Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

437. Telegram From the Consulate General at Hong Kong to the Department of State ¹

Hong Kong , October 22, 1960—2 p.m.

777. Department pass Defense. CINCPAC for POLAD. From Irwin. Re Vientiane’s 771,² 787 and 796³ to Department, Deptels 425 and 428⁴ to Vientiane and cable from Brown to Department draft of which Parsons and I concurred in prior to departure from Bangkok on October 21.⁵

Although in agreement with actions being taken with Souvanna Phouma in accordance references and believe Ambassador Brown should be congratulated on effective handling to say the least confused situation, believe desirability of solving awkward political position of US should not obscure other aspects of situation.

• First: Course of action approved in references in effect suspends course of action proposed in Deptel 384.⁶ Souvanna Phouma will keep government in Vientiane at least for time being and will continue negotiations with PL assuming PL doesn’t put forward impossible conditions.
• Second: Souvanna Phouma wishes and I believe if at all possible intends to reach agreement with Pathet Lao and hopes to do so on basis of 1957 agreement. Revival of 1957 agreement now will have different repercussions and results than in 1957 if for no other reason than PL is stronger and has experience of what happened to NLHX as result of execution of 1957 agreement. However, he believes this type agreement with PL will bring peace to his country and that if he fails resign or is removed the result will be war. But it does not follow that if Souvanna Phouma reaches agreement with PL that peace will follow, except peace of continued effort by PL to take over government from within, or that US interests will be served.
• Third: In order to achieve his policy Souvanna Phouma must hold his government together. This means he must retain support even though lukewarm of first region. Vientiane’s 771 cites Souvanna Phouma as stating first region “absolutely indispensable” to him. With it he can “talk strongly to PL” and break off talks if PL insists on going “beyond frame which he had set”. We do not know what “frame” he had set for negotiations only that he has told us 1957 agreement. He has also said that 1957 agreement was not fully carried out although I believe US thinks RLG did carry it out. Point is we do not know how far he will go either voluntarily or under PL pressure.
• Fourth: Anti-government sentiment exists in first region as shown by Ouan in Luang Prabang and his attempted resignation, by Houmphan’s anti-PL view, action against PL and communication with Phoumi and by King’s talk with our group. Souvanna Phouma is well aware of this and believes US has influence on course of first region. See his request in reference Vientiane 787 to Ambassador Brown that US not seek detach first region from his government. Thus while we are using Souvanna Phouma to solve our awkward political situation, Souvanna Phouma is using us to keep his government together and permit his negotiations with PL to continue. Problem is not to let his use of us permit him to achieve a policy contrary to US interests and which it might be in power of US to affect if we wish.
• Fifth: We should recognize Phoumi’s contribution to preservation of an anti-Communist base in Laos. Without Phoumi it is doubtful if first region would be able to take stand it can today. I realize that if Phoumi had joined Souvanna Phouma’s government he might have been able to hold the government to a reasonably firm line with PL. However, this is not certain given Souvanna Phouma’s policy of negotiation and Kong Le’s seeming power position in Vientiane. In any case if Phoumi had not remained staunchly anti-Communist US ability to exert pressure on Souvanna Phouma in my opinion would have been greatly weakened. Consequently although Phoumi may have faults he is extremely important today to the success of US policy. We should make every effort to control him and we should keep faith with him and support him not to take over the government but eventually to be an important part of any new government. In our meeting I told him that if he cooperated with US and followed the guidance and counsel of Jantzen and Brownfield the US would support him. I think that is an obligation, a responsibility and an opportunity of the US.
• Sixth: Souvanna Phouma has announced that the PL has accepted two of his three pre-negotiation conditions:
  • One, that they would accept a supervised truce. Parsons conjectured on disagreeable thought that this could present opportunity to PL to press for reestablishment of ICC.
  • Two, that RLG civil control would be restablished in Samneua.
  • On third condition, the rearming of FAL units in Samneua by PL who had disarmed them, Souvanna Phouma said something to the effect that the FAL units would be rearmed but didn’t specify by whom. New course of action helps Souvanna Phouma keep government alive, keep it in Vientiane and carry on negotiations with PL.
• Seventh: If Souvanna Phouma should fail resign or be removed tempo of PL and DRV attacks will increase substantially. The US must be prepared for this eventually and should use time, which may be short, gained as result of working agreement with Souvanna Phouma to strengthen Phoumian and other anti-Communist forces. PL have increased in strength, have deployed all over country, witness the ring around Vientine and capability to attack in other four regions. Doubtless PL will also use “time” to strengthen their position politically and militarily.

Comment: Based on relations and above seven points I think that Souvanna Phouma’s using of us and our using of him (see fourth point above) is fair exchange only on short-term basis. Advantages are that US support to Phoumi and others is legalized, that time is gained to strengthen anti-Communist FAL and to seek a better political alignment either in or as successor to present RLG and that some, though questionable how much, possibility is offered to lessen Kong Le influence and power and thus regain Vientiane without military action. Disadvantage (1) is use to which Souvanna Phouma might be able to put this breathing spell in order to advance a policy contrary to US interests and the time it gives to PL to strengthen themselves politically and militarily. It is by weighing these advantages and disadvantages that I conclude course of action outlined in references is desirable but on a short-term basis. Further that it is advantageous only if we are able to strengthen Phoumi, Houmphan and other anti-Communist FAL. This to my mind calls for more than just matériel. It calls for the planning and guidance which Jantzen and Brownfield can give Phoumi to help him consolidate his political and military position in the third and fourth regions and strengthen him and the anti-Communist forces in the second region and which PEO [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can give to Ouane and Houmphan in first region, all of course under supervision of Embassy Vientiane.

Two courses of action have recently been open to US. One, the course of action decided upon in references, and two, urging first region to declare against Souvanna Phouma government and to join forces with Phoumi in the hope of altering the character of or bringing down Souvanna Phouma government. If course one should result in trend unfavorable to US interests, we should not hesitate to attempt course two. With either course I believe that US will be in better position than situation which existed at time decision made to send Parsons mission to SEA.

Parsons’ comments: I hope Department will study Secretary Irwin’s excellent message with great care as it sets Laos problem in most useful perspective. While I agree on almost every point I would add to last thought we should use time gained not only to strengthen non-Communist FAL but to encourage and strengthen politically those in Vientiane and elsewhere who would restrain Souvanna from fatal concessions. More generally speaking I think it difficult among quick-sands that beset course of Laos events to foretell in advance whether any particular alternative such as course two in final paragraph will be best one for us when moment of decision arrives.

I agree, however, that we do now have a second string to our bow and since Souvanna must know of it we have added leverage. It also seems clearer that he does not want to break with us, at least not now.

Holmes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2260. Top Secret, Limit Distribution. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Bangkok, London, Paris, Canberra, and CINCPAC.
2. In telegram 771, October 18, Brown reported a conversation of that same day with Souvanna in which they discussed the Pathet Lao threat and the U.S. wish to supply all Lao forces willing to fight the Pathet Lao. (ibid., 751J.00/10–1860; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 433.
4. Documents 432 and 433.
5. Apparent reference to telegram 716 from Bangkok; see footnote 2, Document 435.
6. Document 421.