Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

493. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Honolulu, December 23, 1960—3:39 p.m.

232339Z. 1. Since August 9, I have consistently and repeatedly maintained that the use of force was the only way to dislodge Kong Le from Vientiane and change the political status. I also recommended the use of US and/or Thai assets because I considered this essential to stiffen Phoumi’s military stance and capabilities despite certain political risks.

2. Now that both above objectives have been accomplished, I believe at this particular stage we should be careful in employment of recognizable U.S. or Thai personnel or military assets known not to be held by RLG while we effectively advertise a clear case of Sov bloc intervention to enlist international sympathy for RLG. Concurrently we should provide the most vigorous support to Phoumi for accomplishment of necessary missions by the Lao themselves to avoid obvious excuse for stepped up Sov bloc intervention.

3. Continued air resupply of Kong Le and Co by Sov bloc might be disastrous to RLG in attempts to reestablish and maintain its control.

4. Therefore, RLG should develop minimum military air capability to take advantage of its right as the legal government to control air space over Laos. To accomplish this, I recommend following courses of action be set in motion immediately:

A. Get agreement from Phoumi and Sarit to send to Thailand on a staggered time schedule Lao pilots for quick checkout in operations of armed T–6s.

B. Supply immediately ten armed T–6s to Phoumi from Thai stocks and replace under MAP.

C. Contract with Air America for maintenance,

D. At soonest time after at least five pilots are ready have RLG announce that no further intervention by foreign aircraft will be tolerated and that Lao pilots have been ordered to shoot down intruders.

E. Try to bag a few birds. Even an unsuccessful attempt will be enough to scare off any transport planes.

F. T–6s could also be used for recce missions and attack against PL artillery and rolling stock.

5. Since time is of the essence in stopping Sov bloc resupply effort, I suggest that delivery of up to four or five aircraft should be expedited under above plan to commence operation ASAP.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2360. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. In an unnumbered telegram from CINCPAC to Chief PEO, Laos, December 25, CINCPAC informed the Chief of PEO that the proposed courses of action were under consideration. The JCS, with the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense, authorized PEO Laos and JUSMAG Thailand to initiate action with Phoumi and Sarit to expedite training of Lao pilots in Thailand. (ibid., EA Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos 1960, Part II; included in the microfiche supplement)