Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

491. Paper Prepared by the Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)¹

Washington, December 17, 1960.

SYNOPSIS OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY General GOODPASTER

Special Watch Committee Conclusions

On the basis of findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting on 16 December 1960 concerning developments relating to Laos, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

The recent developments in Laos have undoubtedly forced the Communists to review their tactics and immediate objectives.

Such evidence as we have to date regarding Communist intentions is susceptible of two interpretations:

a. A decision to rely on the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces, with such increased assistance as is required in matériel and selected personnel,² to prevent the Phoumi–Boun Oum forces from establishing effective control of Laos;

b. A decision to intervene openly with Democratic Republic of Vietnam or Chinese Communist forces.

The course of action “a” would not only advance Communist interests in Laos but would also allow full opportunity for attempting to isolate and discredit the US. Although the evidence better supports the adoption of course “a”, open intervention under course “b” is not precluded even though such a course might involve substantial risks to the bloc.

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
2. In a memorandum to Goodpaster, December 1 7, Allen Dulles submitted an intelligence working paper which concurred with the conclusions of the Watch Committee report. The CIA memorandum concluded that the Phoumi–Boun Oum forces would require massive outside financial and military support to survive. The Dulles memorandum was reported to the President and circulated to the NSC. (ibid., Miscellaneous Material, CIA vol. iii; included in the microfiche supplement)