Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 15, 1960—8:47 p.m.

517. Our reading present situation is that while Phoui seems like idea of conference three principals (Souvanna, Phoui, Phoumi) in Luang Prabang, neither King nor Phoumi considers this a very practical approach on grounds that Souvanna probably would not come and more importantly because they seem to have in mind plan of military action which would presumably unite Luang Prabang and Savannakhet and involve some kind of coup within Vientiane supported by attack with Phoumi force. In any event, Souvanna has now gotten himself into position where despite his earlier abhorrence of Lao fighting Lao and his protestations that he would hold line against PL, he proposing initiate civil war by attack against Luang Prabang and seems be seeking PL cooperation in this. Thus emerges picture of Souvanna supported by PL attacking King supported by FAL.

Important that US position in this issue be made clear to parties involved. We favor action by King and National Assembly which would bring about new government uniting all anti-Communist elements behind King and opposing PL. Government such as we visualize might best be headed by Phoui at this time. We hope that Lao can bring this about without fighting among themselves. This is why we have urged meeting of Phoumi and Phoui with Souvanna and convening of National Assembly at Luang Prabang as means effecting peaceful transition to new government which would unify Lao people against Communist menace to their national integrity. Souvanna can save his country from civil war if he will resign and allow King seek formation new government supported by Luang Prabang and Savannakhet.

If Souvanna will not resign and if proposed meeting of three leaders at Luang Prabang now impracticable, other steps must be taken to induce his resignation. Essential element would seem be display of unity between Phoui, Phoumi and Luang Prabang–Savannakhet groups combined with meeting of National Assembly at Luang Prabang to vote no confidence. To these ends following actions should be taken:

1) Ouan and Houmphan should be informed ASAP [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we favor action by King and National Assembly which would bring about new government which we could support, uniting all anti-Communist elements behind King and opposing PL. They should also be told that we think essential that they align themselves with other anti-Communist elements in defending King and Luang Prabang against PL.

2) We should continue efforts to get to Luang Prabang quorum of National Assembly members adequate for no confidence vote. We gather there are already about 20 deputies outside capital and only few more would need be exfiltrated. Might be suggested to Phoui for instance that he call deputies over whom he has influence to meet with him in Luang Prabang.

3) Time has now come to encourage Inpeng, Ou Voravong and Boun Oum to resign from Cabinet as they have previously desired to do and go to Luang Prabang. This action alone should considerably reduce Souvanna strength.

4) Since possibility PL takeover of Vientiane not to be discounted whatever is political outcome, you should make every effort to win over Kouprasith, help him weld anti-Communist forces under him and establish liaison between him and Savannakhet and Luang Prabang. We consider that if military means are required to recapture Vientiane, greatest chance of success lies in takeover of city from within coordinated with attack from without.

5) It would be ideal as counter to Souvanna’s public assertion that King prisoner of Luang Prabang coup group if King would authorize public statement on his behalf by President of King’s Council or SecGen King’s Palace along line attributed to King by Phoui [document number not declassified]² that Souvanna is prisoner of Pathet Lao and is not free. If radio reported to have been delivered Luang Prabang by Phoumi is operable, such statement might be broadcast from there. In any event widespread dissemination of this line in manner unattributable to US would have beneficial result not only in Laos but also in other addressee countries as well.

6) Our general position as described above should be made clear to Phoumi on confidential basis. He should be told also that we entirely opposed to idea setting up revolutionary government because it could not be internationally recognized. Central objectives should be getting legal government which he can support and through which US can continue unimpeded its support FAL.

7) Phoui should also be informed on confidential basis of our position and should be asked to make it clear to King.

8) You should approach Souvanna to explain our position along following lines. We are shocked that he planning use Kong Le forces to attack FAL forces at Luang Prabang. We can only see such action as initiating civil war between PL and FAL with Souvanna ultimately finding himself on PL side. Tragedy of such situation should be apparent to him in view his own earlier dedication to avoiding fighting among Lao and uniting country in order that he could take firm line with PL. We do not see how he can seriously contemplate using his position as Prime Minister to instigate such undertaking. We would think that his patriotic instincts would lead him to resign his position and support some alternative which could unite FAL and country against PL in hope averting civil war such as that which he apparently now contemplating. You should tell him that as situation has developed it appears that all elements outside Vientiane not cooperating with PL and Kong Le no longer support his government. (If Ouane and Houmphan have not committed themselves, you would of course modify foregoing slightly.) Our honest opinion is that sympathies of King himself lie with those who would be opposing PL should such conflict eventuate.

9) You should notify Department when you plan approach Souvanna so that we may inform British, French, and Australians before or soon after approach is made. Meanwhile we shall prepare allies (French, British, and Australians) for rapid evolution of situation by telling them we have come to conclusion that Souvanna cannot restore peace to Laos, that on contrary country is heading for civil war, and that therefore new governmental formula must be found. We are not prejudging new government but would hope to see reestablishment political processes based on constitution. Would appreciate recommendations from all addressees as to whether we should go further in taking British, French, and Australians into our confidence at this juncture even before Vientiane has approached Souvanna.

10) Re pay issue, and specifically question raised by Corcoran (Bangkok’s 865)³ we not prepared to have FAL disintegrate for lack of pay. It should be explained to Phoumi that only money we have available for pay is physically in Vientiane. Reluctant release October pay until September pay is received by Phoumi. FYI. We urgently developing procedure for handling this, in event situation is not clarified soon by resignation of Souvanna. End FYI.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1560. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Chapman and Usher and cleared in draft with Parsons, Merchant, and Colonel McCrea. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, Canberra, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Not found.
3. Supra.