65. National Security Council Report1

NSC 6012



  • A. NSC 5809
  • B. OCB Special Report on NSC 5809, dated February 10, 1960
  • C. NSC Action No. 2193
  • D. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 11 and 18, 1960
  • E. NSC Action No. 2267
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The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and Mr. Elmer B. Staats for the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 452nd NSC Meeting on July 21, 1960, adopted the changes to NSC 5809 transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 11, 1960 (NSC Action No. 2267).

The President, as of this date, approved the changes to NSC 5809, which as amended is enclosed herewith as NSC 6012; directs the implementation of NSC 6012 by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

A revised Financial Appendix, in preparation pursuant to NSC Action No. 2267–d, will be circulated later.2

By NSC Action No. 2267–c, the Council agreed that, at such time as policy decisions are required as to whether jet aircraft should be provided to Cambodia or Viet Nam, these questions should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration.

The enclosed statement of policy, as approved, supersedes NSC 5809.

James. S. Lay, Jr.3


[Here follows a table of contents.]


I. General Considerations

1. General. Since Mainland Southeast Asia does not represent a unified area, courses of action must generally be determined in the light of widely varying country situations. However, basic objectives and main directions of U.S. policy can and should be established on a regional basis.

2. Consequences of Communist Domination. The national security of the United States would be endangered by Communist domination of Mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by overt aggression, subversion, or a political and economic offensive.

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The loss to Communist control of any single free country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation by the rest.
The loss of the entire area would have a seriously adverse impact on the U.S. position elsewhere in the Far East, have severe economic consequences for many nations of the Free World, add significant resources to the Communist Bloc in rice, rubber, tin and other minerals, and could result in severe economic and political pressures on Japan and India for accommodation to the Communist Bloc. The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus have far-reaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests.

3. The Communist Threat

Overt Aggression. Although Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy supported by substantial military forces. There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities continue in Laos. The Viet Minh have continued to improve their combat capabilities since the Geneva Conference of 1954.
Subversion. In most countries of Southeast Asia a threat also arises from the existence of extensive local Communist capabilities for all types of subversive activities, ranging up to armed insurrection. Additionally, the large overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia offer a fertile field for subversion. The weak internal security systems of the Southeast Asian states make them highly vulnerable to such activities.
Communist Political and Economic Offensive. At present overt aggression and, except in the cases of Viet Nam and Laos, militant subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in the area. The political instability, economic backwardness, export problems, and extreme nationalism of these countries provide many opportunities for Communist exploitation by trade and economic assistance, conventional political and diplomatic activity, and extensive infiltration. This offensive now constitutes a threat to U.S. interests more subtle and more difficult to cope with than other threats.

4. U.S. Role. The United States is likely to remain the only major outside source of power to counteract the Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia. Thus, the retention of this area in the Free World will continue to depend on the extent and effectiveness of U.S. support as well as on the local efforts of the countries themselves.

Political. The underlying purpose of U.S. assistance in the area is to help the non-Communist countries develop more effective political organizations, strengthen their internal administration and enlist greater allegiance in both urban and rural districts. In part, this purpose will be served by programs for military and economic aid dealt with below. In part it will require an intensification of present programs for training competent Asian managerial and technical personnel. And, in part, new approaches, both governmental and private, will be needed. These should not concentrate exclusively at the national [Page 212] level, but should include activities designed to strengthen and vitalize indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an impact on village life, rural society, and educational systems.
Military. Because these countries do not have the capability of creating armed forces which could effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the United States will be required to provide a basic shield against Communist aggression. For the foreseeable future, local will to resist aggression will depend on a conviction in Southeast Asia that the United States will continue its support and will maintain striking forces adequate to counter aggression in Southeast Asia with the capabilities described in current basic national security policy. The combination of such U.S. forces and local will to resist would constitute the best deterrent against aggression. Should the deterrent fail, this combination would also provide the most effective insurance that, in conjunction with indigenous and allied forces, the United States could suppress aggression in the area quickly and in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war.
Economic and Technical. The insistence, throughout most of the area, on economic development provides the strongest lever for the exertion of influence by the Free World or by the Communist Bloc. Without increased external help from some source, most of the governments of the area will be unable, even with adequate indigenous effort, to manage the political demand for rapid betterment in the conditions of life and provide for sound economic development. Failure to obtain such assistance from the Free World will tend to drive these countries toward economic dependence on the Communist Bloc. The general preference in Southeast Asia for Western technical and economic assistance gives the United States and the Free World an opportunity to obtain primacy over Communist efforts in key economic sectors. The outcome may, however, be strongly influenced by the success with which the Free World can cope with Communist efforts to exploit the existence of Southeast Asian export problems, particularly those involving rice. In the period ahead, flexibility of U.S. procedure and rapidity of U.S. action will be increasingly important, if effective advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient opportunities.

