Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

456. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 15, 1960—6 p.m.

865. From Corcoran.

1. Flew Savannakhet November 15 accompanied by Hasey, spent one and one half hours with General Phoumi Nosavan presenting Department’s views along general lines notes prepared Bangkok on basis Deptel 511 and 513² to Vientiane and cleared by Ambassador Johnson and by Mr. Holt representing Ambassador Brown. Naturally it was necessary modify portion of notes concerning Phoui–Souvanna Phouma–Phoumi meeting Luang Prabang in light of fact Phoumi and entire Revolutionary Committee had spent November 14 in Luang Prabang where they had discussions with King and Phoumi at least briefly encountered Phoui. I did tell General Phoumi that Phoui had told me in Bangkok he had met General Thanom and explained to him that he, Phoui, had no political ambitions in current crisis except to contribute to its solution. Also told him Phoui had told us initiative already taken by certain groups of compatriots Savannakhet, Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang to organize resistance appeared most sound and merited his active support and that he ready cooperate unreservedly with them. Also mentioned Phoui’s awareness he absent from country for several months and not familiar recent developments. Phoumi said he regarded Phoui as one of most important politicians in Laos and no personal reason why he could not work with him. He would not commit himself to cooperation Phoui in advance knowledge latter’s plans but saw no obstacle to liaison between them since Phoumi had representative Luang Prabang and Phoui free travel Savannakhet. When I made points U.S. desire avoid situation resulting in two RLG’s each claiming loyalty and thereby perpetuating division anti-PL elements of country Phoumi politely challenged this view. He said best way to bring about change present government would be set up new revolutionary government embracing most of country and calling for constitutional reform.

2. Concerning Phoumi–Phoui–Souvanna Phouma meeting Phoumi had no objections but he did not think Souvanna Phouma would respond royal invitation since he had already gone on record to effect King under duress. He felt that even if Souvanna Phouma desired go Luang Prabang PL would prevent him. Said Souvanna very down-hearted as result Luang Prabang coup but expressed doubt Souvanna would want to go to Luang Prabang so long as he felt himself supported [by] PL and French Government of General De Gaulle. Said French circles would probably arrange Souvanna’s liquidation by PL rather than permit him go to Luang Prabang, resign and tell all about alleged French complicity Kong Le coup.

3. Phoumi said he felt that while it worthwhile try to get Souvanna, Phoui and himself to Luang Prabang with view changing present government this could provide only temporary solution and new crisis would arise shortly. Need was for more basic solution including constitutional revision to strengthen power of King, of National Assembly and of individual ministers while diminishing power of Prime Minister. Savannakhet group had such revision under study. Also under study was proposal for eventual simplification national flag as recently reported Bangkok press. During visit Luang Prabang Revolutionary Committee had proposed King remove Souvanna and dissolve National Assembly. King had declined on grounds well known constitutional scruples. Group then proposed to King preparation report conclusions of which would recommend revision of Cabinet. King would be expected take no action except publicly wish group well in its endeavors. King seemed squeamish about this and reserved position. I took occasion mention U.S. view that NLHX should not be included in new government and that their inclusion would be disastrous. Phoumi replied that this was a dead issue. Nobody really thought any longer of settling score with PL Lao style. They were now regarded as dangerous enemies under foreign control. I also mentioned U.S. view it would be very unwise consider return of ICC. Phoumi replied this also pretty dead issue now.

4. I mentioned U.S. opinion Souvanna Phouma becoming increasingly isolated from anti-Commie elements in country including Vientiane. Said situation moving rapidly to stage where grouping of these elements against him might be possible. Said situation appeared to be developing to advantage patriotic anti-Commie element. Nevertheless extremely delicate. If for example Phoumi forces should attack Vientiane the delicate balance would be completely reversed in favor of Commies. This was the one thing that would weld PL and anti-Commie elements in Vientiane together again behind Souvanna Phouma. U.S. Govt felt therefore Phoumi must not make any move to attack Vientiane; Phoumi replied blandly that he agreed and that this was precisely why he was not going to make any military move against Vientiane. Also he was not going to make any move which would risk loss of U.S. support on which he depended.

