Office of the Historian

314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, December 25, 1959—9:27 p.m.

1308. Vientiane’s 1793 and 1797.2 In view confused status of alleged “takeover” by FAL Department fully realizes extreme delicacy of situation facing you. It difficult determine what steps might be taken at this moment. However, it appears to us that most constructive step now would be for you seek audience with King. If you concur, you authorized seek audience and couch presentation along following lines:

1.
Ask King for his assessment of current situation in order for you give clear report to your Government.
2.
Reiterate US desire that Lao settle their own internal difficulties but our deep interest in their fortunes understandable.
3.
As events in Laos have become of world-wide interest internal developments carry international consequences which have to be taken into account. We feel confident therefore His Majesty will use his high position in moderating action to maximize continuing support of all friends internationally and minimize opportunity for exploitation of situation by enemies of Laos.
4.
You should emphasize again that in eyes friends of Laos most stable basis for RLG would involve greatest feasible collaboration between LHL, CDNI and FAL.
5.
FYI: In making your appeal to King re point 43 you may assure him that the US is not protecting or fronting for any individual, group or faction, and by same token not lending our influence to bring about anyone’s rejection. Lest he surmise we acting subtly to oust Phoui you may use such names as Phoui, Phoumi as illustrating strong elements which we could only hope would be welded together in common cause. Other outstanding representatives from LHL, CDNI and FAL will of course come to mind. End FYI.
6.
You should inform your British, French and Australian colleagues of your démarche to King in order to keep them fully aware of our efforts and our line of argument.

Merchant
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2559. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Steeves, cleared with SEA and Merchant, and approved by Steeves. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩

  2. In telegram 1793, December 25, 2 p.m. Vientiane time, the Embassy invited the Department’s attention to an intelligence report that a coup against Phoui began at 9:30 a.m. Vientiane time on December 25. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2559)

    In telegam 1797, December 25, 9 p.m. Vientiane time, the Embassy stated there was “no coup today.” The Embassy also reported that the FAL considered the Phoui government “illegal as of tomorrow” and had asked Phoui to issue a proclamation ending the Assembly’s powers. The Army, police, and much of the civilian government were refusing to take orders from the Phoui government and therefore he was expected to resign. If he did not do so in 3 days, the CDNI and FAL would force him out. (ibid.) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.

    ↩
  3. As reported in telegrams 1834 and 1838 from Vientiane, both December 28, Smith was unable to make the points suggested above to the King because he was denied an audience. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2859) Earlier, Smith reported in telegram 1806, December 26, that he was able to see Kou Abhay, President of the King’s Council, on the afternoon of December 26 and presented to Kou Abhay the four points. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2659) The Department of State responded in telegram 1316 to Vientiane, December 27, that Smith could at his discretion inform Phoui as well. (ibid.) In telegram 1822 from Vientiane, December 28, Smith reported that he had informed Phoui of the four points. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2859) All these telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.↩