439. Editorial Note
At a meeting at the Pentagon beginning at 11 a.m. on October 28, representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense conferred on Laos. The first topic they discussed was a memorandum prepared by Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin proposing four courses of action to improve the military capability of anti-Communist forces in Laos. Irwin’s memorandum called for: 1) a speed-up of delivery of supplies to Phoumi and the Lao Armed Forces in Military Region 1; 2) assistance to Phoumi’s forces in regrouping, reorganization, and training; 3) help for Phoumi in military and political planning, and 4) stationing of PEO personnel as Lao military advisers at the battalion level. (Memorandum from Irwin to Gates, October 28; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2093, Laos 091; included in the microfiche supplement)
Under Secretary of State Merchant made two comments on Irwin’s memorandum. First, he asked the representatives at the meeting to remember that it was U.S. policy to achieve a political settlement in Laos without a civil war. Second, Merchant agreed with Irwin’s first three points, but not the last. U.S. advisers at the battalion level, Merchant stated, risked the threat of “volunteers” from North Vietnam and worldwide damage to U.S. interests should their role be made public. There was general disagreement by the participants along agency lines whether or not the Lao wanted U.S. advisers. The disagreement then moved to the most basic issue: whether the United States should work through Phoumi or Souvanna Phouma and who was more trustworthy.
[Page 934]The discussion returned to the issue of U.S. advisers at the battalion level. Assistant Secretary Parsons suggested that members of the Royal Thai Police Aerial Resupply Unit (PARUs) should be used as advisers in Laos. Merchant agreed that the PARUs were preferable to U.S. officers, but suggested that this was an issue for the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to decide.
The group then discussed a draft of telegram 466, infra . Parsons again raised the need for a political settlement in Laos and suggested that the draft telegram provided a legal way to support Lao anti-Communists. Irwin thought the action proposed in the draft was “excellent” Asked what would be Kong Le’s and the Pathet Lao’s response to the proposed government, and how would the United States react, Parsons suggested that if Kong Le and the Pathet Lao attacked with North Vietnamese support, the United States would use SEATO and the United Nations. Parsons also raised the possibility of unilateral U.S. action. Merchant summarized the sense of the meeting by stating that there was agreement on the course of action in the draft and that the Departments of State and Defense would take a hard look at the problem of battalion advisers. (Memorandum of discussion at the State–JCS meeting, October 28; Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328; included in the microfiche supplement)