87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia1
381. Mau2 met with Robertson November 17 and 18. Cambodia, Laos and aid to Vietnam discussed. Separate cable sent on Laos portion talk.3 Memorandum conversation on aid questions4 will be pouched.
Mau stated Sihanouk’s policies harmful to free world, he cannot be induced alter them and therefore should not continue be supported. Mau expressed awareness our view that no prospect exists for replacing Sihanouk, but said Vietnamese intelligence indicates internal opposition to Sihanouk growing. Mau referred to replacement of Sihanouk [Page 259] by Nong Kimny as Prime Minister in 1956 at time when Sihanouk having military aid troubles, and said this brought about reorientation of Cambodian policy toward free world.
Robertson immediately pointed out we do not use our aid to exert political pressure on any country. We had nothing to do with replacement Sihanouk by Nong Kimny in 1956. Bulk our assistance to Cambodia used for support of army which is strongest anti-Communist force in Cambodia. ChiComs have offered military aid to Cambodia and would be immediately prepared fill vacuum if we withdrew our support from Cambodian army. Thus on balance we believe it in free world interest that we continue aid Cambodia. Robertson also noted Sihanouk had declined ChiCom military aid, and had refused further ChiCom economic assistance beyond that already accepted.
Mau said Phnom Penh is ChiCom headquarters for Southeast Asia and ChiCom Embassy has staff of 200. Request information available Phnom Penh re numbers and activities ChiComs in Embassy with any reactions in community to their presence.
Robertson raised question Vietnamese-Cambodian border marker dispute. Mau reviewed history this matter. He said according Cambodian King’s letter purpose proposed RKG two-man mission to Saigon would be replacement border marker, but that Son Sann told him in Seattle mission would also want negotiate release Vietnamese prisoners in Cambodia. Mau said GVN had replied to King that, since frontier not agreed upon, local authorities of two countries should first collect facts on the spot about boundary before higher level meeting between two governments took place. King was also told GVN would be willing receive Cambodian mission for discussion other matters RKG might wish raise.
We told Mau we thought proposed Cambodian mission to Saigon could serve useful purpose of agreeing on procedures for collection of facts about frontier. Despite our repeated suggestions along this line Mau remained firm in view that GVN had taken proper course. Referring to increased tension which followed failure Cambodian-Thai negotiations in August, he expressed apprehension similar result would ensue from Vietnamese-Cambodian talks if not adequately prepared beforehand. FYI. Though some ground exists for this feeling we inclined to believe no real desire for settlement this problem by either side except on its own terms. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/11–1958. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall, cleared by Kocher and Jenkins, and approved by Robertson. Also sent to Saigon and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Vu Van Mau, Vietnamese Foreign Minister.↩
- Not found.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. i, p. 100.↩