Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 30, 1959—11 a.m.

1491. Reference: Deptel 1095,²Embtels 1456, 1485, 1476.³ Although I share, as Phoui, your view that it is essential for young to acquire experience in government and national leadership while older men still on scene, and while Prime Minister also fully appreciates merits of principles on which CDNI founded, he considers and I agree that CDNI has contributed little or nothing that could not have been obtained from Tiao Leuam or Keo Viprakone or Colonel Phoumi or General Ouane without CDNI label and that Khamphan, Sisouk and Inpeng, who seem chief troublemakers have not demonstrated the character, ability, force or patriotic spirit that would have at least partially justified their demand for key roles in the government. They are in addition willfully oblivious of fact “every internal act has external consequences fateful to Laos”. In the interests of the US and SEA, as well as of Laos, I cannot see how the CDNI can be allowed to continue its wrecking policy. Contrary to CDNI accusations, I believe Phoui has by and large endeavored discuss issues, including that of constitutional revision, and speak frankly with young colleagues far beyond traditional Lao limits in such relationships and even went so far as allow Khamphan accompany him to US in October, yet more often than not Prime Minister has come up against stone wall with young especially Khamphan who notoriously sulky, obstinate and uncooperative unless his particular and frequently ill-considered views immediately accepted.

It had been my understanding that US policy was to support the three conservative groups equally on basis full joint efforts being absolutely required to attain desired goals. However, as far as I am aware assistance we have accorded CDNI [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] far surpasses that given LHL so it scarcely surprising CDNI has impression it outweighs LHL in our estimation and Phoui might well question our sincerity in repeatedly stating our confidence in him while at same time bulk our material backing goes to those who undermine his government with obvious exception of few such as Tiao Leuam.

In point of fact problem of CDNI raised its ugly head again at my meeting with Phoui November 27 when he asked me how it would be best resolve it once mandate extended and Cabinet strengthened (Embtel 1485).

1. Phoui feels, and I concur, that dominant CDNI young see no lasting need cooperate with him and other older wiser LHL as long as they think they can rely on Army support. Since difficult session with King November 23 for example, ring leader Khamphan Panya has been “extremely active in seeking out military” presumably in effort defeat Prime Minister’s plan for prolongation present legislature. While Phoui does not fear Khamphan can win out unless by coup d’etat which highly unlikely, he does think time has come to remove military from political arena thereby depriving CDNI of its major anti-constitutional prop.

2. Phoui correctly pointed out that CDNI was created as “lay association” to support and not to negate RLG’s reform actions and anti-Communist policies. Now it had clearly though covertly or indirectly become nothing less than an opposition political party and thus operating illegally and irregularly inasmuch as its statutes specifically provide it was not to be a party. Furthermore military are in theory forbidden from engaging in political activities. If all members of CDNI persist in adhering to it, LHL should also be allowed recruit members from Army. Up to now this never attempted though LHL leaders have frequently questioned Phoui on this manifest injustice and Phoui’s reply to date has been that his party cannot properly invite military to join. Nevertheless if CDNI does not reorganize, Prime Minister may have to suppress it as illegal or yield to LHL desires. (Souvanna Phouma indicated to me he had advised Prime Minister thus to suppress CDNI if it did not return to its original character which Souvanna had approved as Premier with distinct understanding it would never become political party (Embtel 1476).) I am puzzled as to what actual unique or unselfish contributions are believed by Department to have been made by CDNI.

3. One of CDNI’s tactics to win grass roots following has been with FAL’s assistance to distribute tin roofing, building materials and tools with CDNI claiming credit in direct competition with RLG’s rural aid program. When I queried Phoui as to source CDNI’s funds for this purpose he stated they came from “US special services” allotted directly to FAL which also sometimes helped with special air transport. Much the same true of government sponsored “youth rallies” according Phoui. I told him that this could not be true. He asked me to double check as he was certain that it had been true even if it now halted temporarily, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

4. Phoui also asserted that many Lao and some diplomatic missions here distrust the “revolutionary CDNI” which so closely affiliated with armed forces fearing lest power will eventually be taken by them in order suppress democratic regime along lines Thailand, Burma, Pakistan. No one dared protest openly however, as CDNI still generally understood to be officially supported by USG. King himself deluded into believing that CDNI once in power will restore absolute monarchy and this why he has risen to bait of possible coup d’etat. Phoui’s opinion that King playing with fire and that, should CDNI-FAL take over, present Lao-US policies would immediately be scuttled.

5. In view above Phoui envisages two alternative solutions: Either (A) CDNI abandons de facto status of political party and reverts to original purpose its founding, thereby enabling military to continue membership or (B) CDNI openly emerges as regular legal party and excludes military entirely. Latter would then set up their own “benevolent” organization for their “good works program”. What he would most like would be full and fair merger CDNI with LHL.

I have been fully aware of fact that Phoui will hesitate to use me as an “element favorable to him” only insofar as he fears I might find out and contradict. This I have done already on three occasions. However, as you know, I have had to give appearance, at least within US circles of some partisanship toward Phoui in order to counterbalance clear appearance of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] partisanship for CDNI which only relatively recently brought under control.

Comment: Friction between young and old would be much easier to neutralize if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activities here were confined to “appropriate operational measures fully coordinated” by me. This, for reasons of which you are already aware, has [not?] been easy to accomplish. I believe however that it may be possible to do so [3½ lines of source text not declassified], I expect to comment further [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on alleged CDNI ascendancy in near future as I feel Department possibly misled in this connection. I also will wish to comment on possible shifts in status of our overall approach here which may call for some special foresight and support for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activities in months to come in other fields that are not now necessary.

Am commenting separately economic aspects reference telegram.⁶

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–3059. Top Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].
2. Document 295.
3. In telegram 1456, November 25, Smith reported a conversation with Phoui in which the Prime Minister summarized a Lao Cabinet meeting of November 23. Phoui described the meeting as “stormy and rough” and the King’s reaction on all issues as “violent,” but noted none of the major issues facing Laos was resolved. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2559) Telegram 1485 has not been found in Department of State files. In telegram 1476, November 27, Smith reported on a private luncheon conversation with Prince Souvanna Phouma on November 24, in which the Prince expressed the view that he had not approved formation of the CDNI as a political party and he now favored abolishing it. (ibid., 751J.5/11—2759) Telegram 1456 is included in the microfiche supplement.
6. See Document 299.