Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 23, 1960—6:40 p.m.

513. Bangkok’s 854 and Vientiane’s 917.²

1. We believe action along lines recommended by Phoui in numbered para 1 Bangkok’s 821³ preferable to action recommended para 2 Bangkok’s 854. It is our hope that if King can get Souvanna to Luang Prabang for meeting with Phoui and Phoumi he can with their help obtain Souvanna’s acquiescence in convening National Assembly at Luang Prabang.

2. As stated Deptel 507⁴ our objective is to get adequate pressure on Souvanna to force his resignation. Unless Souvanna resigns we have doubt concerning legality of government established by King. If Souvanna remains Vientiane and sticks to position he took with Ambassador Brown as reported Vientiane’s 912⁵ and supported by his communiqué on November 21 [12] (Vientiane’s 911),⁶ pursuit of recommendation para 2 Bangkok’s 854 could well result in situation where we had in effect two governments each claiming to be legal. In such situation we might find British, French, and Australians continuing recognize Souvanna and while we and our allies in SEA recognized King’s newly formed government. Our position would be complicated by fact that action by King recommended by Bangkok would be at best of dubious legality under terms of Lao constitution and would be even further weakened by fact that, even if we could persuade King take such action, his conversation with Phoui (Bangkok’s 857, para 6)⁷ indicates we could not persuade King his action was constitutional.

3. Another difficulty arises from ambivalent but nevertheless key position of Kouprasith. If under foregoing set of circumstances Souvanna continued maintain his government was legal, Kouprasith would probably remain loyal to Souvanna. As result Kouprasith might then be thrown into closer collaboration with PL much as was case with Kong Le earlier. We would thus lose possibility carrying Kouprasith with us, separating him from PL and having his support in preserving Vientiane from PL takeover.

4. Thus our objective in getting Souvanna to Luang Prabang is to force his resignation by combination of pressure to do so from King, Phoui, Phoumi, Ouane, and Houmpanh and if necessary by vote of no confidence in National Assembly convened at Luang Prabang. Department would of course be strongly opposed to reappointment of Souvanna as Prime Minister any new Cabinet. Would in fact prefer he not be in Cabinet at all. However believe would be worth accepting latter if this essential to avoid difficulties cited in paras 2 and 3 above and if this served deter PL from armed takeover of Vientiane. Should be noted that we estimate Souvanna might be mollified by offer post in new Cabinet, if such mollifications essential, but that he would not be willing serve under Phoui and with Phoumi and would therefore decline such offer.

5. Following actions recommended:

A. Authorize Bangkok’s recommended message from Corcoran to Phoui, as we anxious get Phoui’s further views ASAP.

B. In resultant conversation, Ambassador’s representative Luang Prabang should also pass to Phoui our other views already set forth Deptel 507 and message already sent via other channels.

C. Corcoran should proceed Savannakhet to make approach to Phoumi as set forth Deptel 511. Should also stress Phoui–Phoumi collaboration as suggested para 5 Bangkok’s 854 to Department. Should explain to Phoumi our desire avoid creating situation resulting in two RLG’s both claiming legality and thereby perpetuating division anti-PL elements of country. Pending receipt info that Phoui actually urging King call meeting of Phoumi, Souvanna and Phoui and convene National Assembly in Luang Prabang, Corcoran might simply say that we urging Phoui do this. Stress to Phoumi confidential nature of our approach to him.

D. Re pay, believe best tell Phoumi this is issue which could be resolved at Luang Prabang meeting. If necessary to clinch argument, Corcoran could add we reluctant press Souvanna further on this issue now for fear we might be obliged make further commitment to him in return for favorable action. Souvanna unlikely make concession in face Phoumi’s exploitation Region 1 coup. We agree with Vientiane that we cannot give Phoumi unconditional guarantee pay him one way or another. Bangkok may inform Sarit accordingly, adding that pay issue is just one more aspect of problem we hope solve by plan set forth Deptel 511 to Vientiane.

E. Re Vientiane’s 913,⁸ see no objection Khamphan Panya’s suggestion Phoumi send liaison officer to Luang Prabang, but presume this not intended as alternative to Phoumi’s participation in meeting called by King.

F. Not clear on reference to Ouane and Houmpanh proceeding Savannakhet. However agree advantages their remaining Luang Prabang. They could manifest their support of Phoui and Phoumi in Luang Prabang just as well as by going to Savannakhet—if that was to have been purpose their visit there.

G. Re Kouprasith, we still not too confident in him, but on basis your recent message⁹ and USARMA 121235Z cite CX–215¹⁰ appears e would support Phoui solution. Seems from here be better he not show hand until Phoui emerges as Prime Minister, unless this should become necessary as means of putting additional pressure on Souvanna to resign.

6. If Souvanna refuses to go to Luang Prabang we will have to turn immediately to some other plan. In preparation therefore CT should have plan for and ASAP begin implementation of exfiltration enough deputies from Vientiane so they can meet in Luang Prabang and vote no confidence in Souvanna. We also interested in indication Dr. Oudom Souvannavong who has anti-PL record may now be interested in working with other like-minded leaders in Vientiane.

7. If above plan or alternative devised by CT does not succeed, believe we would then be faced with necessity getting King to take action suggested para 2 Bangkok’s 854 regardless of risks involved.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1360. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Usher and cleared wth L/FE, the Department of Defense in substance and Parsons in draft. Repeated niact to Bangkok and priority to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 854 from Bangkok, November 13, Johnson suggested that the United States encourage the King, Phoui, and Phoumi to work together, and that the King suspend the Assembly, dismiss Souvanna, and form a government without Souvanna or the NHLX, which could then reestablish contol of Vientiane. In telegram 917 from Vientiane, also November 13, Brown disagreed with Johnson’s advice. (Both ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Paragraph 1 of telegram 821, November 8, outlined a plan by Phoui whereby the King convened the National Assembly at Luang Prabang to debate a motion of censure on the Souvanna government leading to its overthrow. A new government would be formed immediately which would reside in Luang Prabang and adopt a policy of reconciliation among all Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–860; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Document 452.
5. See footnote 2, supra.
6. The Lao Presse communiqué announced that Souvanna could not foresee accepting any decision that the King might be forced to take under pressure of force. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1260)
7. Telegram 857, November 13, contained the summary of a letter from Phoui to Corcoran, November 10. Paragraph 6 noted Phoui’s disagreement with the King’s possible action to force the resignation of the present government. (ibid., 751J.00/11–1360; included in the microfiche supplement)
8. See footnote 4, supra.
9. Not further identified.
10. Dated November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1260)