5. The Problem of Regional Association. Over the long run, the small, vulnerable, and essentially dependent nations of Southeast Asia cannot exist satisfactorily as free nations without closer associations than now exist.

6. The Problem of Alignment. To preserve their independence, strengthen their internal stability, and protect themselves against aggression, some countries in Southeast Asia prefer to join regional security arrangements. Some, however, prefer to avoid alignment with other nations. The basic objective of both groups is to maintain the independence of their countries free of outside interference or dictation, and the independence and vitality of both are important to the United States and to each other.

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II. Policy Conclusions

7. The national independence of the mainland Southeast Asian states is important to the security interests of the United States. If such independence is to be preserved, U.S. policies must seek to build sufficient strength in the area at least to identify aggression, suppress subversion, prevent Communist political and economic domination, and assist the non-Communist governments to consolidate their domestic positions. U.S. policy should not depend primarily on the degree and nature of Communist activity at any particular time, but should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the economic capacities of the countries concerned and U.S. resources available for the area.

8. Where a national determination to maintain independence and oppose external aggression is sufficiently manifest, the United States should be prepared to provide military assistance based upon the missions of the forces as indicated in the “Country Courses of Action” (Part V, below).

9. In the event of aggression against a Southeast Asian state willing to resist, the provisions of the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty should be invoked, but the United States should not forgo necessary action in behalf of such a state or states because of the possibility that other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish more than token military forces.

10. In the long run, the ability of the non-Communist governments to attain political, economic and social objectives will be the dominant factor in defeating the Communist attempts to dominate Southeast Asia. The United States should assist the non-Communist states of the area to formulate and execute programs designed to promote conditions of sound development, to demonstrate that they can achieve growth without reliance on Communist methods or dependence on the Communist Bloc, and to give their peoples a greater stake in the continued independence of their countries.

11. The United States should continue to make clear its own devotion to the principle of collective security, its belief that regional security arrangements provide maximum protection at minimum cost for all, and its expectation that a country’s decision to participate in such arrangements is based on its own calculation of its best interests and does not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial aid. Where countries participate, measures to assure adherence are desirable, normally including preferential treatment in the fields of economic and military assistance as justified by U.S. strategic objectives. Where new opportunities for affiliation develop they should be encouraged. The United States should, however, accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future, and should not exert [Page 214] pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined. The genuine independence of such countries from Communism serves U.S. interests even though they are not formally aligned with the United States. The United States should accordingly support and assist them so long as they remain determined to preserve their own independence and are actively pursing policies to this end.

III. Objectives

12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist Bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free World; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free World.

IV. Regional Courses of Action5

13. Support and assist the countries of the area on the basis of their will and ability to defend and strengthen their independence.

14. Respect each country’s choice of national policy for preserving its independence, but make every effort to demonstrate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the Free World, as well as the dangers of alignment with the Communist Bloc.

15. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate closely with each other on a basis of mutual aid and support, and support indigenous efforts to develop regional associations so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the spirit of resistance to Communism.

16. Participate actively in SEATO, and seek to develop both its miltary and non-military aspects in a manner that will convincingly demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional association, the usefulness of which extends beyond deterrence of Communist expansion. Encourage limited participation of non-Communist, non-SEATO Asian nations in certain SEATO activities.

17. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression as well as to indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, and propaganda.

18. Encourage the Governments of Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam to maintain close relations with the GRC and to support its international position as the Government of China. Having in mind the desirability, from the U.S. point of view, of Malaya and Singapore developing closer relations with the GRC, encourage these Governments, as appropriate, to take steps that will lead ultimately to this [Page 215] objective. Seek to ensure that Malaya does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime or support its seating in the United Nations as the Government of China, and that Singapore does not develop closer economic or cultural relations with Communist China. Encourage the countries of the area to eschew relations with the Communist regimes of North Korea and North Viet Nam and to support the international position of the Governments of the Republics of Viet Nam and of Korea.

19. Maintain, in the general area of the Far East, U.S. forces adequate to exert a deterrent influence against Communist aggression, in conformity with current basic national security policy.

20. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland South-east Asian state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.

21. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for U.S. assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt, including even military action after appropriate Congressional action.

22. As appropriate, assist the police forces in Southeast Asian countries to obtain training and equipment to detect and contain Communist activities.

23. In order to strengthen the non-Communist governments of the area and to help forestall their economic dependence on the Communist Bloc:

Provide flexible economic and technical assistance as necessary to attain U.S. objectives. In the framing of U.S. aid programs to South-east Asian countries take into account the economic and technical assistance being provided by other Free World nations and by international institutions, coordinating with such nations and institutions where appropriate.
Encourage measures to improve the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign, and to mobilize the maximum investment of U.S. private capital in the area consistent with the prevailing climate.
Encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo Plan countries, and other friendly countries to contribute available resources to promote the economic growth of Southeast Asia.
Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to orient their economies in the direction of the Free World and to rely primarily on non-Communist markets and sources of supply for trade, technicians, capital development, and atomic development.
In carrying out programs involving disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad:
Give particular attention to the economic vulnerabilities of the Southeast Asian countries and avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, detracting from the ability of these countries to market their own exportable produce.
Give particular emphasis to the use of the resources to promote multilateral trade and economic development.
Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade relationships between the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia.
Take advantage of adverse local reactions to Communist barter agreements with countries in the area by demonstrating the advantages to these countries of conducting trade on a multilateral commercial basis.

24. Make a special, sustained effort to help educate an expanding number of technically competent, pro-Western civilian and military leaders, working bilaterally, through the United Nations, with the other Colombo Plan countries and with other friendly countries. Stress the development of potential and secondary leadership to support the thin stratum of elite now administering the central governments and bring to their support modern techniques and technology in public information and organization.

25. Place increased emphasis on community development projects, educational programs, and other activities aimed to influence the welfare and attitudes of the people at the village level.

26. Strengthen informational, cultural and educational activities, as appropriate, to foster increased alignment of the people with the Free World and to contribute to an understanding of Communist aims and techniques.

27. Hold or reduce the number of U.S. officials in each country to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs, in order to head off an adverse political reaction to the presence of a large number of Americans in relatively privileged positions.

28. Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact with and knowledge of the Free World. Explore with friendly religious organizations ways of developing Buddhist fraternal associations and identification with Free World religious leaders and movements.

29. When not in conflict with other U.S. political objectives, continue activities designed to encourage the overseas Chinese in South-east Asia (a) to integrate fully and as rapidly as practicable into the national life of their host countries, becoming loyal citizens and identifying [Page 217] themselves with the interests of these countries; (b) to support and participate in anti-Communist activities in their countries of domicile; (c) to resist Communist efforts to infiltrate and gain control of their communities. Seek to ensure that elements within these communities that continue to feel and act as Chinese rather than as citizens of their host countries look to the GRC as the custodian of Chinese social and cultural values and support it as the representative of the interests and aspirations of the Chinese people.

30. Discreetly encourage the governments of the countries of the area to promote and facilitate the integration of racial minorities, bearing in mind that the extent and pace of such integration will be affected by the willingness of the host countries to permit the overseas Chinese and other minorities to participate in the national life without discrimination.

[Numbered paragraph 31 (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

32. Promote economic cooperation between the countries of the area and Japan and with the Government of the Republic of China, to the extent feasible without jeopardizing the achievement of U.S. objectives toward the individual Southeast Asian countries.

33. In order to promote increased cooperation in the area and to deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influence or domination, assist as feasible in the development of the Mekong River Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual aid.

34. Should any country in the area cease to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence, terminate U.S. economic and military assistance programs to such nations.

35. Exercise caution to ensure that the United States does not become so identified, either in fact or in the eyes of the world, with particular regimes, individuals or political factions in the countries of the area as to hinder U.S. accommodation to changes in the political scene.

V. Country Courses of Action in Addition to the “Regional Courses of Action” Above


36. In view of the emerging opportunities in Burma and the repercussions that developments there will have on the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa, make a special effort to influence an increasingly favorable orientation in Burma’s policies.

37. Encourage and support those elements in Burma which can maintain a stable free government that identifies its interest with those of the Free World and resists Communist inducements, threats, and programs to subvert Burma’s independence.

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38. Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and international responsibilities compatible with our own objectives.

39. For political purposes, upon Burmese request make military training available on a grant basis and modest amounts of military equipment and supplies on a sales or token payment basis, as consistent with U.S. interests.

