Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, August 31, 1959—8:28 p.m.

470. Re Embtel 503 repeated Vientiane 68² and CINCPAC 36.³ Suggest in your discretion you might take line in restricted session September 2 that although we see no immediate probability SEATO being called upon to intervene in Laos situation, and hope this can be avoided, if situation does deteriorate suddenly and drastically SEATO may receive appeal for assistance in face of which it could be called upon to act quickly and decisively. Such action might be required in several fields including military, political and psychological. Council Reps may therefore consider appropriate to discuss where SEATO would stand in such circumstances and what plans can now be developed enable organization step in effectively if called upon.

Among possible topics which might be discussed could be the following:

1. Necessity for refinement and updating of MS/147/13/59.⁴

2. Political factors which might enter into effort and ensure SEATO receives maximum freedom of action in meeting Lao request for assistance, including interrelationship potential SEATO courses of action with possible simultaneous consideration of problem UN. Scope and degree of support UN membership would be of particular importance.

3. Psychological factors which must be contended with in rallying support of world opinion and in countering inevitable Communist propaganda attacks against SEATO in consequence its action.

Aside from above and any other points you may deem appropriate, suggest you may wish discuss latest actual reports situation Laos. Department requests Embassy Vientiane supply you direct latest analysis of situation for such use.

Issuance of appropriately worded communiqué could have advantage dampening down overplay of speculation and of helping to ensure that everybody says same thing about what transpired at restricted session. As we assume fact of meeting will be known to the Communists, Department sees no need to publicize for that purpose. We accordingly could go along with any communiqué written in very low key or with agreement among delegates that, if queried about meeting, they will say meeting was held to discuss developments in area since last meeting and that they will refuse to be drawn out further.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/8–2859. Secret; Niact. Drafted in FE; cleared with Parsons, in IO/UNP, and in substance with OSD/ISA; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 503 from Bangkok, August 28, Johnson stated he had informed Pote Sarasin that the United States favored a special meeting of the SEATO Council Representatives on September 2 to discuss the situation in Laos. (Ibid., 790.5/8–2859) He had been instructed to do so in order to “further emphasize seriousness with which we view situation in Laos.” (Telegram 433 to Bangkok, August 26; ibid., 790.5/8–2659)
3. Not found.
4. Reference is to SEATO contingency plan MPO 5B/59, dated July 13. This was a contingency plan for the introduction and maintenance of a SEATO force to assist the Lao Government in countering Communist insurgency in a contingency in which: a) the Lao Government appealed to SEATO for assistance; b) the SEATO Council consented to the request on condition that it and the Lao Government jointly agreed on the mission of the SEATO force and overall direction of operations remained the responsibility of the Lao Government; c) the Council invited a member nation, to be known as the “appointed nation,” to be responsible to it for the conduct of operations by the SEATO force; and d) Communist countries were not overtly intervening in Laos, but were covertly providing possible support to the insurgents. (Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files, Reel S–2–59)