devoted to the defense budget. Embassy understands that US agreed to increase its aid by this amount to enable GVN to make a payment on its obligation to RKG.

B. As to Nhu’s statement to Ambassador Durbrow that Sihanouk wishes to step down due his inability handle RKG’s problems, I have no indication that Sihanouk is perturbed. He seems confident. He is planning state visit Indonesia February and plans receive Admiral Felt for official visit after he returns from Indonesia. It is always possible Sihanouk will resign, but unlikely he will do so from sense his own inability handle Cambodia’s problems.

There is no doubt GVN agents can find diverse dissatisfied element in Cambodia. This is normal. Son Ngoc Thanh can hardly be considered a likely leader these disorganized groups. He is widely respected for his fight for Cambodian independence, but, since independence now attained, and in view his steady refusal cooperate with RKG or even live in Cambodia (although he has been offered safe return), he is considered increasingly disgruntled man who has abandoned principles and only seeks return to power by any means. He has no organized following.

In general I continue believe that despite Sihanouk’s faults his removal from Cambodian scene would cause serious instability and provide increased opportunities for Communists. Monireth is high principled, autocratic and his little practical experience in government. I am dubious about his ability provide effective leadership in Cambodia where politics characterized by compromise and corruption and where leader must be able create strong feelings personal sympathy among people. French Ambassador Gorce agrees with me that he poses no threat at all to Sihanouk’s position at present. From GVN point of view Monireth likely to be more nationalistic and uncompromising on various problems dividing the two countries than Sihanouk.

C. Embassy appreciates Department’s efforts second and third paragraphs Embtel 381, and requests Department’s reactions above suggestions.

Separate telegrams follow re other points raised Deptel 381.⁵

Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/11–2158. Secret; Limited Distribution; Noforn Continued Control; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Documents 86 and 87.
3. Not found.
4. See footnote 2, Document 84.
5. In telegram 612 from Phnom Penh, November 26, the Embassy reported that Cambodia and South Vietnam had reached an agreement on the disputed border marker and that there was also progress on other Cambodian-South Vietnamese issues. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/11–2658)