Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI
88. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)1
Dear Hugh: I enclose two copies of a memorandum of a conversation I had with Brother Nhu concerning Sihanouk and the situation in Cambodia. [2 line of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]
Howard Elting and I have no intention of going into this business any further with Nhu but since the latter deliberately brought up the subject I thought we should hear him out and report the results through this channel. Nhu is obviously trying to stimulate our interest with a view to enlisting our cooperation or at least our acquiescence in possible future moves against Sihanouk.
With best regards,
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure
Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) and Presidential Adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu, Saigon, November 13, 19583
SUBJECT
- Cambodian Situation
During the course of a two-hour luncheon today, Ngo dinh Nhu, the President’s brother, volunteered the following information regarding current developments in Cambodia. The following are the pertinent parts of that conversation.
According to Nhu, many diverse elements in Cambodia are perturbed about the economic and political situation as well as the question of the growing corruption. These heterogeneous elements for different reasons desire to see Sihanouk replaced by someone other than one of Sihanouk’s stooges. There is no question of a coup d’etat per se, since there are no forces of a cohesive enough nature to carry out a successful coup. Nevertheless, there is enough dissatisfaction [Page 261] with the actual situation to cause Sihanouk some concern about his own position. However, since he does not see how he can solve the existing social, economic, and political problems or quell the latent discontent over corruption, Sihanouk is toying with the idea of stepping down in favor of Prince Monireth. Since Sihanouk fears that if he puts another one of his stooges in as Prime Minister he will only make matters worse, he believes he can take the wind out of the sails of the heterogeneous opposition by making Monireth Prime Minister. According to Nhu, Monireth is well known for being a super-nationalist, an anti-Communist, and a very honest man who is against corruption. Therefore, he is the only person in the country who will satisfy the various disgruntled groups which are separately worried about current developments.
According to Nhu, Sihanouk’s popularity is based in considerable part on the fact that the Communist cadres throughout the country work continuously to bolster his popularity since he is playing a pro-Communist game. Moreover, Nhu believes that despite outward appearances the Queen is worried because she has lost her influence with Sihanouk. Nhu claims that although the Queen has not let it be known except to intimates, she was not consulted regarding recognition of the Chicoms. She is worried by this fact and about the future of the royal family following that recognition. The Queen also is apprehensive about the heterogeneous opposition and feels that it would be best for her and Sihanouk if someone else took over temporarily. For this reason she also is thinking of making her brother, Prince Monireth, the next Prime Minister. Thus, according to Nhu, there are many elements working toward a legal change of government headed by Monireth.
The reason Sihanouk and the Queen are thinking along these lines is that they believe this would be a very cunning move which would put the onus of solving their difficult problems on Monireth. The assumption of the Premiership by Monireth will also act as a safety valve for the various opposition elements. Furthermore, Monireth who is not very clever and has an honest one-track mind, will immediately initiate action against Communism and corruption, and to try to straighten out the economic situation. This will antagonize all the elements favorable to Sihanouk, particularly the Communists. His action will unite these elements, which include Sihanouk’s hand-picked deputies, and bring about the fall of Monireth’s government in due course. When this takes place, the present opposition elements will have exposed themselves, proven their inability to run the government, and the people will again clamor to have Sihanouk resume power. This phase, according to Nhu, will develop purely from internal pressures, and should not and could not be aided and abetted by any outside power, particularly Viet-Nam or even Thailand.
[Page 262]Phase two of this change in government should give an opportunity for Viet-Nam, Thailand, the United States, and other Western countries to so influence Monireth that he will not play the game of Sihanouk, the Queen, and the Communists. If Monireth plays his cards well, he will in due course be able to change the orientation of Cambodian policy so that instead of moving further and further to the Left, it will become more favorable to the free world. For instance, once Monireth takes over as Premier, he should be advised not to make any anti-Communist statements, nor to denounce corruption and not to make any startling statements about the need to revamp the economy. On the contrary, he should firmly announce Cambodia will follow the same policies as in the past and live up to its commitments with all countries. In this way the plans of Sihanouk and the others will be frustrated and the comparatively small opposition groups who now favor Monireth would gain in effectiveness and be able to retain him in power. In the meantime, according to Nhu, Monireth, who is well liked and respected by most of the army, should quietly work to get the army and police force more solidly behind him. He should also quietly work on the few anti-Communist province chiefs to win them over. If he is successful in this endeavor, other province chiefs who are now either bought or controlled by the Communists will disengage themselves from this affiliation and look favorably upon Monireth. Once Monireth has gained sufficient backing from these elements, he would then be in a position to carry out the anti-Communist and anti-corruption policies he desires to put into effect and take steps to better the economic situation of the country.
