Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 22, 1959—7:49 p.m.

1295. 1. Your 1759² confirms our earlier analysis that CDNI–FAL probably with King’s active encouragment will not accept continuation new government beyond December 25. In light this situation following guidance provided which you should follow unless instructed otherwise.

2. In considering political situation we increasingly concerned over apparently inexorable trend our becoming involved ever more deeply internal Lao affairs. We face very real danger being so committed that we become scapegoat for all ills and target all grievances while at same time losing with all factions measure of influence we have so far enjoyed.

3. In what is essentially struggle for power, interpretation of Constitution has become central issue. It appears opinions of King and CDNI on one hand and Phoui and LHL on other are seriously held and deeply felt. (We note Constitution is silent as to what institution has power of interpretation.) For us to inject ourselves into this issue on either side would almost certainly be strongly resented. Moreover it questionable degree to which we can in fact influence situation.

4. Wish also to recall formula advanced our 1051³ was only suggestion which appeared to us reasonable compromise between factions but that formula could be adjusted if it served insure cooperation (Deptel 1081).⁴ Essential objective in our view remains preservation of unity all anti-communist elements. Responsibility of division which has occurred must be shared by Phoui. The apparently impending palace-endorsed action to change government may be way for Lao achieve degree of unity of anti-communist elements where Phoui has failed.

5. It is Department’s conclusion therefore that our long-term interests would be best served if we now step aside and permit Lao to work out new relationship among themselves. Rather than take sides in immediate internal political tug-of-war, you and your staff should save your influence to effect reconciliation of opposed factions and encourage them devote their energies to essential problems of Laos. If your opinion on present political problem is requested you should state interpretation of Constitution is Lao affair and confine your concern to those actions which may have possible serious international consequences. This would include first of all sensitive issue fate of jailed NLHX leaders. We oppose violence or bloodshed on this as on other issues. If Lao engage in untoward excesses, it is US as Laos’ strongest friend whose interests would be deeply involved. Lao leaders should therefore exercise greatest prudence and restraint.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2259. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Chapman; cleared with Steeves, Anderson, and Parsons; and approved by Dillon. Repeated to London, Paris, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See footnote 6, supra is this what supra refers to? check! TODO .
3. Document 292.
4. In telegram 1081, November 19, the Department of State clarified its instructions on U.S. support of the anti-Communist factions by stating that it did not insist on the specifics of the formula advanced in telegram 1051. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1859; included in the microfiche supplement)