Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

459. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 17, 1960—4 p.m.

938. Bangkok for Admiral Felt. Reference Deptel 517.² As reported Embtel 935,³ I think danger attack by Vientiane on LP now remote and that skids getting under Souvanna as Prime Minister. Question therefore resolves itself into matter priorities and timing as to how best administer final push. We all agree best for Lao to do this as much themselves as possible (Deptel 501,⁴ paragraph 2). In any event our action must be according to a plan fully accepted by Lao elements we are supporting if it is to be effective. Agree essential element our plan is unity between Phoui, Phoumi, ourselves and LP in support our plan. This is first and fundamental requirement. Also agree that setting up revolutionary government unwise. We do not yet have Phoumi/Phoui agreement that this is the right course. Phoui agrees but Phoumi, who now holds predominant military power, does not. So our first task is persuade Phoumi cooperate in our plan. Without this agreement and full cooperation with Phoumi, this effort cannot succeed. Believe Corcoran should renew effort to achieve this end and that we should not act until this fundamental prerequisite success our plan has been established.

On numbered paragraphs reference telegram: (1) Agree for Ouan, though his exact status and potential still uncertain as he is now in Savannakhet under Phoumi control. In addition, special effort should be made get Ouan reestablish his contacts with anti-PL officers Vientiane with whom he has special relationships to get them stay in city and cooperate Kouprasith in defense against PL. We should hold off on Houmphan (now in hospital LP under guard) until he recovers from his illness and his relationship with Bounleut, Bountheng and others is clarified.

(2) Agree in principle. Three deputies have already approached us and we helping. Problems however serious. Phoumi would, of course, have to be persuaded have such meeting and let his deputies go LP. Nineteen deputies now out of Vientiane, one of whom is out of country. Tiao Souk, formerly staunch Souvanna man, now vacillating wildly. Twelve more at least required. Most deputies reluctant leave without families. (Most have large families and one deputy told us he had forty relatives living with him and would not desert them.) Considerable sums money will be required though this, of course, manageable. Security measures in city being tightened. Leaks almost certain if we start urging departure. This will reveal our position prematurely, with consequent limitation our capacity continue forward our interests here, not to mention consequences internationally. Therefore, believe most we can do this juncture is respond affirmatively requests for help, and urge Phoumi and Phoui to work on deputies they know.

Also relevant that Souvanna told press yesterday he would agree assembly meet LP if safety assured.

(3) Again feel resignations should be timed with other measures in our plan. Moreover, Inpeng in key position keep us informed Cabinet actions, PL negotiations and financial plans government. Boun Oum could easily and probably safely be persuaded go.⁵

4) Agree. Would be helful if Phoumi would make contact with Kouprasith. ARMA endeavoring persuade several key anti-PL officers who considering leave for Savannkhet stay here and fight PL.

5) Agree action proposed would be ideal but am convinced King will not act. Result Phoumi and Phoui recent talks with King clearly confirm this. However, LP radio might put the story out in King’s name without his approval.

6) Agree. Essential Phoumi concur our plan.

7) Agree.

8) Believe démarche Souvanna outlined paragraph 8 unnecessary on matter of attack on LP and premature on question resignation. This should be used only as last resort, since once we come out in open to Souvanna that we want him resign we place ourselves utterly in his hands. All he has to do to put us in completely untenable position internationally is tell press that we are asking him resign or announce it over radio and we are on the spot publicly for most blatant kind of interference in international [internal?] affairs, thus frustrating policy Department telegram 425.⁶ He is quite capable of doing this, as shown by his remarks about us to press yesterday on much less provocation. This he said is “no longer national, but international problem.” (Embassy telegram 930)⁷ Also he most likely stop our aid to Phoumi if we show our hand too closely. Another real possibility is appeal by Souvanna to UN with consequences foreseen Department telegram 425.

Would also precipitate open break with British and French Ambassadors who will rally Souvanna support unless otherwise directed by their governments as result US démarche proposed paragraph 9, reference telegram.

Lao are pushing Souvanna. There is a feeling of trimming sails to catch Phoumi wind stirring in Vientiane. Let us let them do it with discreet assistance from us as in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7. It may be necessary for them to do it militarily, probably without much bloodshed, if Phoumi and Kouprasith can get adequately integrated. But let us reveal our stand as little as possible (Department telegram 501, paragraph 2).

10) I agree FAL should not be allowed disintegrate for lack of pay. But I still say stand firm. Phoumi can have the money he needs by one simple action. For us to pay covertly runs great risks for us with UN and may mean paying twice again. We got away with it once without public exposure but practically impossible to do so again. It invites a demand for ouster of all our PEO representation, thus hamstringing us completely and depriving us of our means of communication with LP and Savannakhet. It also loses us our already tenuous control over Phoumi. If we yield on this one he will know absolutely that all he has to do where he disagrees with us is to stand his ground and US will come obediently to help.

Believe Department should reveal our general position, but not specific actions, soonest to British, French and Australians. Re paragraph 9 reference telegram, if they could agree, it would be most helpful and I think time has come to make our position clear to them even if they disagree. We should know their position and the consequences we face from them, so as to know how best to act. Doubt if they would agree effort force resignation Souvanna. They might be prepared join us in urging negotiation and cabinet reshuffle. They might even accept Phoui. Please make clear to them that we have not taken active steps against Souvanna so far but have confined ourselves to support FAL in all areas to maintain its integrity and opposition to PL. This for my protection with Addis and Falaize as well as for USG protection should matter arise in UN. We must always remember that there is considerable risk French leak to Souvanna. Should base our case on now demonstrated incapacity Souvanna to govern, his involvement with PL, and King’s opposition to him. I am going Bangkok this afternoon to see Admiral Felt at his request. Consider this meeting important.⁸

Meanwhile, however, we can proceed with basic prerequisite getting Phoumi agreement our plan and with actions 1, 4, 6 and 7 and Department can proceed with paragraph 9. Next day or two should also clarify position Souvanna. I can, of course, get back here on few hours notice if necessary.

Foregoing represents views all members country team, independently arrived at by each, and consolidated after detailed study and deliberation.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1760. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated niact to Bangkok, to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, Canberra, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Document 457.
3. Dated November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1660; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Document 449.
5. In telegram 529 to Vientiane, November 18, the Department of State sent the following instructions concerning paragraphs 2 and 3: “In view pace of events believe that we must accept some risks to achieve our objectives. Therefore believe [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be authorized take prudent actions to exfiltrate deputies and to encourage resignation Ministers.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1760)
6. Document 432.
7. In telegram 930, November 16, the Embassy transmitted to the Department of State a summary of Souvanna’s press conference of that same date. When asked if the United States was supporting the rebel forces in Savannakhet, Souvanna replied “certainly.” When asked if this was illegal, Souvanna gave the same answer. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1660)
8. A brief summary of this November 18 meeting is in telegram 874 from Bangkok; see footnote 2, Document 461.