Office of the Historian

311. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, December 23, 1959—2 a.m.

1762. Department pass DOD niact for ACSI. Embtel 1759.2 Following based on limited distribution discussions reference telegram with DCM and chiefs political section, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] USIS and Army Attaché:

1.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] checks with leading elements civilian and military members excluding General Ouane indicate no knowledge alleged coup plan. Can not overlook possibility Ouane statements true, but being carried out without knowledge CDNI central committee. It would seem highly unlikely if plan is true, that Ouane would give Prime Mininster 48 hours notice during which he could prepare counteraction employing military units allied with him. Therefore, we feel one of followng three estimates most realistic:
A.
Ouane deliberately made coup statements to Heintges knowing they would be passed to United States Embassy and expecting Embassy to inform Prime Minister which would result aggressive move on Prime Minister’s part and then excuse counteraction on part of Ouane, which would place FAL in position to turn back full powers to King.
B.
Statements could be merely another example of Ouane’s boasting as he has done in numerous occasions during past two years. More than likely Ouane has actually prepared plan to counter any military action on part of Prime Minister or General Sing, but that in speaking to Heintges he enlarged upon it imaginatively as is frequently his practice.
C.
Ouane has plan of action to support King in event King declares assembly and government expiration as of December 25, which many CDNI members still hopefully feel may occur.
2.
In view possibility that this mere effort at provocation on part of Ouane to entice Phoui into attempted repressive actions recommend that I be authorized to make appointment see Prime Minister late afternoon December 23 to ascertain indirectly whether Ouane in fact had presented ultimatum requesting Prime Minister resignation. If Prime Minister does not attempt move up appointment or then gives no indication of such having occurred I desire keep entire subject quiet and not discuss with Prime Minister lest we fall into Ouane’s trap.
3.
However, chance Ouane really intends going through with ultimatum, strongly urge I be authorized have Heintges inform Ouane immediately that he had double checked with me on what would happen if army attempted to bring present government to end on or after December 25 by threat or use of force and that he had found my instructions were to immediately suspend all military assistance payments and deliveries if this happened and that Heintges felt in best interests FAL he should warn Ouane of inevitable consequences before he took proposed step.
4.
In view position taken recently with CDNI, FAL and King under Deptel 991 and 1051, assuming Ouane’s statements may be true, we do not feel that United States Government can now stand idly by and permit Ouane, presumably on behalf FAL–CDNI and King attempt achieve by threat force what they have been unable to accomplish by legitimate constitutional means. While we have little fear that Phoui would bow to such an ultimatum we feel it must be avoided if we are to hope for real conservative unity in next elections. Furthermore, unless we react strongly and promptly, the neutralists and much of friendly world might well believe true obvious resultant Communist charges that this an American supported move to get anti-Communist extremists and Army back in control.
5.
Please advise niact.3 Embassy, ARMA, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] PEO continuing discreetly check all contacts likely knowledgeable.
Smith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2359. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated niact to CINCPAC for POLAD and to London, Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok. Received at 5:39 p.m.↩
  2. See footnote 6, Document 308.↩
  3. See footnote 3, infra.↩