Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

296. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 25, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Commentary on New York’s 477² (attached)

1. In FE’s opinion the Secretary General’s report on Laos³ should be read with two factors in mind:

a) The Lao have immeasurable confidence in the UN and in its Secretary General whom they regard with awe. A gentle and polite people, they would be apt to speak along lines they thought would be pleasing to their guest.

b) The Secretary General approaches the situation in Laos with certain definite views, notably that the only long-term solution requires mediation between Vientiane and Hanoi; that the events of last summer were in part provoked by the strong anti-Communist stand of the RLG, as well as by too strenuous activities by the U.S.; and that there exists considerable tension within Laos itself.

Thus his statement that the tension in Laos is predominantly domestic in nature (paragraph 1) and his report of the King’s statement that “although it was ‘useful’ to have claimed mountain people were being subverted by Communists, real story is that two peoples (Lao and ethnic minorities) have fought for hundreds of years.” In fact, we consider that the basic situation in Laos, a country made up of isolated self-sustaining villages, is essentially stable. While it is true that there is little sympathy between the mountain people and the plain-dwelling Lao, and that occasional fighting has occurred, the tension between the various ethnic groups has been grossly exaggerated. The Secretary General, in his report, noticeably makes no mention of North Vietnamese participation or of the historic link between the Pathet Lao and North Viet-Nam. Yet the fighting and agitation that have taken place since July and spread throughout the country cannot be interpreted simply in terms of internal tensions. Even the UN Subcommittee found that the rebels “receive support from the territory of the DRVN.” (Paragraph 97 of its Report.)⁴

2. The King’s revelation that he had been in communication with Ho Chi Minh has not been known to the Department or to CIA. However, it may be questioned whether these communications went beyond formal exchanges of greetings and whether they might be considered “as a favorable development which argues against freezing the situation which is fluid and thereby disrupting this link.”⁵ King Savang has in the past been emotionally anti-Pathet Lao and anti-Viet Minh and it would seem passing strange if he had maintained personal communications with Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the country whose divisions came within 30 miles of the royal capital in 1953.

3. The Secretary General’s statement that the RLG would “welcome” the return of the ICC (Paragraph 6) should be read in the light of the two factors cited in paragraph 1 above. The Secretary General has maintained that the Geneva Agreement was still applicable to Laos and the Lao may perhaps have deferred politely to his strong opinion. We doubt, however, that the RLG has altered its firm opposition to the reactivation of the ICC.

Regarding the Secretary General’s argument that the function of border observation belonged properly with the ICC,⁶ L/FE submits “that observation of the Lao borders is a proper function of the ICC if carried out for the purpose of regulating the introduction of military personnel and war materials (Article 27(c)) into Laos.. Further, it is believed a persuasive argument can be made that such observation is a proper function in the exercise of the ICC’s power to supervise the execution of any of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement (Article 27(a)). It might be added that having once allowed the ICC to reconvene in Laos for the purpose of carrying out border inspections it might be difficult, from a legal point of view, to limit its activities only to these border inspections.”⁷

4. Despite the above reservations regarding the Secretary General’s report, we consider his proposal to undertake a substantial UN effort to assist in the economic development of Laos as sound. The problem, which Kuznetsov himself raised, may be to find funds. However, if this UN effort is limited to bringing in technical assistance, the magnitude of funds required may be manageable. Furthermore, limiting the UN to technical assistance would have the further advantage that it would bring numerous technicians and experts to Laos. The arrival of other foreigners would seem to be in line with our interest in trying to reduce the size of the American presence in Laos, or at least to make it less apparent by blending it in a larger international community.

1. Source: Department of State, SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, 312 UN Presence, 1959. Secret. Drafted by Chapman and cleared with Usher, Anderson, and Steeves. Herter initialed the source text.
2. In telegram 477, November 24, Lodge reported the results of a briefing of French, British, Canadian, and U.S. Representatives at the United Nations by Hammarskjöld on his visit to Laos, his analysis of the situation there, and his plans for the future. (ibid., Central Files, 315/11–2559; included in the microfiche supplement)

3. The account of Hammarskjöld’s mission to Laos and his impressions of the situation there became the source of a disagreement between the IO and FE bureaus which is reported in notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, November 25, which read as follows:

   “Mr. Wilcox stressed the importance of the talk between Lodge and the SYG on Laos and said he was reasonably reassured regarding the latter’s intentions. Mr. Parsons differed with this view and said that the SYG’s analysis was totally different from all other analyses in that it ignored to an extraordinary degree the Communist factors and exploitation. Mr. Reinhardt indicated his agreement. Mr. Parsons suggested later that there was a real need to communicate directly with the SYG, preferably through the Secretary, to give him the full flavor of our interpretation of Communist efforts in Laos. Mr. Berding noted the SYG’s suspicion of our own activities.”

   This disagreement carried over to the next Staff Meeting, November 27, as follows:

   “There was continuing argument between FE and IO on the SYG’s attitude regarding Laos and the necessity for further discussions with him on the actual situation there. Mr. Wilcox emphasized the importance of timing of any moves we make in Laos, such as augmentation of our military training personnel.” (Notes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meetings by John A. Calhoun; Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

4. U.N. doc. S/4236, November 5.
5. (paragraph 5) [of telegram 477 from USUN, November 24. Footnote in the source text.]
6. Paragraph 4. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Quoted from a memorandum from Katherine Lincoln to Chapman, November 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2559; included in the microfiche supplement)