5. This led me to ask for Phoumi’s estimate politico-military situation in Vientiane and his current opinion Kouprasith’s capabilities. Phoumi replied radio intercept yesterday indicated Kouprasith had been replaced as Chief of Staff FAL by Colonel Bounma. He felt Kouprasith had probably made some effort to resist PL but had also collaborated with them and issued orders to PL to attack Savannakhet forces. In past two days there had developed a quarrel between Kouprasith and PL over question of pay and rank and between Kouprasith and Kong Le over the use of certain trucks. He felt PL had probably maneuvered Kouprasith into trap.

6. Phoumi expressed confidence he had military situation Luang Prabang well in hand and stated Ouane and Houmphan, latter ill, in Luang Prabang and both expected Savannakhet today or tomorrow. Ouane in Muong Sai would be flown to Savannakhet. Phoumi had refused his request for stopover Luang Prabang enroute. Made it clear he still distrusted Ouane and had low opinion of him. Diagnosed Houmphan’s illness as severe hangover from too much rice alcohol. (On entering Phoumi’s HQ I met and exchanged amenities with General Sing who was setting on the front porch obviously very much at loose ends.)

7. Phoumi volunteered info that Somsanith under date Nov 9 had sent proposal Phoumi meet with National Assembly delegation at Bangkok, Phnom Penh or Saigon. Phoumi said Revolutionary Committee meeting later today to consider this offer. They had no intention refusing it and he expected they would make constructive counter offer that delegation come to Savannakhet under assurances full immunities but not of course immunities of National Assembly members since Savannakhet no longer recognized National Assembly. Almost in next breath and with straight face Phoumi said he already could round up some 20 Deputies outside Vientiane area and if Somsanith and associates came to Savannakhet he might have majority of National Assembly which could vote no confidence in Souvanna Phouma. He admitted Deputies unlikely participate in such action so long as families behind in hostage situation Vientiane.

8. Phoumi eventually came around to the troop pay question by stating King told him yesterday that when asked by Assistant Secretary State Parsons during visit whom he wanted U.S. to support, King had replied he wanted U.S. to support Savannakhet forces. Phoumi said he also had gotten impression U.S. had decided support his forces and he could not understand why U.S. would not furnish pay except on condition he submit to Vientiane. In line nature my current instructions and in view time and energy expended this subject in past meetings, I said only that I thought that this was an issue that could be resolved at a Luang Prabang meeting.

9. At close of meeting Phoumi asked me extend his respectful greetings to Admiral Felt whom he knew to be in Bangkok and to tell Admiral Felt he hoped U.S. would continue to support him.

10. Comment: I made every effort keep conversation on friendly plane but in light my reiterated instructions I felt obliged set forth Department and Embassy Vientiane views with great precision except for aforementioned modification portion of my approach concerning Luang Prabang meeting to take into account fact Phoumi had already been there. Nevertheless I must report that I had impression Phoumi and I were talking at cross purposes many times during discussion notably in reference to Phoumi–Souvanna Phouma–Phoui collaboration, necessity avoiding competing governments and troop pay question. It appeared to me Phoumi did not think line I was taking jibed with his estimate his present power position or his estimate increasing PL political power Vientiane. In discussing troop pay question he said he expected to have serious desertion problems shortly because unable pay troops. Concerning latter question I feel bound suggest that Embassy Vientiane, understandably concerned about problem “legality” Souvanna Phouma government, consider following question:

“Are we under present circumstances Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Xieng Khouang, Savannakhet and Pakse prepared to stand pat on the troop pay question even if this means disintegration of FAL forces outside Vientiane area?”

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1560. Secret; Niact. Also sent niact to Vientiane and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 8:54 a.m.
2. Documents 453 and 454.