Office of the Historian

460. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, November 17, 1960—4 p.m.

939. For Assistant Secretary Parsons only from Ambassador. Hope you will see Embtel 938,2 especially second paragraph. It seems to me that so far we have all overlooked a key element to the success of our plan; that Phoumi, the principal power factor, has not yet accepted it. Without his full cooperation, it cannot work.

I have just received Dept’s message [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on pay.3 I beg of you not to allow us to be forced by one man’s stubbornness into cutting our throats in Vientiane, in the UN and with Phoumi by giving in on this issue. It will inevitably be known and our opposition is now in a mood to exploit it. It invites a demand for ouster of all our PEO representation, thus hamstringing us completely and depriving us of our means of communication with LP and Savannakhet. We will be a defenseless defendant in the UN. My usefulness to you here, for the time being at least, will be at an end. Phoumi will be wholly out of our control. I can assure you that the FAL will not disintegrate. Let’s keep a steady nerve.4

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1760. Secret; Niact; No Distribution.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Not further identified.↩
  4. In telegram 522 to Vientiane, November 17, the Department of State responded that it was aware of the dangers Brown outlined, and was seeking a way of handling the issue to avoid Brown’s worse fears. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1760; included in the microfiche supplement)↩