299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1509. For Parsons from Smith. ReDeptel 1095.2 Following are my comments on economic portions of reference telegram. Fully appreciate that comprehensive character Embtel 1300 makes rapid analysis and response quite impossible. Whole point was to raise for consideration by top level US agencies concerned the far reaching implications of this message. Even pending receipt additional telegram treating specific economic and aid questions, I feel it necessary correct certain misapprehensions that appear to have been created by reference telegram. It was not my intention nor indeed Tobler’s to level “wholesale indictment on our entire effort to date,” nor to imply that “all of what we planned and set in motion for eventual stabilization of situation in Laos has been ill-conceived or worthy of abandonment merely because it has not met our full expectations.” Fact of matter is that if number of our efforts had not been successful this country would undoubtedly already be down drain. What we did say and what I wish reiterate today is that effort taken as whole has not been nearly successful enough and that Tobler and I consider our programs in Laos likely prove “too little and too late” unless major changes in magnitude and significant changes in method and administration are undertaken soonest.
I agree that message may have been somewhat imprecise and sweeping but I concurred in it because I felt that Tobler on basis of intensive briefings and keen observation had succeeded in wrapping up in one short piece a piercing assessment of basic problems that beset our effort. This approach synthesized our soul-searching talks over past six weeks and placed in current focus the basic problem, elements of which have been reported by me over past many months. We agreed that this assessment should be forwarded to Department and ICA as boldly and as frankly as possible. Had this presentation been duly caveated with credit for past efforts and attempt made to balance out good with bad, central thrust of what Tobler had to say would have been lost.
I should also like emphasize that Tobler was sent out here with specific mandate from Riddleberger to take an over-all look at our posture and to report to him directly on what he found. Further he has [Page 686] specific instructions from Riddleberger “to make Laos a clean show.” Thus bold thinking of this sort would appear to me to be basic ingredient for accomplishing his mission.
This is not evidence of frustration which develops from our inability to produce desired results. It is much more fundamental than this and when Tobler speaks of programming for failure, he means merely that desired results will simply not be achieved with tools he has at his disposal under current programming. When he said that the program was built on quicksand, he meant that effort taken as whole was simply not designed to buy us success and that instead we were spending highly disproportionate amount of our time simply bolstering foundations under multiplicity of our approaches. In this I also concur.
This reference was not directed at PEO training program which Tobler feels has been considerably more successful generally speaking than training programs undertaken on civilian side. Nor indeed was Tobler directing his criticism at monetary reform. While he still has misgivings on some of indirect consequences of monetary reform, he would be among first to say that the reform in itself was necessary first step. Having seen something of pre-reform period and played part I did in finally bringing monetary reform into being I feel even more certain than Tobler of its high value and its success. Finally, I have found Tobler alert in grasping political significance of the many things we do and when he addresses himself to the military side of our program, he is viewing it not as military expert for which he is not qualified but rather from viewpoint his own efforts and political consequences of our efforts [1 line of source text not declassified].
Finally, we do not agree that “our lack of progress is ‘solely’ chargeable to Lao lack of experience, non-existence of proper institutions and internal insecurity.” While it is true that Lao carry lion’s share of responsibility for lack of progress made, we too have been lax in providing soon enough the kinds of trained highly-skilled and French-speaking personnel that were absolutely essential in early days of our program. While progress has been made in this direction, it is still not enough and USOM will simply not succeed in its task unless this hurdle can be overcome.
In conclusion I would like to reiterate that whole purpose of this message was to try to give you and Riddleberger insight into our deepest thoughts, no matter how unpalatable they may be because we feel so strongly that course we are following is not going to succeed. We were thinking only of the present and the future about which we can all do something and not much concerned about past judgments which must have seemed justified at the time. It seemed to us quite clear that unless action were taken immediately under recommendations [Page 687] we jointly formulated, if indeed it is not already too late, we should look to a UN solution for problem of Laos. As you know since sending this message, we have further pursued this approach in our country team message3 and are even more convinced now than we were then that this would have substantial advantages to US. We fully recognize that the advantages must be weighed with obvious disadvantages inherent in this solution but they in turn must be weighed with the ability, indeed the desirability, of US continuing to carry this free world burden alone. Separate message on this subject will have reached you prior receipt this message.
There is one further thought I should like to add. We were shown earlier this fall how very easy it was for the opposition to undermine our whole posture in this country. With all due respect to efforts we and Lao have made, it was not those efforts but rather the rumblings in SEATO, appropriate speeches made, and lightning action of UN which pulled us out of hole. Disturbances of this sort could reoccur at any moment and in fact are occurring now albeit on smaller scale throughout Laos. We were not prepared then nor are we now to cope internally with a repeat performance and I am not clear why you feel that the “embarrassment which would face us in moving forward on many aspects of current programs inaugurated as result careful and laborious effort agreed to by many departments of USG,” would be greater than the embarrassments that would result from failure to face squarely facts now at hand.
I am sure you will understand that our Embtel was not meant to criticize or belittle in any manner the tremendous and vital efforts made by you and others in Washington which have kept Laos afloat to date.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–159. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.↩
- Document 295.↩
- Telegram 1500, November 30; see footnote 2, infra.↩