438. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

835. Ref Bangkok’s 735, 745 and 746 to Dept.2 Propose send Corcoran back Savannakhet with following instructions upon receipt Dept’s approval which hereby requested:3

[Page 931]
1.
Phoumi was advised by Sec Irwin and Adm Riley that US would support him in effort maintain integrity FAL and defend against PL on condition and only on condition he followed US advice. To this he fully agreed (Bangkok’s 686 to Dept).4 He should be held to this agreement. We cannot afford allow ourselves get in position where he can disregard or hedge on our advice and still continue get our support.
2.
Because of circumstance which you admirably explained Phoumi, we are obliged furnish supplies to different regions independently, according their needs for best defense country. Chief PEO and Amb Vientiane are judges these requirements and tempo their supply, not Phoumi. He is not overall commander anti-Communist operation throughout country. You should make these points unmistakably clear to him.
3.
You should not allow yourself get in position arguing with Phoumi as to motives and capabilities Ouan, Souvanna or others, or bargaining with him as to conditions our support his effort in south or those of others elsewhere.
4.
After establishing foregoing points, you may tell him that he has been treated more than generously in comparison with First Region. (Will give Corcoran details tomorrow.) He has been provided with two hundred fully equipped paras from Erawan despite RLG request send them elsewhere. He has been sent technical personnel and supplies necessary maintain and make his aircraft airworthy. MAP supplies being furnished southern regions according same criterion their needs as others. If he is sincere desiring combat PL he should applaud rather than criticize dropping supplies to northern troops actually attacking PL.
5.
You may tell Phoumi neither Emb Vientiane including CH/PEO nor Sec Irwin nor Amb Riley have the slightest doubt genuineness anti-Communism Houmphan. We convinced Ouan feels same, also Kouprasith.
6.
As far as Seno is concerned, he should consider himself fortunate Seno base available at all for operation supplying Second, Third and Fourth Regions, and must realize the delicate international problem involved in the use Seno for these purposes.
7.
On pay, we perfectly willing accept normal peacetime procedures, which only legal way can and must operate. Vientiane paymaster will bring down Sept pay in usual manner. By same token, Phoumi must follow normal peacetime procedures, by sending documentation for October pay to Vientiane so that money can be prepared and brought down by Vientiane paymaster.
8.

You should advise Phoumi King unwilling publicly acknowledge statement loyalty for reasons given Embtels 824 and 825 to Department5 but that King agrees committee should be dissolved if status dismissed officers and civilians restored. Continued existence committee hampers US position internationally and consequently our capacity help Phoumi. Absence any sort of accord between north and south frustrates objectives US policy. (Bangkok’s 716 to Dept6 approved by Dept’s 445 to Vientiane.7)

Only possibility we see of break in impasse reflected Bangkok’s 735 and Embtel 8298 to Dept is dissolution committee. In my view, this would give chance beginning restoration some form north-south and FAL unity in face enemy which so desperately needed. (Bangkok’s 676 to Dept.)9

Souvanna has agreed US support Phoumi southern regions despite Phoumi’s rebel status. Next move is up to Phoumi to extricate himself from the status, so as enable US continue its support without running grave international risks and being dependent on Souvanna’s permission and to make possible beginning unification without which his country cannot long survive in independence.

9.
You may advise Phoumi that if and when he agrees dissolve committee and before announcement I will endeavor obtain Souvanna’s agreement withdrawal proposed ordinance dismissing him, Bounleuth and other officers from Army and officials from their positions.
10.
FYI: There are increasing straws in the wind here in Vientiane indicating stiffening resistance [to] PL on part Souvanna and other groups on which we should endeavor capitalize. End FYI.
11.
So far as Phoumi’s military activities are concerned, he must be made to follow Riley’s advice (Bangkok’s 686 to Dept, paras 5 and 7) and not think of doing anything more until this achieved.
12.
I realize this difficult assignment, but unless we display utmost firmness in making Phoumi comply with his promise be guided by our policy, we will completely lose control. The slightest give on our part will constitute surrender, given Phoumi’s temperament. He is [Page 933] already wriggling hard on the hook; e.g., his letter to Sarit.10 If he gets off we are in untenable position and delicately poised applecart in Laos will certainly be upset.
13.
In view Phoumi letter to Sarit, Ambassador Johnson may wish consider telling Sarit position we take with Phoumi these issues and reasons therefor.
Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2760. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In these telegrams, October 25, 26, and 26, respectively, Thomas Corcoran, on temporary assignment from CINCPAC POLAD, reported on a trip he made to Savannakhet, October 24–26, and his discussions with Phoumi, Boun Oum, and the rest of the Revolutionary Committee. (ibid., 751J.00/10–2560, 751J.00/10–2660, and 751J.00/10–2660, respectively; all included in the microfiche supplement)
  3. In telegram 464 to Vientiane, October 28, the Department of State concurred in the sense of these instructions, but instructed Corcoran to deliver his remarks in “a more amicable manner.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–2760; included in the microfiche supplement)
  4. See Document 431.
  5. Telegram 824, October 25, contains an account of the discussion between Brown and King Savang on October 25. In telegram 825, also October 25, Brown reported more specifically on the King’s unwillingness to accede to Phoumi’s request for a public Royal recognition of his loyalty in return for dissolution of the Revolutionary Committee. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2560; included in the microfiche supplement)
  6. See footnote 2, Document 435.
  7. Document 436.
  8. In telegram 829, October 26, Brown reported that Souvanna said that he had no intention of negotiating further with Phoumi who had rebuffed all his attempts to reach an accommodation. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–2660; included in the microfiche supplement)
  9. See footnote 4, Document 432.
  10. Not further identified.