Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

310. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, December 23, 1959, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, December 23, 1959, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos: Government Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Acting Secretary Dillon
• Director of CIA, Mr. Dulles
• General Persons
• General Goodpaster
• Assistant Secretary Parsons

Mr. Dillon told the President that in Laos there was a fast-moving situation which might lead to a coup d’etat and which we had been following very closely. He then described developments there along the lines of the talking paper dated December 22,² leading up to the latest information which is that the Chief of Staff of the Army may present today to Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone an ultimatum designed to effect a change of government on December 26 when the Deputies’ mandate will have expired. He explained that the rift between the anti-Communist LHL party of Prime Minister Phoui and the anti-Communist CDNI, affiliated elements of the Army and, we understood, the King, had come to a head over the question of how to interpret the Constitution in regard to the Deputies’ mandate and the life of the Assembly. As it was the King who was originally the source of the Constitution, he would seem to have some right to interpret it. Mr. Dillon went on to explain that under Phoui’s interpretation and resultant plans, elections were proposed for April, pending which the present government would continue in power.

The President commented that it would seem to be desirable to get Phoui’s reaction to General Ouane’s ultimatum as soon as possible. The Acting Secretary said we expected to get further word today. The President then remarked that it might be a good idea to set the elections right away, thus resolving the basis of the difference. Mr. Dillon pointed out certain practical difficulties involved, to which Mr. Parsons added that following Communist infiltration and subversion last summer the situation in the countryside made the Lao shy away from elections just now. Mr. Dulles added that he thought the conservative groups would wish to patch up their differences and try to present a unified front before holding elections.

Mr. Dillon then said that faced with this delicate internal situation we had thought it best not to intervene but rather to stand aside and let the Lao work out their own relationships. We would, however, exert our influence against violence and against anything which might provoke outside intervention and we would, as opportunities come along, urge that matters be resolved in an orderly way. The President remarked that this seemed sensible and said that he approved the line we had been following.

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parsons then withdrew, leaving Mr. Dillon to take up several other subjects.

Attachment

LAO POLITICAL SITUATION³

1. Since August 1958 the Lao Government has been headed by Prime Mininster Phoui Sananikone. It was intially composed of members of the Rally of the Lao People (RLP), the major Lao party, and of the Committee for the Defense of the National Interests (CDNI), an association of young, relatively better educated non-Parliamentarians both civilian and military. In January 1959 a number of Army officers close to the CDNI were included.

2. We consider that the RLP, CDNI and Army are the only politically significant anti-Communist groupings in Laos and therefore believe that their unity is essential to the stability and continued progress of the Lao Government.

3. The Phoui Government achieved notable successes in tackling some of the major problems left pending by previous governments: monetary reform, village aid and training the Army. The Government’s progress was stopped by the fighting of the past summer. In fact, we interpreted the insurgent action as an effort by the Communists to preserve their apparatus in Laos and counter the progress which the Government was making in winning over the countryside.

4. While the Government was able to obtain real results, there always existed the sub-surface friction between the old politicians of the RLP and the younger members of the CDNI and Army. In this dispute the King has always sided with the CDNI and Army and has been most critical of the RLP.

5. This friction has now come out into the open. On December 15, Phoui formed a new Cabinet composed wholly of RLP members excluding all CDNI and Army participation. The Assembly (controlled by the RLP) has endorsed this Cabinet.

6. The visible issue which brought matters to a head centers on an interpretation of the Constitution. The King, CDNI and Army consider that the mandate of the present legislature will terminate on December 25, while the RLP has approved Phoui’s position that the deputies’ mandates may be extended to the next election, scheduled for April 1960. We now have information that the CDNI and Army will present Phoui with an ultimatum requesting him to resign on December 26; if not, the Army will take the necessary action to bring about the appointment of a new government. There is reason to conclude that the King would support such a move.

7. We do not believe that an eventual coup would result in bloodshed. We have made clear that Lao leaders should take into account possible international consequences of internal actions. We consider that our interests are best served by avoiding becoming too involved in this situation and by permitting the Lao to establish new relationships among themselves. We have so instructed our Ambassador.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2359. Secret. Drafted by Parsons. On a copy of this memorandum, ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, a marginal notation indicates that Dillon approved it on December 29.
2. Printed below.
3. Secret. Prepared by Chapman. Attached to the copy of the memorandum cited in footnote 1 above.