Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

307. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 21, 1959—3 p.m.

1718. Reference: Deptel 1274.² In my best personal judgment (answers numbered according questions reference telegram):

1. It is possible but now appears unlikely CDNI leaders and their adherents in FAL may soon attempt retaliate with major political maneuver or some firm coup tactic. Since statement reported Embtel 1674³ principal CDNI leaders have all except Sopsaisana indicated privately they have no intent attempting take over government on December 25 but instead intend cooperating in jobs outside Cabinet being offered by government. There has been considerable activity among CDNI military officer adherents under leadership of General Ouan, but he maintains and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] all believe he simply moved to be sure that General Sing’s efforts to alert certain units to prevent a coup did not make it possible for Sing himself to organize a coup. However, though unlikely, and [it?] possible both CDNI and Ouan may merely be covering, in view of our firm opposition to coup last Janury, intent to move in response to King’s request they expect after December 25. Phoui when I talked with him before receipt reference telegram did not think so (Embtel 1712).⁴

2. Only possible, however, if King party to plan. Doubtful that King now prepared openly contest decisive assembly interpretation constitution. Seemingly calm acquiesence to new Cabinet believed due King’s frank recognition Phoui had clear right under full powers change his Cabinet as he wished. Phoui’s agreement relinquish full powers concurrent opening special assembly session and his prior announcement that elections would be held soon according electoral law could have been significant factors in King’s terms Saturday’s assembly interpretation electoral law present government would continue until elections. Believe King may be confident elections will sweep present assembly and government out of power. Even Khamphan admits privately that assembly is interpreter of constitution and as he forecast, assembly did support constitutionality continuation mandate present deputies until April elections at least. If King determined to take issue with entire LHL at this time presumably he could still attempt maintain assembly action unconstitutional and [garble] different Provisional Government to prepare for elections in April. I now consider more likely he might attempt such action when Phoui government some time after December 25 requests him to call National Congress to postpone elections and extend mandate until December 1960 or later but Phoui confident can persuade him (Embtel 1712).

3. I do not think Phoui himself has loaded dice by setting up obvious weak shell of Cabinet for Phoui considers this stronger Cabinet than either preceding two because is relatively united. He could hardly have made private deal with King while Katay, Pheng Wong Savan and Bong Souvannovong present and my judgment is that he would be unwilling participate in a different Provisional Government set up by King [garble] present government unless we insisted.

4. I do not think our best role would be to stand aloof and “let nature take its course” in a coup whether royally directed or not, despite any future potentials of strength CDNI and their FAL supporters may have to offer. To do so after representations we made under Deptels 991 and 1051 would cause disastrous loss prestige and reputation for meaning what we say, painfully acquired during July August September 1958 blocking of aid; and furthermore continuation present government does not mean loss future potential strength of small number really valuable personalities in CDNI and Army.

5. I do believe we should be prepared to make strong appeal to King, if appears he about take authority into own hands, to insure that he will not condone actions such as violence to eradicate NLHX prisoners or restrict liberty or constitutional privileges of LHL and their conservative supporters. In other words I believe we should be prepared to warn King we are not prepared support unnecessary violence or coup by unconstitutional or illegal use force. Believe I should immediately be authorized to warn Army and CDNI firmly but quietly to this effect now, and to repeat to His Majesty later if necessary.

6. Obviously it would not be in best interests US for King to intervene. There will be no impasse now unless King creates it. We now have promise of maintenance stability and continuity and even possibility of development of a new unity under Phoui’s leadership of present government if only King and Army can be persuaded to let him convene a National Congress to vote a year extension of Assembly and postpone elections until at least December 1960. Any intervention of King now against present government would be to move against US objectives. Phoui is determined to support and salvage for Conservative Front all elements of CDNI and Army leadership that are really worthwhile and reliable in interests Laos as US sees them. However, neither he nor LHL will again permit them, without voters mandate, to occupy Cabinet positions in which they can again at will paralyze government action desired by majority of Assembly by their “united” blocking tactics. As individual civilian or military officers he will give them every reasonable opportunity but will not help them into positions where as members rump political gang can make ruthless partisan war weakening effective conservative unity against Communists.

7. As to best method strengthening my hand and making US position clear and acceptable, I believe position already made crystal clear to all factions except that CDNI, Army and King may still have belief we would passively accept unnecessary violence against NLHX coup against legally constituted LHL government. Therefore urge I be specifically authorized make clear to Army at least and to CDNI and King if it appears necessary that we would find any effort to block or overthrow by force present legally constituted Government of Laos as being contrary to maintenance stability, unity and continuity dictated by national interests of Laos and that such action would call for immediate drastic reconsideration of extent to which continuation of our support was wanted.

It does not appear necessary to consider sending special emissary or bringing me home for special orders at this time although depending on developments here it seems likely it may become desirable to consider bringing me home on consultation some time after middle January when trend present government becomes more fully apparent.⁵

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2159. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; No Distribution Outside Department.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. In telegram 1712, December 20, Smith reported the main points of a general discussion he had with Phoui on the morning of December 20 concerning the political crisis over extension of his government. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/12–2059; included in the microfiche supplement)

5. The Department sent the following brief response to the advice in this telegram in telegram 1283 to Vientiane, December 21, as follows:

   “Seems we may have gone about as far as we can with prudence without seeming to ‘Mother’ Lao domestic affairs. Should developments suggest further consideration of approach to the throne we will advise. Further comments will follow.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2159)

   Smith replied in telegram 1740 from Vientiane, December 22, that he concurred and observed that there were few, if any, signs of a possible coup at present. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2259) Both telegrams are included in the mirofiche supplement.