Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

312. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 24, 1959—11 p.m.

1784. Reference: Deptels 1295,² 1298,³Embtel 1779.⁴

1. Re paragraph 2 reference telegram 1295. While I am also increasingly concerned over apparently inexorably increasing US involvement Lao internal affairs and this concern principal motivation Embtel 1500,⁵ Embassy can not see easy way out since any sudden withdrawal now would scarcely preclude our becoming “scapegoat for all ills”. Present planned step-up UN role and in Britain and other lateral [bilateral?] aid may help reduce extent US will continue be “target all grievances”.

2. Re paragraph 3 1295, constitution is not “silent as to what institution has power interpretation”: Article 44 constitution clearly states: “it is incumbent upon National Assembly to interpret definitively text of constitution” (il appartient en dernier ressort a L’Assemblée National d’en interpreter le texte”). This clause forms part of original constitution and not been nullified by amendment.

3. I seized opportunity conversation morning December 24 (reference Embtel) make clear to Prime Minister along lines paragraph 4 reference telegram 1295 that “formula advanced” to RLG by Department was intended only as suggestion “which appeared to us reasonable compromise between factions” that “could be adjusted if it served ensure cooperation.” I further stressed (paragraph 5 1295) that any “interpretation of constitution is Lao affair” and that, bearing in mind principal goal was achievement unity, if Lao found it necessary disregard temporarily some details of the constitution it was US view that would be up to Lao themselves. We were naturally interested in all major internal developments in Laos but particularly concerned over any that might have unfavorable international repercussions and said that “first of all this would include sensitive issue fate of jailed NLHX leaders”. “We oppose violence and bloodshed on this as on all other issues. If Laos engages in untoward excesses, it is we as Laos’ strongest friend whose interests would be deeply involved.” I said I felt sure he understood it was never intended that Lao Prime Minister himself or any other Lao leaders should feel bound follow to letter these suggestions; submitted for study and consideration only in effort help Laos maintain its independence from Communist domination.

4. I will of course continue carry out Department’s instructions promptly and meticulously. Nevertheless felt obliged invite attention fact in Embassy’s opinion Department’s estimate that “responsibility of division must be shared by Phoui” is not fully accurate assessment, except for his unfortunate and now highly regretted press statement, in that Prime Minister to our certain knowledge made tremendous effort in response Department’s 991 and 1051 during crisis to conciliate all groups and most particularly CDNI. Even now he appears [have] intention so doing. From here difficult fully understand Department’s continuing unstinted though largely unrewarded support CDNI, some key members of which patently pursuing and have pursued personal not Lao national interests and certainly not those of US despite fact that as directed Deptel 1081⁶ I personally kept our “views forcibly before them”.

5. We have now carefully “stepped aside” to “permit Lao work out new relationship among themselves” but I am still hoping that, if his hand not forced by FAL, Phoui will even now be able succeed in working out democratic and constitutional solution free from dangers to us of arbitrary rule by Royal decree.

However fear CDNI, having now ascertained no US reaction to carefully calculated revelation to Heintges, will no longer hesitate force Phoui’s hand.⁷]

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2459. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to London, Paris, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Document 309.
3. In telegram 1298 to Vientiane, December 22, sent in response to telegram 1762, supra, the Department noted that telegrams 1762 from Vientiane and 1295 to Vientiane crossed in transmission. In telegram 1298, the Department added a clarification to telegram 1295 (Document 309). It stated that the situation was “too confused to warrant any direct action on our part. We could very easily take misstep which would rebound to our ultimate disadvantage and embarrassment.” Therefore the instructions sent in telegram 1295 “must stand as guidance.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2259)
4. In telegram 1779, December 24, Smith reported a conversation with Phoui on December 24. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2449)
5. See footnote 2, Document 300.
6. See footnote 4, Document 309.
7. Smith amplified this argument in telegram 1 785 from Vientiane, December 24, and stated that it seemed certain to him that Phoumi and Ouan, having ascertained no firm U.S. reaction to Ouan’s revelation to Heintges, were now planning a coup on December 26 or 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2459; published in the microfiche supplement)