Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 22, 1959—8 p.m.

1758. ReDeptel 1274,² 1283³ and Embtels 1718,⁴ 1740.³ Chief PEO Heintges has just reported conversation on plane en route Vientiane to Pakse this morning where ceremony opening new rifle range and weapons demonstration took plce in which Ouan told that CDNI–Army plan to threaten Phoui tomorrow with a bloodless coup unless he and his government go to Luang Prabang December 26 and resign. Being reported more detail separate telegram⁵ but indicated coup has been being carefully planned in greatest secrecy by CDNI and Army sympathizers at least since early November. Ouan said he would warn Prime Minister tomorrow of consequences if he does not resign on 26th. Ouan had made arrangements prior his departure for Col. Oudone Sananikone to request appointment for him with Phoui on 23rd. If Phoui refuses appointment CDNI plans go ahead with coup. If Phoui refuses interview tomorrow CDNI will assume that this means Phoui will refuse to resign. Heintges quite sure Oudone Sananikone fully informed and therefore able to indicate significance of interview. Heintges questioned Ouan repeatedly with regard to possibility bloodshed; Ouan insisted that if coup made necessary [by?] refusal LHL government resign, would be bloodless. Ouan absolutely certain that he will have control all elements FAL at time regular Saturday night meeting of Senior Officers Association which normally attended by all key senior officers. Ouan senior officers, where any dissidents will be safely put under control, [sic]

Ouan absolutely sure that King will insist Phoui form new government if present government resigns. Heintges received clear impression that King has positively guaranteed that he would ask only Phoui form new government, and Ouan emphatically emphasized that they wanted Phoui to remain as Prime Minister. Ouan stated that CDNI wished seven places out of fourteen in this cabinet and this would include Minister Defense Ounthone, Mininster Interior Phoumi, Director of Military Affairs in place any Secretary State Defense Gen. Bounthieng recently graduated from Leavenworth. Col. Oudone Sananikone also being offered portfolio.

When Heintges asked what they would do if Phoui simply renamed present cabinet he said he would have no objection to any of them being included in government except that he intimated Katay would have to leave Ministry Interior but because of his importance would be retained in a minor portfolio. Ouan insisted to Heintges that CDNI was not trying to take over government, that there are certain people in government who have no right to be there, have only self interest and are not interested in country but trying to stay in power by unconstitutional means. First unconstitutional thing Phoui had done was to try to shift Khamphan Panya from Foreign Affairs to other portfolio; second to form new government so near end of government’s term; third attempt to prolong government beyond December 25. Ouan indicated that if not unconstitutional at least attempt remove Khamphan from Foreign Affairs portfolio had been attempt contrary to Lao governmental tradition.

In further questioning by Heintges Ouan admitted that formation of government so late in session perhaps not unconstitutional but also against Lao tradition. While in Pakse CHPEO had opportunity to discuss situations in the regions with third and fourth regional commanders who indicated that there would be operations conducted beginning December 25 of minor nature which Heintges interpreted as indicating certain security measures to be taken in region possibly being associated with coup. Heintges present during dictation this telegram and believes covers high points conversation. Heintges explained Ouan had always been exceptionally frank with him. This is outside contingency which my assessment indicated possible though unlikely. I asked [ask?] authorization to warn FAL, CDNI leaders against coup. Inasmuch this not granted, Department’s guidance most urgently sought.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2259. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; No Distribution Outside Department. Received at 1:22 p.m.
2. Document 306.
3. See footnote 5, supra.
4. Supra.
3. See footnote 5, supra.
5. Telegram 1759 from Vientiane, December 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2259; included in the microfiche supplement)