Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 1, 1958¹

Washington, December 1, 1958

SUBJECT

• Withdrawal of Cambodian Ambassador in Bangkok

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Nong Kimny, Cambodian Ambassador
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
• J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary
• Eric Kocher, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
• Thomas J. Corcoran, Officer in Charge, Laos Affairs

Ambassador Nong Kimny called at our invitation to discuss with Mr. Robertson the suspension of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand. He took the occasion to hand Mr. Robertson, under cover of a note dated December 1, a copy of a Cambodian government communiqué on the withdrawal of the Cambodian Ambassador in Bangkok.²

Nong Kimny briefly reviewed Thai/Cambodian relations during the last few years with particular stress on the question of the Temple Preah Vihear which he said the Thai had occupied improperly. He referred to Prince Sihanouk’s recent visit to Bangkok, to the subsequent breakdown in negotiations on the Preah Vihear question and to the demonstrations against the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok last September. He also cited harassment of the Cambodian frontier police by the Thai police and stated that three days after the recall of the Cambodian Ambassador in Bangkok, the Thai started building up huge concentrations of troops and war matériel at the frontier. It was for this latter reason he had called at the Department on November 29³ to inform us that these steps taken by the Thai constituted a threat to peace in that part of the world. All of these developments, he said, led to the Cambodian decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Thailand.

The Cambodian government hoped that the United States as a genuine and sincere friend of both Cambodia and Thailand would do all it could to help preserve peace. The Ambassador’s most recent instructions from his government were to tell the Department that if there were a country that was threatened, that country could not be Thailand. Thailand was a mighty military power by comparison with Cambodia. The Cambodian Government and people hoped that all allies of Thailand, particularly the United States, would never let Thailand invade Cambodia. Mr. Robertson said he hoped he need not emphasize to Nong Kimny the well-known opposition of the US to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It was inconceivable to us that armed conflict should take place between Thailand and Cambodia in this instance. Our position of opposition to the use of force was the same throughout the world in disputes involving North and South Korea, North and South Viet-Nam, East and West Germany, India and Pakistan, Portugal and India and the Netherlands and Indonesia, for example. Resort to war to settle all these disputes would represent a breakdown of world order. In October President Chiang pledged to the world that he would not use force in the settlement of his differences with the Chinese Communists. If war should come in that quarter it would be because the Communists wanted it and had refused to renounce it. Mr. Robertson said he had cited all these instances to emphasize that we have taken the position with such strong allies as Presidents Rhee and Chiang that we will not use our arms or provide logistic support for offensive military action. It is a fundamental principle of our policy to persuade all nations to renounce the use of force in the settlement of international problems.

Mr. Robertson asked Nong Kimny if the Cambodians thought that a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations with Thailand offered a better chance of solving differences between the two countries than continuance of the relations. Nong Kimny replied that after the breakdown of negotiations on Preah Vihear the Cambodians had repeatedly stated particularly in informal contacts with Prince Wan in New York that they were ready to resume negotiations whenever the Thai so desired. The suspension of relations with Thailand was a regrettable measure but it was the only means by which a weak country such as Cambodia could protest the abuse heaped upon it by a more powerful country. This was not a hasty decision by Prince Sihanouk. It had been pondered for a long time. Perhaps it could be understood only in the context of the centuries of mistrust that had existed between Thailand and Cambodia.

Mr. Robertson remarked that the Ambassador was correct in saying that the US was a friend of both Thailand and Cambodia. We desired to be helpful and would exert whatever influence we had with both countries towards a settlement of their differences and the re-establishment of good relations between them.⁴ We would be glad to help in any way we could in the finding of a solution in accordance with principles of the United Nations Charter. Any other course of action would be unthinkable to us. Nong Kimny said he personally was glad to see that the Cambodian government always thought first of turning to the United States which had so helped Cambodia in the past. Cambodia was not asking the US to exert pressure on any other country but had confidence in American principles and it was sure that the US could help to settle this problem. Mr. Robertson thanked the Ambassador for the communiqué he had presented and said that we should read it and communicate with the Ambassador again.

As Ambassador Nong Kimny was leaving the building he remarked in conversation with Mr. Kocher that he did not see why the Neighborly Relations resolution inspired by the Czechs in the UN should involve Cambodia and Thailand but that he had no instructions from his government on this subject.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.51H92/12–158. Confidential. Drafted by Corcoran and approved by Kocher and Parsons.
2. The substantive text of the communiqué was transmitted in telegram 1311 from Bangkok, November 25. (Ibid., 651H.92/11–2558) Cumming sent Dulles a memorandum on November 25 summarizing the recent deterioration of Thai-Cambodian relations. (Ibid., 601.51H92/11–2558; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Reported in a memorandum of conversation, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.51H92/11–2958)
4. At Department instructions, the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Phnom Penh offered to transmit messages between Cambodia and Thailand in an effort to help expedite their resolution of differences. This offer was accepted by both countries. While some reduction in tensions could be traced to negotiations through the respective American Ambassadors, Thai-Cambodian discussions reached an impasse by December 20. At this point the Department concluded that the mission of Baron Beck-Friis on behalf of U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, which both Thailand and Cambodia had requested, afforded the best prospect for the resolution of the Thai-Cambodian problems. (Telegram 428 to Phnom Penh, also sent to Bangkok as 1183, December 4; and telegram 476 to Phnom Penh, also sent to Bangkok as 1310, December 20; ibid., 651H.92/12–458 and 651H.92/12–2058, respectively)