Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

492. Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 20, 1960¹

Washington, December 20, 1960

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2.]

3. The Situation in Laos (NSC 6012;²NSC Action No. 2324;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 19, 1960⁴)

Mr. Dulles predicted a strong Communist reaction to recent events in Laos. He said the initial Communist reaction to the defeat of the pro-Communist forces in that country was a combination of political and military pressure. The Communists are castigating the West, especially the United States, and are requesting the reconvening of the International Control Commission. Militarily, the initial Communist reaction consists of a covert strengthening of the Kong Le forces north of Vientiane and a build-up of the Pathet Lao forces elsewhere. Soviet planes are conducting air drops north of Vientiane probably for the purpose of reprovisioning the Kong Le forces. Mr. Dulles felt that a more massive Communist intervention in Laos could not be excluded. The Kong Le forces, which are retreating in good order, may regroup for an attack on Vientiane, or may continue north to Luang Prabang. Phoumi is trying to make arrangements to get the King out of Luang Prabang by air. However, the Kong Le forces may move to the Sam Neua area to join up with other Pathet Lao forces. Mr. Dulles felt it was unlikely the Soviets would assume the risk of supplying the Pathet Lao by air, using Soviet planes, unless they intended to follow up this action with other vigorous measures. A number of Soviet IL–14’s are arriving in Hanoi, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Chinese Communists are airlifting supplies to Nanning, while North Vietnam is flying supplies to Dien Bien Phu. Mr. Dulles believed the Communists would do whatever was necessary to get rid of the anti-Communist regime in Laos. He added that the Phoumi forces fought well in the recent action, but that Phoumi was overoptimistic as a result of his victory, and was ill-informed as to enemy strength and dispositions. We are endeavoring to assist Phoumi to increase reconnaissance. Mr. Dulles believed that the present anti-Communist government in Laos would require extensive outside assistance in order to survive, and that even with such assistance large parts of the country would remain outside government control. If the Phoumi forces make their position at Vientiane secure, a Communist government with a national front flag may be set up at Sam Neua under Souvanna Phouma, who is now in Cambodia. However, Souvanna may attempt a government in exile in Cambodia. Mr. Dulles, in conclusion, said the Government of Laos would be subject to a continuing and dangerous threat over the coming weeks.

Secretary Herter said he had had several talks in Paris with the French and British Foreign Ministers, who were very much concerned about the situation in Laos.⁵ The French dislike Phoumi intensively, despite his recent successes. The United Kingdom does not oppose Phoumi so violently, but feels the only solution for Laos is a government composed of all the parties in the country. Secretary Herter said that when he left Paris the French remained non-committal and had not yet recognized the new Government of Laos. SEATO obviously has a correct interest in the situation of Laos. In SEATO we are under the obligation to consult with respect to internal subversion and have a specific responsibility to render assistance to Laos in the event of external aggression. Thailand is now endeavoring to have the problem of Laos considered in SEATO, but we are taking the position that SEATO ought not to take any initiative in the absence of external aggression. Secretary Herter then noted that there was some evidence of Thai involvement on Phoumi’s side in the fighting at Vientiane. He said he wished to point this out because the Communists would make accusations that the Thais were aggressors in Laos. This could develop into quite a serious problem. The President said perhaps we should have some of our aircraft carriers in the vicinity. Secretary Gates said U.S. aircraft carriers were already in the area. He then asked whether we were making any effort to capture Soviet equipment supplied to the Kong Le forces. Mr. Dulles replied that we were making such efforts but he did not know of any Soviet equipment captured so far. General Lemnitzer believed one Soviet mortar had been captured.

Secretary Gates believed the situation in Laos was likely to remain critical for months. Secretary Herter thought there was need to accumulate all the evidence we could get of Soviet activity in Laos, in view of the fact that the case might be taken to the United Nations. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets would probably be clever enough to provide the pro-Communist forces in Laos with U.S. equipment, which the Chinese Communists had captured in the Korean war. General Lemnitzer said the 105’s which supported Kong Le at Vientiane might be U.S. 105’s. Mr. Parsons said that Thailand claimed to have in its possession a Soviet helicopter with U.S. markings. Mr. Gray asked whether this situation did not require additional U.S. military assistance to Laos. Secretary Gates replied in the affirmative, but said no further authorization was needed.

The National Security Council:⁶

Noted and discussed the subject in the light of (a) an oral report by the Director of Central Intelligence based upon the enclosure to the reference memorandum of December 19, 1960; and (b) comments by the Secretary of State on certain policy implications involved.

[Here follow items 4 and 5.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 21.
2. Document 65.
3. NSC Action No. 2324, approved by the President on October 26, noted that the NSC had discussed recent developments relating to the situation in Laos on October 20. See Document 434.
4. This memorandum transmitted Dulles’ December 17 memorandum to Goodpaster; see footnote 2, supra.
5. Accounts of these discussions are in a memorandum of conversation, December 15, and Secto 26, December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1560 and 751J.00/12–1860, respectively; both included in the microfiche supplement)
6. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2357, approved by the President on January 3, 1961. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)