Nhu believes that the growing tendency in the Near East, Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand for the military to take over control from selfish politicians will come to the fore in Cambodia to assure Monireth’s retention of power, provided he plays his cards carefully. Nhu admitted that if this second phase is successful, Monireth would be more of a super-nationalist than Sihanouk and would make excessive demands on Viet-Nam, Thailand, and possibly even Laos. Nevertheless, Monireth is definitely anti-Communist, incorrupt, and pro-Western, particularly pro-French. In order to bring about a more pro-Western policy in Cambodia, Viet-Nam would be willing to put up with these super-nationalistic claims of Monireth. This problem could be handled amicably in due course, once the basic Cambodian policy has been changed. Nhu stated that since Monireth, a graduate of St. Cyr, is pro-French, the French would not be against his taking and retaining power. Even if he should fail to stay in power, the French would not have antagonized Sihanouk since all they would have done would have been to “go along with his desire to step down from power in favor of Monireth.”
[Page 263]After describing this situation, Nhu explained that Bao Dai, the French and General Hinh, Binh Xuyen, Communists, and other intriguers in 1954 believed that if they put Ngo dinh Diem in power, he, too, would hang himself by taking too precipitate action and thus eliminate himself as a political power in the country. According to Nhu, Diem and his entourage realized this and frustrated the plans of these intriguers by playing their cards carefully and slowly. Nhu said, for instance, instead of attacking the Binh Xuyen head-on, Diem maneuvered them into withdrawing from Saigon. They withdrew into what the French considered an impregnable area from which it would have been very costly in men and ammunition to drive them out. Again, instead of doing as the French expected, Diem did not attack but merely saw to it that all food supplies were cut off from the Binh Xuyen and eventually they were so weakened that they could be defeated at slight cost.
I interrupted Nhu repeatedly during the conversation to raise questions and particularly pointed out that such a plan is complicated to say the least and that I questioned seriously whether it would be successful. Nhu admitted that this is true but stated that the situation had become so serious that if Monireth should become Prime Minister, it is in the interests of Viet-Nam, the United States, and other free countries to do all they can to keep him in power.
When Nhu first brought up this subject, I told him that Mr. Elting had reported to me about a conversation he had had with Nhu along similar lines a few days ago and that in the meantime we had been thinking about the matter quite seriously. I added that, while there may be certain anti-Sihanouk elements in Cambodia, we had no information indicating that they are strong, cohesive, or effective in any way. I added, on the contrary Sihanouk seemed to be more popular than ever after his visits to China, the U.S., and the U.N. and therefore any efforts made to unseat him by coup d’etat or otherwise would probably be unsuccessful and would only enhance his prestige. It might even drive him further into the arms of the Chinese Communists. It was at this point that Nhu stated much of Sihanouk’s surface popularity is due to Communist activities which are backing him to the hilt. I stated that while I was aware that Monireth was at one time a fairly popular military figure, he has been in retirement for a long time and therefore, as far as we are aware, he has no popular appeal. Nhu reiterated he does have considerable popularity with large sections of the armed forces and if he could win over the armored brigade in Phnom Penh, which is quite possible, his chances of remaining in power would be greatly enhanced. I then said that we had heard reports that Dap Chhuon was somewhat dissatisfied with developments in Cambodia and asked whether he would favor Monireth. Nhu replied that although Dap Chhuon is not too pleased with current [Page 264] developments, he is too tied to the regime to be trusted to take effective action unless he were to become convinced that things were going well for whoever might replace Sihanouk. Nhu then brought in the name of Son Ngoc Thanh, who is anti-Sihanouk but who is a republican and therefore probably would be against Prince Monireth. I asked Nhu how the Deputies and other persons like Penn Nouth, Sam Sary, and others would react to Monireth’s retaining power. He did not go into details in answer to this question nor give any indications that Sam Sary might be involved in Monireth’s plan. He confined his remarks to saying once Monireth had the backing of the army and certain other political elements in the country, these persons would fall in line or be neutralized. Before going on to another subject, I again emphasized to Nhu that we had been giving very serious consideration to the situation and developments in Cambodia and that we had no indication whatsoever that any such plan would succeed and made it clear it would not have U.S. backing. I added our information indicated that not only was Sihanouk very popular but he has the full backing of the Queen and most other effective elements in the country. Nhu replied that when General Collins was Ambassador here, he and the American Intelligence Service were convinced that Ngo dinh Diem could not last for more than a few weeks. We were wrong then, and he is convinced we are wrong now.