Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 28, 1960—10:26 p.m.

466. As pointed out by Secretary Irwin (Hong Kong 777)² our problem re Souvanna Phouma is not to let his use of us permit him to achieve a policy contrary to US interests, while we are trying use Souvanna to solve our awkward political situation. Events of past few days indicate that Souvanna’s usefulness in achieving essential US objectives is about at an end and that his use of us can be very damaging to those objectives. We especially fear that nature of Souvanna’s position vis-à-vis PL and Kong Le on the one hand and Phoumi forces on the other is creating situation in which will of FAL to resist PL attacks can be fatally undermined. This especially true if such attacks accompanied by PL propaganda charges that attacks justified because doubtful loyalty of FAL forces (including those of Houmphan) to Souvanna government. FAL would have no motivation to fight back in situation where Souvanna, apparently supported by US, taking adamant stand against Savannakhet group. In these circumstances, particularly if rumored Kong Le–PL attack against Savannakhet forces were to materialize, we fear whole anti-PL position in Laos could be demolished. Our apprehension has been heightened by additional evidence contained Vientiane’s 839³ that Souvanna striving obtain our backing to eliminate Phoumi from scene, as contrasted with earlier statements by Souvanna that he wanted our backing to help him stand firmly against PL.

There follows a résumé of certain other pertinent background considerations which have led us to a redefinition of our immediate problem in Laos and a plan of action for meeting that problem. Department considers we moving into new phase and plan of action set forth below should be used as guidance in period ahead.

Recommendations requested for implementation this plan of action particularly with respect to means of exfiltrating deputies from Vientiane and establishing liaison with the various Lao elements, i.e., King, Phoui, Houmphan, Ouane and Phoumi, as well as the line we should take with them.

I. Background Considerations

1. Souvanna has not acted upon any of conditions set forth in our 384⁴ as requirements for our support of him and for Phoumi’s unconditional support of Souvanna. One possible exception is that he still maintains that he is standing by his two preconditions to substantive negotiations with PL. However either Khamking’s report to us (Embtel 446)⁵ of counter conditions advanced by PL as requirements for their acceptance of Souvanna’s preconditions was untrue, or else Souvanna has seen fit to ignore this unacceptable move by PL in his discussions with you.

2. Since setting forth our four conditions in 384 Phoumi has not taken any action against Souvanna and has in fact expressed himself willing to a) support Souvanna if latter accepted these conditions, b) dissolve his revolutionary committee if King would recognize this dissolution, and c) make constructive response to any reasonable proposition from Souvanna. However Souvanna has not met any of four conditions, King was unwilling to recognize dissolution Phoumi’s revolutionary committee because he thought such dissolution at this time would be unwise, and finally Souvanna has not in fact made reasonable proposition to Phoumi.

3. Souvanna is rapidly losing or has lost sympathy of all important non-Communist leadership elements in Laos. Ouane and Houmphan are prepared to declare themselves opposed to Souvanna’s government but have been restrained from making such declaration by us. Inpeng, Boun Oum and Ou Voravong have in past indicated readiness resign from government.

4. King is opposed to Souvanna and apparently desires to have Ouane and Houmphan declare against Souvanna as preliminary to establishment by King of para-military government in Luang Prabang.

5. Conclusions: It appears from foregoing that Souvanna will not be able to pull Army and non-Communist Lao elements together and provide leadership to country in standing up to PL threat.

6. Problem is to make transition to government which can accept these objectives without inciting a) desperate reaction by Souvanna directed against US, or b) general outbreak of military action by PL forces.

II. Plan of Action

7. Exfiltrate from Vientiane to Luang Prabang enough members of National Assembly so that there could be established in Luang Prabang quorum of National Assembly. (We gather there are already over dozen deputies outside Vientiane.)

8. After discussions with Phoui in Bangkok (in which we would point out reasons for our concern about present predicament of Souvanna’s government), encourage Phoui to go to Luang Prabang at time to be determined in light of developments.

9. Authorize Ambassador Brown to make another démarche to Souvanna in which he would point out that we fear Souvanna is in process of losing country to PL because he has not insisted on observance of his two preconditions to substantive negotiations and has not been able to deal effectively with Kong Le–PL control of Vientiane.

10. Regardless outcome démarche it appears any one of three possible events would create situation in which King would probably issue, and Souvanna would probably seek to comply with, request for Souvanna to come to Luang Prabang to consult: a) vote of non-confidence by Assembly; b) coup against Souvanna in Vientiane by Kong Le group in attempt to put in Souphanouvong or Quinim as Prime Minister; c) declaration from Ouane and Houmphan at Luang Prabang against Souvanna government.

11. Souvanna would then go to Luang Prabang and after discussions with King agree negotiate with Phoui an understanding pursuant to which Phoui would be asked by King to form government that might include Souvanna. Such government would also include strong representation of old LHL and CDNI groups, perhaps including Phoumi as Minister Defense or SecState for Defense. Conceivably Ouane could remain as Commander-in-Chief with Bounleuth as FAL commander in south. Problem of placing Phoumi in such setup is recognizably difficult in view fact he not on good terms with either Phoui or Souvanna and lacks confidence in Ouane. Apparently requires arrangement in which Phoumi would be ranked below Phoui and Souvanna but above Ouane.

12. Outcome of such solution would appear to be one which would be fully acceptable to all non-Communists in Laos as well as commend itself to British, French and Australians. Would probably be acceptable also to Thais; and Vietnamese have already expressed themselves as favoring Phoui government. Souvanna could accept such an arrangement because he has worked with Phoui before and because Phoui is not Phoumi man and Souvanna would therefore not lose face vis-à-vis Phoumi.

Foregoing should be considered in light (a) possible breakdown of situation described Embtel 829,⁶ and (b) necessity avoiding situation in which Souvanna exploits foreign support from both sides while failing take steps which advance US objectives of unity and integrity of country.

13. Department considers would be best not discuss this plan with other governments at this time.

14. Bangkok’s 763⁷ just received indicates Phoui’s ideas developing along same line as above. Would be useful for Corcoran have early conversation with him to explore Phoui’s ideas on how accomplish Phoui’s proposals, inasmuch as he may have simpler and therefore more practicable approach than that set forth above and it would be of course highly desirable have Phoui accomplish this objective with minimum trace of US assistance.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2860. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Usher, cleared with SEA, G, and Merchant in substance, and approved by Parsons. Repeated priority to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Document 437.
3. In telegram 839, October 28, Brown reported that Souvanna informed him that Phoumi had to be removed from Laos and asked the United States not to think of him as indispensable. Souvanna also told Brown that if the United States ceased to support Phoumi, he would “disappear.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2860; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Document 421.
5. The reference is in error; telegram 446 from Vientiane, August 31, does not contain any report from Khamking. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–3160)
6. See footnote 8, Document 438.
7. Not found.