Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 28, 1959—8:53 p.m.

1324. Time precluded immediate response to your 1798² amidst other pressing operational matters Christmas Day. Department however believes your reftel requires comment.

On day your 1759³ was received indicating possibility of coup steps were taken immediately to preclude very erroneous assumption which you consider probable if coup consummated. British, French, Australian colleagues were called in and given full briefing on basis current information from Vientiane and we shared with them our estimate and judgment as to best course of action. Colleagues were read practically in toto instruction sent you in Deptel 1295⁴ which was repeated to all capitals concerned so that no one in possession of facts could be under any misapprehension or in dark with respect our policy (Deptel 1302⁵ and separate message to Canberra⁶). Our colleagues in Washington made privy to instructions recognized possibility very point you raise but were without exception convinced we were taking right stance and that if our posture of silence might one day be interpreted as Machiavellian gesture in favor of coup this would merely have to be met when and if it raised its head.

It should also be recalled that question of interpretation of constitution was major issue in this crisis and that resolution could be achieved either by coup or by compromise. Given nature of Lao and past experience we thought latter somewhat more likely.

In making decision re appropriate posture and action we have had to keep clearly in focus that our objective is a non-Communist government in Laos with which we can work. We cannot get into business of irrevocably committing USG to individuals, groups or factions if in doing so our flexibility and freedom of movement in any set of circumstances in Laos are lost to say nothing of our influence as well when our favored individual groups or factions defeated. As you know we have been supporting all anti-Communist groups in various ways and urging unified effort on all.

There has been no “about face” apparent or otherwise unless our refusal to back Phoui as an individual through thick and thin come what may is interpreted in that fashion. For us to have endorsed course of action which you suggest we might have done by bringing pressure to bear on FAL and CDNI would have been evidence to them that our interest in retention of Phoui at all costs was objective rather than preserving as much anti-Communist unification as possible. In circumstances you described we considered degree of intervention in Lao internal affairs which was apparently required to be both inappropriate and dangerous to our future position in Laos.

While we have no personal quarrel with Phoui—quite contrary—and have meant every word we have said with respect to our support for him this must always be on assumption that as Prime Minister he could contrive some means lead a government which could work vigorously insure security and will bring Laos security in this critical period. It clear that formation of weak LHL government and subsequent Assembly action brought on volatile and unstable situation beyond influence of any outside power to control. Under these circumstances Department could not commit US to intervention on behalf of individual who although in our opinion best qualified in Laos was seemingly unable to rally the right support. We could not make empty threat of cutting off support to other non-Communist elements for in pursuance our overall interests we could not have carried through the threat without the most dire consequences.

Our 1308⁷ reiterates general principles for presentation to King. If his action results in retention of Phoui in some acceptable coalition it would in our view be all to good but if majority of Lao leaders including King do not find this acceptable we naturally must acquiesce. We shall continue to keep these points as clear as possible before our free world friends, especially those with whom we work most closely, and can only expect they will accept our reasons for retention of this position as being in best interests of what we are all trying to bring about in Laos.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2859. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Steeves and Parsons, cleared by Anderson, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Paris, London, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
2. Document 313.
3. See footnote 6, Document 308.
4. Document 309.
5. See footnote 2, supra.
6. Telegram 252 to Canberra, December 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2359)
7. Supra.