455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vientiane 1

514. 1. Situation appears to be heading toward complete perhaps disastrous break among non-Communist elements.2 While it question how far we can now influence situation, we should nevertheless seek [Page 959] to implement as much of plan defined in Deptel 5133 as possible. In particular a) we should ascertain from Phoui whether there is any possibility of inducing King call meeting Luang Prabang of Phoui, Souvanna and Phoumi and convene National Assembly there (Deptel 507);4 b) Corcoran should proceed Savannakhet as instructed Deptel 513 and seek find out what Phoumi’s plans are. Corcoran should particularly stress importance of coordinating any move against Vientiane with Kouprasith as you have [been] instructed by other channel.5 Corcoran should also make clear to Phoumi that Vientiane military have been changing attitudes toward Pathet Lao and would appear ready cooperate with him against PL. Review of traffic raises question whether this point has ever been made to Phoumi.

2. Since Ouane appears to hold key position, we should seriously consider whether we cannot in some way dissuade him from moving on Luang Prabang.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1460. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Chapman, cleared in substance with SEA and the Department of Defense, and approved by Parsons. Also sent niact to Bangkok and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Apparent reference to information in telegram 925 from Vientiane, November 14, in which Brown reported that Souvanna had informed him of his intention to retake Luang Prabang by force. (ibid., 751J.00/11–1460; included in the microfiche supplement)
  3. Supra .
  4. Document 452.
  5. Not further identified.