Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

449. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 10, 1960—10:48 p.m.

501. Your 895.² As explained in our recent telegrams Department has kept firm position that we must proceed with implementation our line of action set forth Deptel 466.³ We have two immediate concepts re implementation that line of action.

• First of these is that to maximum extent possible development of situation leading to Phoui’s assumption Prime Ministership should be a purely Lao movement toward Phoui. US hand in this should be revealed as little as possible.
• Second, Phoui should be allowed free hand to explore situation and test his plans, such as those set forth in Bangkok’s 817,⁴ in conversations with Lao leaders. Presumably when he has done this he will let us know of his findings and his recommendations. We should be prepared to back him in any reasonable plans.

Applying these concepts to situation presented by your 895 consider you should proceed as follows:

a) You should make clear to Souvanna we consider inclusion of NLHX in cabinet would be disastrous.

b) If you consider helpful, you may also wish express our deep concern re apparent united front nature of recently formed Committee of Neutrality. Experience of other countries with similar united front parties has been that, regardless of size or nature of non-Communist groups included therein, the parties are run by the Communist element. Moreover they are run in such a way that the non-Communist elements lose their separate image in eyes of general public and Communists frequently appear to be speaking on their behalf. Experience of Burmese Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League in 1946–47 is case in point. League had district and provincial organization [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It was discovered that key posts of General Secretary at major province and district headquarters were in almost all cases held by Communists who operated organization for exclusively Communist objectives. The problem was only resolved when Gen. Aung San summarily dismissed all Communists from League.

c) Our reading of Phoumi’s position is that he would not be prepared to accept such proposal nor would he listen to idea that he leave country as Ambassador to Bangkok or elsewhere. Nevertheless we agree that Corcoran be instructed go to Savannakhet and tell Phoumi and Boun Oum we consider it to their advantage to enter into these discussions. While we agree unwise reveal to Phoumi or Sarit proposals to be made by National Assembly Delegation, Corcoran should nevertheless make clear to Phoumi and Boun Oum that we are unalterably opposed to any proposal to include NLHX in government. Corcoran should urge Phoumi and Boun Oum in any event make constructive counter proposals and well-reasoned presentation of their position. By so doing they may be able influence members of Delegation and particularly Somsanith, and through them other National Assembly Delegates to more favorable view position Phoumi and Boun Oum.

d) Corcoran should also recommend that Savannakhet group propose meeting of National Assembly in Luang Prabang to review current situation in Laos.

e) Finally Corcoran should reiterate to Phoumi our continued opposition any attack by Savannakhet group on Vientiane. Such an attack might weld Vientiane forces and PL at time when military in capital are showing increasing restiveness toward PL.

f) If Phoui is to play any role relative these negotiations it should not be cast as attempt merely to bring Souvanna and Phoumi together, but more broadly as attempt to bring about solution which would bring non-Communist Lao leadership together. Main point is that you should avoid giving Phoui impression that objective of these negotiations is to support Souvanna as Prime Minister.

FYI. Re Bangkok’s 818,⁵ Phoui, who had just left Paris, in conversation with Parsons in Tokyo October 24 alluded to alleged tripartite agreement and also expressed concern that British and French FonMins and Secretary had decided in New York to pursue French aim along lines Sarit’s representation thereof to British Ambassador Bangkok. Parsons assured Phoui this was not the case.

Our underlying idea in foregoing is that if Phoumi can be persuaded adopt reasonable attitude toward National Assembly Delegation and gain their understanding of his position, some ground work will be laid on basis of which Phoui might later be able bring about reunification Phoumi with an RLG under Phoui’s leadership. End FYI.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–960. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Usher and cleared in substance with the Department of Defense and in draft with Parsons and Merchant. Repeated niact to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 895, November 9, the Embassy reported that Souvanna told Brown that he had asked the Thai Government to help him get Phoumi’s agreement to open discussions. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 440.
4. See footnote 2, Document 445.
5. In telegram 818, November 7, Johnson reported that Sarit was concerned over an alleged “secret agreement” by the United States, United Kingdom, and France during the recent U.N. General Assembly session to accept Souvanna Phouma as the head of a neutralist Laos. In addition, Sarit believed that the French had instigated the Kong Le coup to achieve this end. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–760)