40. Encourage the Burmese Government to establish internal security throughout the country, and discourage further foreign assistance to Chinese Nationalist irregulars and ethnic rebel groups in Burma.

41. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Burma, invoke the UN Charter and, subject to Burmese request for assistance, take necessary military and any other action to assist Burma if Burma is willing to resist Communist resort to force and U.S. vital interests are involved: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to the approval by the Congress.


42. Seek to increase Cambodia’s respect for and confidence in the United States and the Free World in order to assist in maintaining Cambodia’s independence and in curbing its tendency to increased orientation toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc. To this end demonstrate continued friendly U.S. support for Cambodia’s independence, understanding of its policy of neutrality, and concern for its economic and social progress.

43. In shaping particular courses of action in Cambodia, take into account the fact that Prince Sihanouk enjoys wide-spread popularity, particularly among the rural population, and controls all major sources of political power. Devote special efforts toward developing Sihanouk’s understanding of U.S. policies and of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia, bearing in mind his extreme sensitivity to any suggestion of pressure or slight.

44. Since real or fancied threats from neighboring Free World countries have been a major factor contributing to Cambodia’s sense of insecurity and its consequent readiness to accept Sino-Soviet Bloc support, endeavor persistently and firmly to improve Cambodia’s relations with these countries, particularly Thailand and Viet Nam. Take every appropriate occasion to impress on the governments of neighboring countries the importance of repairing their relations with Cambodia.

45. Seek means effectively to promote a sense of responsibility on the part of Sihanouk and other Cambodian leaders for exerting sustained effort to create conditions conducive to better relations with neighboring countries and for avoiding contentious and provocative [Page 219] statements. When feasible and consistent with over-all U.S. interests, take steps to prevent provocative actions by any of the countries concerned.

46. Encourage positive cooperation between Cambodia and neighboring countries such as joint participation in the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual aid.

47. Continue to provide modest military aid to enable the Cambodian armed forces to maintain internal security against Communist subversion or other elements hostile to U.S. interests and to discourage Cambodia from accepting substantial military aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

48. Concentrate U.S. economic and technical assistance primarily in those areas in which increased Communist influence would entail the greatest threat to Cambodia’s neutrality and independence.

49. In view of the relatively strong position still maintained by France in Cambodia, seek opportunities for greater mutual understanding and cooperation with the French in the furtherance of common Free World objectives.


50. Provide military assistance for the development and support of Lao armed forces capable of maintaining internal security against Communist subversion or other elements hostile to U.S. interests and providing limited initial resistance to Communist aggression. Encourage Laos to formulate and implement a broadly conceived security plan, including both internal and external security, which encompass the services of all branches of the Royal Government, civil and military.

51. In the provision of U.S. assistance, direct our programs to the promotion of social and economic progress and unification of Laos, thus helping maintain the confidence of the Royal Government in its anti-Communist, pro-Free World “neutrality.”

52. Continue to promote conditions engendering confidence by Lao leaders that the UN Charter, SEATO, and Free World support provide a favorable basis for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and inducements, and at the same time continue to impress upon the Lao the need for a sense of responsibility and recognition that too drastic actions may have adverse international implications.

53. Encourage the Lao to observe constitutional and legal processes as providing the soundest basis for the growth and vitality of democratic institutions; discourage resort to force in political affairs.

54. Encourage the Lao Government to give emphasis to programs tending to reorient disaffected elements of the population.

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55. Encourage and support cooperation between Laos and other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, including such joint efforts in the anti-subversion, economic, communications, and military fields as is feasible.

56. Develop greater mutual understanding and cooperation with the French in the furtherance of common Free World objectives.

57. Strongly support “the UN presence” and expanded UN technical assistance in Laos, and make a special intensified effort to encourage other friendly nations to assume a larger share of responsibility for the support of the country.


58. Promote the development of a Thai leadership which is increasingly united, stable and constructive, is supported by the Thai people, and willing to continue the alignment of Thailand with the United States and the West.

[Numbered paragraph 59 (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

60. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces sufficient:

To maintain internal security.
To present limited initial resistance to external aggression.
To make a modest contribution to collective defense of contiguous SEATO areas.

Continue to urge the Thai Government to improve the organization of the Thai Armed Forces so as to make a maximum contribution to the above objectives.

61. Encourage and support an improvement in relations between Thailand and Cambodia.

Viet Nam

62. Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone. In this regard encourage and assist public relations and public information programs of the Government of Viet Nam directed both internally to the Free Vietnamese and externally to North Viet Nam.

63. Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership.

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64. Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam.

65. Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh.

66. Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy, and discreetly manifest in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEATO Treaty, to defend itself against external aggression.

67. Encourage and support an improvement in relations between Viet Nam and Cambodia.

Federation of Malaya

68. Encourage the continued development of a strong, stable Malaya within the Commonwealth.

69. Encourage the Commonwealth to exercise primary responsibility in Malaya but be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the maintenance of Malaya’s stability and independence.

70. In the application to Malaya of the course of action in paragraph 23–a, be prepared to provide needed technical assistance to Malaya, and consider the extension of loans for economic development if alternate sources of financing prove to be inadequate.

71. Discreetly encourage the present Malayan leadership to improve its position of strength and responsibility unless more favorable alternatives develop.

72. Discreetly encourage Malaya’s participation and membership in SEATO, avoiding any actions which might strengthen neutralist sentiment.

73. Encourage the Malayan Government to take vigorous actions to curb Communist subversion and to rely primarily on the Commonwealth for any assistance required.

74. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Malaya, place initial reliance on Commonwealth, SEATO or UN resources as appropriate, but be prepared, subject to Malayan request for assistance, to take independent U.S. action along the lines of the proviso in paragraph 20.

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75. Bearing in mind Singapore’s strategic position and its importance to the Free World, encourage development toward a politically stable, economically viable Singapore, willing to cooperate with the United States and capable of resisting internal and external Communist threats.

76. Encourage and support British, Australian, Federation of Malaya and Singapore Government efforts to strengthen moderate political forces in order to counteract as much as possible the extreme left’s pull on the Government. Be prepared, however, after consultation with the British, to take such independent action as necessary to accomplish this end.

77. In case the Communists or extreme leftists move to gain control of the Government by legal or violent means, consult with the United Kingdom, the Federation, and if appropriate other interested parties, and as necessary support counteraction, being prepared, as necessary, to take independent action along the lines of paragraph 21.

78. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Singapore, place initial reliance on the resources possessed by Singapore, the British and the Federation of Malaya, but be prepared to take action, if necessary, in accordance with paragraph 20.

79. While recognizing the desire of Singapore to merge with the Federation, do not encourage such a step unless and until such action appears to be useful in achieving both long-range and short-range U.S. aims as set forth in paragraphs 75 and 76; in the meantime use the Singapore Government’s desire for closer ties and eventual merger with the Federation in an effort to counteract the extreme left’s pull on the government.

80. Encourage efforts by the Government of Singapore to solve its political and economic problems in ways consistent with U.S. objectives. To the extent feasible, rely on the United Kingdom to provide external financial support to Singapore and, to the extent desired by the United Kingdom, support the utilization of Free World international financial institutions in the promoting of economic development and economic reforms in Singapore. Be prepared, however, to provide U.S. technical and economic development assistance when such assistance would be of special significance in achieving U.S. objectives.

81. In all U.S. activities in Singapore, keep in mind the continuing British responsibility for Singapore’s defense and foreign affairs, and the British role in internal security as well as British knowledge and experiences in governing Singapore, and seek to avoid action likely to cause a serious misunderstanding between the United States and the United Kingdom.

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VI. Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Special Situation in North Viet Nam

82. Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime.

83. Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.

84. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet Nam or Laos.

85. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and internationally whenever possible.

86. Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination.

87. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake programs of political, economic and psychological warfare against Viet Minh Communists.

88. Apply, as necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, restrictions on U.S. exports and shipping and on foreign assets similar to those already in effect for Communist China and North Korea.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/PNSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret. The source text includes revised pages resulting from a new paragraph 18 and certain revisions in paragraphs 29 and 30 (formerly paragraphs 28 and 29), all of which were incorporated in NSC 6012 on August 24. The reasons for these changes, which deal with overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the relations of Southeast Asian nations with the Republic of China, are set forth in memoranda from Boggs to the NSC and from Parsons to Herter dated August 5 and 11, respectively. (Ibid., S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351; included in the microfiche supplement)
  2. The financial appendix is included in the microfiche supplement.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  4. For purposes of this paper, “Mainland Southeast Asia” consists of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaya and Singapore. In addition, there is attached a supplementary statement of policy on the special situation in North Viet Nam. [Footnote in the source text.]
  5. The following courses of action are not applicable to the State of Singapore at this time: paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 22–a, and 32. [Footnote in the source text.]