Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, September 2, 1959—8 p.m.

549. At Council representatives restricted meeting this afternoon I strongly urged importance discussion contingency planning against possibility RLG appeal for SEATO assistance, taking line contained Department’s 470 (repeated only Vientiane and CINCPAC).² Made liberal and effective use of Vientiane’s 496 and 497 to Department.³ Information contained these latter telegrams had not yet been received by any other Council representatives and served shock them out of complacent assumption that Laotian situation could be relied upon drift along with little possibility anyone required make any hard decisions.

As other representatives were reluctant enter into any meaningful discussion without instructions, no decisions were reached except to recommend to governments urgent attention be given to matter and instructions requested that would permit meaningful discussion, if possible, at another meeting to be held prior to scheduled September 15 meeting. During course discussion I especially pointed out pertinence MS/147/13/59 to present situation, suggesting representatives urge on their governments importance giving necessary instructions to MPO and military advisors permit agreement at earliest possible date. Chief MPO,⁴ who was present, confirmed to Council representatives that presently no agreed military plan existed if SEATO decided reply affirmatively to an appeal from Laos. Chief MPO also pointed out necessity for governmental decisions as set forth paragraph 14 enclosure 1 to MS/147/13/59.⁵

As some representatives, particularly UK and France, opposed issuance any communiqué, correctly pointing out communiqué is not normally issued following Council representatives meetings; agreement was reached that if questioned by press, Secretary General authorized to say that Council representatives held their usual discussion of developments in the treaty area. If asked whether Laos was discussed, he was authorized to reply affirmatively pointing out it was “a part of the treaty area”. UK suggestion also adopted that SG be authorized to state: “that organization is watching events in Laos closely but no action seems called for as things stand”.

During course of discussion I mentioned reply contained Deptel 480 Department intends to make to inquiries.⁶

More detailed account follows.⁷

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–259. Secret; Priority; Seato. Also sent priority to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh, London, Paris, Manila, Canberra, and Wellington.
2. Supra.
3. Both dated September 1, telegrams 496 and 497 reported on reverses suffered by Royal Government troops at the hands of opposing forces, some of which were alleged to have entered Laos from North Vietnam. In telegram 496, Ambassador Smith stated his belief that the attack had “grave implications.” (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–159) See also footnote 2, Document 253.
4. Brigadier L.W. Thornton of New Zealand.
5. This paragraph pointed out the necessity for prior agreement on specific matters regarding the SEATO force so that implementation of the plan not be delayed. (MPO Plan 5B/59 (MS/147/13/59), July 13; Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files, Reel S–2–59)
6. In telegram 480, September 1, the Department stated its intention to reply to press inquiries that it anticipated that the Council Representatives would meet that week for a general review of the Communist threat to the SEATO area, during which it could be expected to assess the Lao situation. “Department is emphasizing privately to pressmen that SEATO very much in background re Laos and probably will remain so unless situation changes markedly.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–159)
7. Telegram 574 from Bangkok, September 3. In it, Johnson reported that the French Representative at the meeting had disparaged reports that recent insurgent action in Laos included the use of training areas in Vietnam, and stated that in the absence of external interference in Laos, the issue would be one for the United Nations. Johnson noted that he had agreed to the latter assertion, but pointed out that SEATO was obliged to consider various contingencies under which Laos might seek help. (Ibid., 790.5/9–359)