313. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1798. Pass ACSI. Deptel 1302.2 I consider it most important we conceal our exact knowledge so far in advance of CDNI–FAL plan. I will be greatly surprised in event coup actually comes off if British, French and Australians here, if they learn that we knew about this so much earlier this week and let it happen without either warning Phoui or stopping FAL, will not find it full and incontrovertible evidence of the dichotomy of US approach they have long suspected. In view known close relations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CDNI and PEO and FAL and of complete financial dependence of FAL on US aid, they can hardly be expected to believe we could not have stopped it if we had wished and as they currently and fully briefed they will recall terms of our official advice to all factions. They knew and approved Phoui’s actions under his program to bring harmony among conservatives in accordance with our advice. They knew that CDNI flew squarely in face of our advice but nevertheless appeared to continue to be supported.
While Heintges assures me that General Ouan does not know that he passed his revelations on to me I feel sure Ouan and Phoui both assume that he did and it seems possible they might even use with Phoui the argument that he might as well join them since we let him down and supported them by knowing of plot and not warning him or stopping them. Even if they do not use this argument Phoui and rest of deputies who represent parliamentary mandate could hardly be blamed if in the future they are skeptical re advisability of ever again following solemn US advice when it is inconvenient politically and personally. However, I am sure Department must have weighed all three possibilities before instructing me and my staff stand aside, and my problem now if Phoui does not compromise and coup comes off as planned is simply that I would appreciate instructions re lines Department wishes me and my staff to follow in our off-the-record remarks to Lao, UN, and foreign missions here re (1) our position before, [Page 716] during, and after coup, (2) our appraisal present situation. Embassy must be prepared explain its apparent about-face in manner which best protects US interests.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2759. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated priority to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, and London. Received at 1:55 p.m.↩
- In telegram 1302, December 23, also addressed to London, Paris, CINCPAC, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok, the Department of State informed these posts that Department officers had met separately with British, French, and Australian representatives to inform tham about the potential change in the government in Laos. Department officials used the instructions in telegram 1295 to Vientiane, Document 309, as the basis of their explanation of U.S. policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2259; included in the microfiche supplement)↩